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SUMMARY
System-of-systems (SoS) are becoming increasingly networked in an effort to
provide new capabilities and functions not possible with individual systems. However,
this connectivity also introduces new vulnerabilities to SoS that must be considered.
This thesis addresses this problem by investigating the effects of node failures on SoS
networks, and identifying methods for mitigating the effects of those failures.
Two methods to account for potential SoS network threats are designing for ro-
bustness and designing for resilience. Robustness is a traditional design method,
focused on designing systems that are insensitive to perturbations in operating condi-
tions. This is a passive method, aiming to preemptively handle uncertainty through
careful selection of system design parameters. There is growing interest in taking an
alternative approach to handling uncertainty and potential failures, namely resilience.
Resilience focuses on designing a system that can maintain or recover desired capabil-
ities following a disturbance or threat event. This method takes an active approach to
potential threats, focusing on the ability of a system to adapt to threats. This thesis
hypothesizes that for SoS networks, resilience is a more cost-effective method than
robustness for handling complex operating environments and unexpected threats.
Based on the hypothesis that SoS networks should be designed to be resilient,
a methodology is developed for designing resilient SoS networks. This methodology
includes a capability-based resilience assessment framework, used to quantify SoS re-
silience. A complex networks approach is used to generate potential SoS network
designs, focusing on scale-free and random network topologies, degree-based and ran-
dom rewiring adaptation, and targeted and random node removal threats. Statistical
design methods, specifically response surface methodology, are used to evaluate SoS
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networks and provide an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of po-
tential designs. This analysis focuses on main factor effects and interactions. Linear
regression is then used to model a continuous representation of the network design
space, and determine optimally resilient networks for particular threat types.
The methodology is applied to an information exchange (IE) network model to
demonstrate its use and identify resilient IE networks. IE networks provide a fun-
damental representation of important characteristics and processes occurring on SoS
networks. Results show that optimally resilient network topologies are random for
networks with adaptation, regardless of the threat type. However, the optimally re-
silient adaptation method sharply transitions from being fully random to fully degree-
based as threat randomness increases.
Cost-benefit analysis of resilient and robust SoS networks is performed to test
the hypothesis that a resilience-based approach is more appropriate for SoS than
a robustness-based approach. A military command and control (C2) application is
used for this analysis, due to the need for C2 networks that are resilient in the face
of evolving threats and uncertain operating environments. This analysis identifies
conditions within which resilient C2 networks are more cost-efficient than robust
ones, based on the cost of rewiring network links relative to creating new links.
The primary contributions of this thesis are threefold: (1) a methodology for
designing resilient SoS networks that provides a quantitative and exhaustive method
for exploring and optimizing SoS network resilience, (2) an understanding of how
IE networks should be designed for resilience, with respect to their initial topology
and adaptation method, and (3) cost-benefit analysis comparing resilient and robust
C2 networks showing that the most cost-efficient approach depends on the ratio of
rewired link costs to new link costs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO SOS NETWORKS AND
RESILIENCE
We are becoming increasingly reliant on systems that are networked together to pro-
vide services used in everyday life. The connectivity among these systems enables
them to provide new capabilities and functions not previously possible. These types of
integrated systems are called system-of-systems (SoS). Examples of SoS exist in many
different domains, including intelligently networked devices, critical infrastructures,
and networked military forces.
While networks are critical to the operation of many SoS, they also introduce
vulnerabilities to those SoS. As SoS become more connected, the need to understand
these vulnerabilities and the impacts they may have on SoS performance grows. This
thesis aims to address this problem by investigating SoS vulnerabilities to network
threats and ways to mitigate the effects of those threats.
This chapter motivates the need for SoS research, defines SoS and describes the
role networks play in SoS, discusses challenges faced by SoS networks, and identifies
methods to address challenges related to potential network threats. Two overarching
research questions for this thesis are established from observations of SoS network
challenges, and research objectives formulated to investigate those questions.
1.1 The Need for SoS Research
Advanced information and communications technologies have increased connectivity
between systems with civil and military applications. For example, the continued
development of Internet-capable devices has created a global market focused on the
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Figure 1: High-level view of functionality in the ITS [36].
Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT is based on the idea of connecting systems to-
gether (e.g. building, vehicles, mobile phones) so they can interact with each other to
provide new benefits to individuals, organizations, and societies. Potential applica-
tions include health monitoring, domotics (intelligent homes), and manufacturing [16].
Another example of networked civil systems is the Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS). The ITS program “aims to bring connectivity to transportation through the
application of advanced wireless technology” in an effort to reduce traffic accidents
and improve the efficiency of transportation systems. The vision of the ITS program
is based on a connected vehicle environment, where vehicles, the infrastructure, and
mobile devices are connected to each other [7].
Many military operations also utilize networked systems to achieve information
superiority over constantly evolving threats. This transition towards a connected mil-
itary force stems from the concepts of network-centric warfare (NCW) and network
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enabled capability (NEC) [13, 29, 5]. NCW and NEC aim to support and improve
future military operations by “networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters...”
[13]. These military SoS rely on technologies such as the United States (US) Army’s
Capability Set 13, which allows soldiers to connect to a mobile communications net-
work, enhancing the connectedness of US forces and the situational awareness of sol-
diers. For example, capability Set 13 enables US troops still deployed in Afghanistan
to maintain tactical communications while much of the current communications in-
frastructure is being removed from service [54]. Another technology enabling connec-
tivity is the Nett Warrior system. This system uses smart phones as an “end-user
device” to provide soldiers with a system for accessing and using available networks
[37].
The proliferation of information and communications technologies has created
highly connected SoS able to provide capabilities and functions not previously avail-
able. However, increased reliance on connectivity within SoS creates a need to improve
our understanding of the role networks play in SoS, and potential vulnerabilities they
may introduce to those SoS.
1.2 Defining Characteristics of SoS
It is important to define what an SoS is, specifically differentiating between SoS and
systems. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines a system as “a functionally,
physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdepen-
dent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole” [90]. This definition,
and others [2, 3, 74], focuses on a system being a collection of elements operating
together to perform a desired function. Systems engineering (SE) focuses on the de-
velopment of systems with consideration of the technical and managerial aspects of
their entire life cycle, from conception to operation [6].
Though SE has provided valuable support in the design and analysis of past
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systems, future demands require a transition from focusing on the engineering of
individual systems to the engineering of multiple systems integrated into an SoS. With
respect to this new type of engineering challenge, “there seems to be little argument
concerning present shortcomings in our abilities to deal with difficulties generated by
increasingly complex and interrelated systems of systems” [65]. As such, a field of
study addressing the engineering of SoS has emerged.
SoS engineering (SoSE) is still in an early stage of development, resulting in many
proposed definitions of an SoS. Descriptions of SoS can be found as early as 1956 [50],
with the modern view of SoS being introduced by Eisner, Marciniak, and McMillan in
1991 [42] and Shenhar in 1994 [101]. Maier provides a popular definition of an SoS as
“an assemblage of components which individually may be regarded as systems, and
which possesses two additional properties: operational independence of the compo-
nents and managerial independence of the components” [74]. A more recent definition
provided by Jamshidi emphasizes the networked aspect of SoS. This definition will
be used for the purposes of this thesis:
Definition: ...systems of systems are large-scale integrated systems
which are heterogeneous and independently operable on their own, but
are networked together for a common goal - Jamshidi [60].
The Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems summarizes major devel-
opments in the field and characteristics of SoS [90]. Commonly identified elements
distinguishing an SoS from a system include the following [66]:
 Operational independence of elements - decomposition of an SoS into con-
stituent systems would not render the constituent system inoperable.
 Managerial independence of elements - constituent systems that make up SoS
can be separately acquired and integrated with the managerial function of the
constituent systems remaining independent of the SoS.
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 Evolutionary development - once an SoS is enabled, changes have to be made
to the SoS as more knowledge is acquired and circumstances shift.
 Emergent behavior - properties and behaviors of an SoS develop from the in-
teraction of system elements over time. These properties and events cannot be
predicted or understood from the properties of single elements in the SoS.
 Geographical distribution - SoS are large geographically distributed assem-
blages.
 Interoperability - individual systems are typically designed in isolation, requir-
ing the consideration of interoperability between systems.
 Complementarity - each system should complement the other systems within
the SoS.
 Holism - the whole is the primary and often greater than the sum of its parts.
These characteristics of SoS show several differences between an SoS and a system,
notably the inclusion of multiple systems (which themselves may be complex) in an
SoS and the independence of those individual systems. These differences result in
several distinctions between SE and SoSE, summarized in table 1 (aspects of SoSE
focused on within this thesis are highlighted). The following observation identifies
unique characteristics of SoS that are particularly relevant to this thesis:
Observation: SoS are composed of multiple systems networked together
to achieve a capability not possible with a single system. Complex inter-
actions between systems often result in emergent behavior and require the
consideration of interoperability costs.
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Table 1: Major Drivers of SE and SoSE [50]
SE SoSE
Focus Single complex system Multiple integrated complex systems






Timeframe System life cycle Continuous
Centricity Platform Network
Tools Many Few
1.3 Representing SoS as Information Exchange Networks
Many SoS researchers have established the networked nature of SoS. Some researchers
explicitly include the term “network” in their definition or description of SoS [23, 60,
101]. Other researchers investigate SoS by viewing them as a network [34, 44, 46, 50,
74]. Examples of network approaches to SoS include an SoS management framework
based on network management principles [50], an SoS approach for analyzing civil
transportation networks [34], and the application of SoS methods towards the study
of critical infrastructure (CI) network interdependencies and resilience [44, 46].
Military organizations have also recognized the role that networks play in military
SoS, resulting in the establishment of many network research efforts, such as the
Network Science center at the US Military Academy at West Point. These efforts
seek to improve the effectiveness of the US military through an understanding of how
networks operate and how they can be used within military SoS. For example, the
command and control (C2) of complex military operations can often be viewed as an
SoS composed of systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), satellites, and
data centers, as shown in fig. 2. Representing this SoS as a network allows analysts
to focus on the overall structure of the SoS and the ability of systems to communicate
necessary information throughout a mission.
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Figure 2: Military SoS network example, composed of several individual systems
connected together to share information and coordinate necessary activities [1].
This thesis takes a network approach to the design of SoS, focusing on the structure
of an SoS network and interactions between individual systems. Network nodes are
defined to represent systems within an SoS, with links between nodes representing
connections between systems. Examples of possible network connections include:
 Physical: Internet, transportation, power grid, communication, sensors
 Information: social, organizational, financial
 Decision: command structure, control architectures, organizational
Focusing on SoS networks, no emphasis is placed on the design of individual sys-
tems. Rather, this thesis focuses on how those individual systems should interact
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with each other to provide desired overall SoS capabilities. Since SoS show evolu-
tionary development, this thesis also considers how network structures defining those
interactions should evolve over time.
Since many of the discussed SoS networks enable some sort of information ex-
change among systems, this thesis uses a message passing network as an example
of an SoS network. Examples of information exchange (IE) SoS networks include
Internet-enabled smart devices used to improve the efficiency of everyday activities,
large-scale enterprise organizations using technological networks to distribute infor-
mation, and military C2 networks sharing necessary information to develop situational
awareness. These information-centric SoS capture the fundamental nature of many
SoS networks. Nodes in an IE network represent systems, with links representing
data or message passing links between those systems (e.g., professional relationships
between individuals in an enterprise organization or communications links between
military systems).
1.4 SoS Network Challenges
Networks are essential for the operation of many SoS, particularly those relying on
connectivity to enable information exchange critical to their functionality. However,
the increasing complexity and uncertainty of SoS threats makes it difficult to provide
uninterrupted network connectivity. This difficulty is especially seen in the military
domain, where military missions have transitioned from conventional to asymmetric
warfare. Conventional warfare typically involved long, multi-year missions that gave
military forces time to design systems for the mission at hand. In contrast, asymmet-
ric warfare is characterized by quickly evolving threats that are “unpredictable and
unprecedented”. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are an example of an adver-
sary changing its tactics to create a new threat to soldiers [81]. These unpredictable
threats can result in system failures and unacceptable performance at the SoS level
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[32]. The uncertainty surrounding future threats makes it difficult to predict future
needs of military systems [33]. This problem is made even more difficult by the fact
that increasingly stringent military budgets require SoS to be cost efficient, as well
as effective [81]. Therefore, there is a need to design SoS able handle a variety of
threats, and in the case of an unanticipated threat, be able to recover from it.
Potential threats to SoS networks create a need to understand the effects of system
(i.e., node) failures on the ability of SoS networks to function. However, simply
understanding these impacts is not enough. That understanding should then be
used to identify methods for mitigating the effects of potential system failures. The
National Research Council describes this need in its report on networks and the Army,
claiming “there is a clear need to better understand and design networked systems
that are both robust to variations in the components (including localized failures) and
secure against hostile intent” [79]. This observed need results in the first overarching
research question for this thesis (RQ 1):
Research Question 1: What happens when SoS network nodes fail and
how can we mitigate the effects of those failures?
Answering this question is a difficult task because of the uncertainty regarding
potential threats, as well inherent complexities of SoS networks. One challenge to
answering this question is the fact that SoS are often composed of a mix of legacy
and newly developed systems. This integration of new and old systems may result
in situations where systems are not being used for the purposes they were designed
for [32]. These systems may then be operating outside of designed operating ranges,
increasing their probability of failure. There is also a lack of data characterizing the
performance of new systems, particularly when used in large-scale SoS. This lack
of data “creates a large degree of uncertainty in the reliability of the overall SoS
architecture in fulfilling the required capability needs” [33].
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Another challenge associated with SoS networks is interoperability. Interoperabil-
ity is a key enabler for the successful operation of SoS, allowing heterogeneous systems
to link together and communicate with each other. However, providing high levels
of system interoperability and connectivity requires large investments in system ac-
quisition and operation [35]. The cost of high interoperability requirements creates
a difficult challenge for SoS designers, as they must balance the benefits of increased
system connectivity with the costs of providing that level of interoperability. The fol-
lowing observation summarizes challenges to designing SoS networks and answering
research question one:
Observation: Designing SoS networks able to mitigate the effects of
potential node failures is challenging, because SoS networks face uncertain
and evolving threats, are composed of legacy and new systems, and require
consideration of system interoperability costs.
1.5 Mitigating SoS Network Threats with Resilience
A literature review is performed to identify methods for designing SoS networks ca-
pable of mitigating potential network threats. These methods should be cost effective
because of cost implications related the use of legacy and new systems in SoS, as well
as subsequent interoperability issues for those systems. This review seeks to answer
the second overarching research question for this thesis (RQ 2):
Research Question 2: What is the most cost effective method for de-
signing SoS networks that can mitigate the effects of potential network
threats?
Two promising methods for addressing this issue are designing for robustness and
designing for resilience. These methods focus on designing a system, or SoS, to provide
desired capabilities in a wide range of conditions, in spite of potential component or
system failures.
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A traditional method for handling potential threats is to design a system that is
robust to perturbations in the operating environment. Robustness can be defined in
the context of SoS as the following:
Definition: Robustness , in the context of an SoS here, is the reduced
sensitivity of SoS performance to variations in individual system perfor-
mances that could potentially generate cascading effects across an SoS
network [33].
A similar definition of robustness claims that a system property or capability is robust
if it is invariant to perturbations [15]. Traditional robust design uses probabilistic
methods to identify design parameter settings that make a system insensitive to noise
factors. Various techniques such as Taguchi arrays and robust parameter design
support this approach [78]. Robustness can also be achieved by overdesigning a
system to reduce its probability of failure [15, 81]. This process may involve the use
of high reliability components or materials to ensure performance and reduce system
uncertainty. Excessively high design requirements can also be established to reduce
failure probabilities. Another common method of achieving robustness is through
system or functional redundancy [15]. Redundancy uses backup systems or parallel
functional paths to maintain capabilities in spite of system failures.
Despite a long history of designing for robustness, there are several disadvantages
to taking such an approach for the design of SoS. For one, overdesign and redundancy
are no longer affordable for organizations facing increasingly strict budgets and pres-
sure for cost efficiency [81]. This is especially true when considering SoS, due to the
scale and breadth of systems used in an SoS [109]. The use of legacy systems also
makes it difficult to incorporate robust design, since improving previous designs may
require lengthy and expensive retrofits to previously acquired and active systems.
The independence of systems within an SoS also limits the control SoS designers have
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over the development of component systems [32]. These observations regarding the
applicability of robust design for SoS are summarized as follows:
Observation: Designing for robustness is not as well-suited for SoS ap-
plications as it is for systems design, due to the use of legacy systems and
inability to control the design of new systems used within SoS. Addition-
ally, unknowns threats, complex emergent behaviors, and cost restrictions
make it difficult to limit system failure probabilities.
Instead of focusing on how to design an SoS that is insensitive to failure, a better
approach may be to assume that at some point a failure will occur. In fact, some
researchers acknowledge that eventual failures within an SoS are unavoidable, regard-
less of preparations taken to limit such events, due to their complexities and emergent
behaviors [73]. Therefore, designers should instead focus on how an SoS will adapt
to failures, while using remaining operational systems. This approach focuses on how
to improve the ways in which currently available systems are used within an SoS,
rather than improving the design of the individual systems themselves. Designing
for resilience focuses on the ability to adapt to and recover from potential failures or
disruptions.
Resilience is an active method of handling potential threats, focusing on adapt-
ability and capability recovery. In comparison, robustness is a passive method focused
on preemptively integrating defensive measures into a system to prevent or mitigate
the effects of anticipated threats. Neches defines a resilient system as being “effective
in a wide range of situations, readily adaptable to others through reconfiguration or
replacement, with graceful and detectable degradation of function” [80]. This defini-
tion and others from the literature [53, 73, 104, 112, 81] identify several characteristics
of resilient systems:
 the ability to provide desired capabilities in a variety of conditions
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 graceful and detectable degradation of function or capability when faced with
a disruption
 the ability to maintain or recover degraded capabilities when faced with antic-
ipated and unexpected disruptions in a timely manner
 the ability to adapt to evolving threats and operating conditions, often through
reconfiguration and replacement
 affordable and effective performance
Based on these characteristics, the following definition of resilience (within the
context of SoS) is provided for the purposes of this thesis:
Definition: Resilience is the ability to maintain or recover desired ca-
pabilities in a timely manner when faced with a threat or disturbance,
through well-informed design and adaptation.
Since this definition focuses on the ability to maintain desired capabilities, clarifi-
cation is given regarding the difference between SoS capability and performance. An
SoS capability is defined to be a specific function that an SoS is desired to be able to
provide. SoS capability is time invariant if no changes to the SoS occur. For example,
an IE network may have the capability to transfer C messages per second (i.e., a
throughput rate of C data packets per second). This capability does not change if no
changes are made to the network.
In comparison, SoS performance is defined as a time-varying measure of how well
an SoS is achieving a desired capability. Returning to the IE network example, though
the network is capable of passing C messages per second, at any given time instant t,
the actual observed message transfer rate of the network (i.e., its performance) is some
value y(t) that may slightly differ from C. Figure 3 shows a notional comparison of
SoS performance over time following a single disruption event, for robust and resilient
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Notional comparison of performance for a robust SoS (a) and a resilient SoS
(b), where y(t) is the SoS performance level at time t (e.g., the number of successfully
transfered messages in an IE network). The robust design is more insensitive to the
disruption than the resilient design. However, the resilient design is able to adapt to
the disruption, allowing it to recover nearly all lost performance levels.
SoS designs. The SoS capability for this example would be the initial performance
level seen before the disruption.
Sterbenz et al. describe the need for resilience, claiming that “resilience must
be viewed as an essential design and operational characteristic of future networks in
general, and the Global Internet in particular” [104]. The DoD has also recognized the
importance of resilience, creating an Engineered Resilient Systems (ERS) initiative
focused on developing methods and tools for designing and analyzing resilient systems
[80, 57, 81]. Neches and Madni describe DoD systems as being “called upon to perform
increasingly complex missions in a variety of operational environments. They need
to be rapidly fieldable, affordably adaptable, and effective” [81]. These three design
goals, affordable, adaptable, and effective, form the basis of the ERS initiative and
provide guidelines for the design of resilient systems. Uday and Marais also argue
for a focus on SoS resilience, specifically noting the difficulties of a reliability-based
approach for SoS [109].
A review of the literature identifies designing for resilience as a promising method
to handle potential threats faced by SoS networks, while accounting for inherent
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difficulties associated with SoS design. Based on this review, the following hypothesis
is formed in response to research question two:
Hypothesis 2: Resilience is a more cost effective method than robustness
for designing SoS networks able to mitigate potential threats, due to a
focus on adaption within resilience.
1.6 Summary and Research Objectives
Increased connectivity among systems has created networks of systems, or SoS, able
to deliver more capabilities and functionality than individual systems. However, the
dependence of SoS on networks has created a need to understand what happens when
network nodes fail, and develop methods to design SoS networks able to mitigate the
effects of those failures. This need is reflected in research question one, the first
overarching research question for this thesis.
Two methods for designing such SoS networks are designing for robustness and
resilience. Robustness is a passive approach to handling threats and failures, while
resilience is a more active approach to this problem. Research question two is con-
cerned with which approach is best suited for SoS networks. This thesis hypothesizes
that resilience is a more cost effective approach than robustness for SoS networks,
due to challenging aspects of SoS and the focus on adaptation within resilience (HYP
2).
Three overall research objectives are defined for this thesis. When completed,
these objectives should answer the two overarching research questions for this thesis
(RQs 1 and 2), and test hypothesis two. The first research objective (RO 1) is defined
as follows:
Research Objective 1: Develop a methodology for assessing and de-
signing resilient SoS networks.
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The developed methodology should provide guidelines for quantitatively assessing
resilience, defining potential SoS network designs, and comparing the resilience of
those networks. The methodology should also consider network adaptation, due to
the focus on adaptation within resilience. Therefore, the methodology must meet the
following requirements to satisfy research objective one:
 Assessments of resilience should be quantitative and capability-based.
 Design alternatives and threats should focus on the networked nature of SoS
(i.e., they should focus on network topologies and network threats)
 Network adaptation should be considered as a mechanism for mitigating poten-
tial threats.
The second research objective (RO 2) is to use the developed methodology to
answer research question one, and is defined as follows:
Research Objective 2: Use the developed methodology to determine
the impact of node failures on SoS networks and identify network designs
that are resilient to potential threats.
The third research objective (RO 3) is to answer research question two and test
hypothesis two, by comparing resilient and robust SoS network designs as follows:
Research Objective 3: Perform cost-benefit analysis on resilient and
robust SoS network designs, to compare resilience-based and robustness-
based approaches to designing SoS networks.
The primary contributions of this thesis are threefold. First, a methodology is
developed for designing resilient SoS networks that expands on previously existing
methods for evaluating resilience and exploring adaptive network designs. Second,
16
the methodology is used to investigate and optimize the resilience of adaptive IE
networks facing potential network threats, contributing to our understanding of how
network adaptation can be used to improve resilience. Third, cost-benefit analysis of
resilient and robust military SoS networks identifies scenarios in which one approach
may be preferred over another, advancing our knowledge of the benefits of resilience
relative to robustness.
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of relevant work that has been done to ad-
dress the design of resilient SoS networks. This review is used to identify significant
gaps in the literature, as well as provide background knowledge of relevant concepts
and methods. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodology developed by this
thesis. Chapter 4 describes a framework for assessing system resilience, used in the
first step of the developed methodology. Chapter 5 describes a complex networks
approach for generating SoS network alternatives, used in the second step of the
methodology. Chapter 6 describes the use of statistical design methods for evaluat-
ing SoS network alternatives, used in the third and final step of the methodology.
Chapter 7 uses the developed methodology to explore and optimize the space of po-
tential SoS network designs. Chapter 8 performs a cost-benefit analysis comparing a
resilient SoS network design to robust designs. Chapter 9 summarizes the developed
methodology, results from implementation of the methodology, contributions of this
thesis, and potential extensions of this work.
1.7 Representative Test Problem: IE Network Model
An IE network model is created as a test problem to provide a platform for testing
various steps in the methodology as it is developed. This test problem focuses on
message passing within a network, due to the importance of information exchange
in SoS networks. The model is based on a message passing network model used to
study the robustness of organizational networks [38] (discussed in section 2.3.3), and
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is adapted to consider network adaptation as a means for resilience.
The model represent systems within an SoS as network nodes, and communication
paths between systems as network links. Nodes are defined as active or inactive
to represent system failures or attacks. All nodes begin as active in a simulation.
Nodes become inactive and are removed from the network if they fail or are attacked
throughout a simulation. Links connected to inactive nodes are also removed.
The model represents information exchange between systems through message
passing between nodes. Every active node has a probability, µ, of generating a new
message at every time step in a simulation of the model (i.e., µ defines the message
generation rate of a node). The message generation rate of the entire network is
defined by µN , where N is the size of the network. Every generated message, Mij,
has a source node i, the node that created the message, and a target node j, the node
that the source node will try to send the message to. Messages represent information
required by the target node to perform its necessary functions. For example, a message
may contain the location of a downed soldier in a military search-and-rescue scenario.
The target node in this example may be a helicopter tasked with retrieving the soldier.
The message generation rate defines how demanding the network task environment
is. High values of µ represent networks that generate and require a large amount of
information exchange to properly function. Low values of µ represent networks that
generate a small amount of information and can perform well with limited information
exchange.
The model is simulated from an initial simulation time, t0, to a final time, tfinal.
Simulations progress in discrete time steps, t0, t1, . . . , tfinal, where each step is arbi-
trarily defined to represent one second in time. Time steps can be defined to represent
any time length desired. The message generation rate is adjusted throughout a simu-
lation to ensure that the expected number of messages created each time step by an
entire network stays constant as nodes are removed. The message generation rate at
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where µ0 is the initial message generation rate, N0 is the initial number of active
nodes (i.e., the initial network size), and Nt is the number of active nodes at time t.
Message targets are selected uniformly at random from the set of active nodes in
the network excluding the source node, such that the probability of selecting node j





Message target selection can be adapted to give preference to certain nodes in the
network using a weighting function, such as the softmax function. The softmax
function is a generalization of the logistic function, and is commonly used in game
theory for determining the probability that a player selects a given action based on its
expected reward. Using this function, the probability of selecting node j as a target,





where dij is the geodesic distance between the source node i and possible target
node j and τ is the temperature parameter. Variation of the temperature parameter
defines how far information must generally travel in the network to maintain system
functionality. High temperatures (τ →∞) would give all nodes the same probability
of being selected (i.e., target selection is uniformly random), representing networks
where information does not have to travel far in the network. Low temperatures
(τ → 0+) would give preference to nodes far from the source node, representing
networks where information has to travel far in the network.
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Figure 4: Example of message sending in a network with N = 100 nodes. The source
node, target node, and shortest path between those nodes are highlighted. Node sizes
are scaled by degree (i.e., number of incident links).
Messages are sent from their source node to their target node using the shortest
path in the network, as shown in fig. 4. Each time step in a simulation of the model,
every message is forwarded from its current node position to the next neighboring
node in the shortest path from it to the target node of the message. Nodes are assumed
to have complete knowledge of the current network topology and set of active nodes,
enabling them to determine the shortest path to a target node at any given time. A
message is lost if no path exists between the source node and target node, the target
node becomes inactive before receiving the message, or a node becomes inactive while
holding the message.
The capability, C, of a network is defined by its ability to receive messages over
time, such that
C = µ×N × V, (4)
where µ × N is the expected number of messages generated by the network in a
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given time step and V is the value of each message (assuming all messages have the
same value). The expected number of generated messages determines an IE network’s
capability because the purpose of an IE network is to enable information exchange
through message passing. Therefore, the more messages a network is expected to
generate, and ultimately receive, the more capable the network is. This capability
definition assumes that messages are eventually able to reach their target location in
a normal operating scenario.
The performance, y(t), of a network (i.e., the network’s ability to provide its
desired capability) is then defined as the total number of messages actually received





where Ri(t) is the number of messages received by node i at time t.
Time sensitivity is also considered in determining IE network performance, through
a time sensitivity parameter ∆, where 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1. For some networks, the time taken
to receive a message does not affect the value, or usefulness, of the message. These
networks are referred to as time insensitive IE networks. However, most SoS networks
are used to exchange information that is time sensitive. Returning to the search-and-
rescue example, if the downed soldier is in a hostile environment, the time taken to
rely a message containing the location of the soldier to a rescue helicopter will strongly
affect the benefit gained from receiving that message. Information exchange in an
enterprise organization is also likely to be time sensitive. Many organizations depend
on up to date information to make decisions regarding day-to-day processes. If re-
quired information takes too long to arrive, decisions may be made using inaccurate
or irrelevant data.
IE network performance, y(t), is adjusted to account for time sensitivity by defin-
ing the value of a received message as ∆d, where ∆ is a time sensitivity parameter
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and d is the travel time for the message (i.e., the time between when the message was









where dij is the travel time for the jth message received by the ith node at time t.
Since messages travel one “hop” in the network at each time step, message travel
time is equivalent to the geodesic distance between the source and target node of a
message if no changes occur to the network while the message travels. Setting ∆ = 1
makes eq. (6) equivalent to eq. (5). Decreasing ∆ increases the importance of message
travel time, i.e., decreasing ∆ increases message time sensitivity. Therefore, if ∆ < 1,
messages with longer travel times contribute less to network performance than those
with short travel times. Network capability, C, is also adjusted for message travel
time by defining the value of a message to be V = ∆〈d〉, where 〈d〉 is the network
average path length (i.e., the expected travel time of a message).
Figure 5 shows the effect of changing ∆ on IE network performance, for various
message travel times. For ∆ = 1, the network performance y(t) = 100 regardless of
message travel times (there are 100 nodes in the network and each node receives one
message at time t). As ∆ is decreased from one, network performance decreases since
each message has a travel time d > 0. For a given ∆ < 1, as message travel time
increases, network performance decreases. Equation (6) therefore captures time sensi-
tivity by reducing the value of messages as travel time increases. Table 2 summarizes
important model parameters used by the IE network model.
This model of information exchange in a network is simple enough to be computa-
tionally inexpensive and scaled to large SoS networks, but includes enough dynamic
processes to study fundamental behaviors of those networks. The model also cap-
tures the primary characteristics of SoS, and is therefore used as a representative test
problem for investigating SoS network resilience. The following summarizes several
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Figure 5: Effect of changing ∆ on network performance, for a network with N = 100
nodes, where each node successfully receives one message at time t, and each message
has a travel time specified by d.
Table 2: IE network model parameters
Parameter Description
N Initial network size
L Initial number of links in a network
[t0 tfinal] Simulated scenario time interval (in seconds)
µ Message generation rate
∆ Time sensitivity
SoS characteristics found in the model:
 The network is composed of many individual systems (i.e., nodes) that interact
with each other.
 These systems are networked together to quickly disseminate necessary infor-
mation, providing a level of information exchange not possible with individual
systems.
 Emergent behavior likely exists, due to potential complexities of the network
structure, making it difficult for analysts to predict the behavior of the overall
network from properties of individual systems.




This chapter reviews the literature to identify existing methods that may be used
to design resilient SoS networks, which may provide an answer to research question
two. This review also seeks to determine the current state of our understanding
regarding network resilience, in an attempt to answer research question one. This
review focuses on work from three research domains: SoSE, resilience engineering,
and complex networks.
2.1 SoSE Methods for Resilience
Uday and Marais develop a method called stand-in redundancy to improve SoS re-
silience [109]. Their method assumes a hierarchical representation of an SoS, based on
a functional decomposition of desired capabilities. The lowest level of this hierarchy
represents the single-system functions within the SoS (e.g. a UAV providing imaging
of an assigned surveillance area). The middle level represents multi-system capabil-
ities, C. Multi-system capabilities are those achieved through the use of multiple
single-system functions (e.g., imaging and target identification through the collabo-
ration of a UAV and satellite). The highest level represents the overall SoS capability.
Using this functional decomposition of an SoS operation, the authors apply com-
binatorial optimization to re-task existing systems to missing functions. Following
an attack or system failure, some previously satisfied functions may no longer have
a system assigned to them. Re-assigning existing systems to cover those functions
allows the SoS to continue its operation and provide its desired capabilities. This
optimization is performed with respect to constraints on target levels of performance
and reliability for each capability. Performance and reliability levels are calculated
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using estimates of system reliability and the conditional probability that systems are
able to provide their functions given that they are fully operable.
Researchers have also developed methods to model SoS networks and account
for the interdependencies within them. Filippini and Silva [46] provide a framework
for analyzing SoS network resilience based functional dependencies among systems.
Eusgeld, Nan, and Dietz discuss modeling alternatives for SoS, focusing on inter-
dependent critical infrastructures [44]. Davendralingam and DeLaurentis develop a
method for architecting an SoS that is robust to perturbations [33].
Limitations of SoSE Methods for Resilience
The stand-in redundancy approach to SoS resilience is quantitative and capability-
based. The method is also adaptive, through re-tasking of component systems to
necessary functions following system failures. However, this method assumes the
existence of a central controller able to optimize and re-task every component system
within an SoS network. SoS networks are often composed of independently operated
and managed systems, making it difficult to provide a single entity with global control
of the SoS network. This method also assumes that level of performance can be
determined through probabilistic assumptions of system and function reliabilities.
These reliabilities are not easy to obtain, especially given the many interdependencies
and emergent behavior of SoS networks. A more thorough method would simulate
the performance of the SoS and consider the impacts of the network structure on that
performance.
Other work on SoS resilience is also limited in its applicability towards the research
objectives for this thesis. The framework presented by Filippini and Silva has limited
considerations of adaptation as a response to a disturbance. Work by Eusgeld et
al. focuses on the representation and modeling of network interdependencies, but
does not offer suggestions for how to account for those interdependencies and design
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resilient SoS. Work by Davendralingam and DeLaurentis focuses on SoS robustness
rather than resilience.
2.2 Resilience Engineering Methods for Resilience
Resilience engineering is a growing field of research that has seen much progress
in recent years. Interest in resilience as a concept of its own, separate from safety,
reliability, and robustness, stems from the observation that today’s operating environ-
ments are becoming increasingly complex and volatile. The uncertainty surrounding
possible threats to critical systems requires system designers to develop systems that
can not only absorb disturbances, but also adapt to them, effectively and affordably
[80]. Several frameworks for resilience assessment and design exist in the literature.
This section discusses the most relevant frameworks with respect to designing SoS
networks.
A System Resilience Framework
Vugrin et al. propose a capability-based framework for assessing the resilience of
critical infrastructure and economic systems [112]. Their framework consists of two
main components: a quantitative method for measuring the impact of disturbances
on performance and recovery costs, and a qualitative method for assessing important
aspects of a system that determine its resilience.
The authors propose quantitative metrics for resilience using measurements of
system performance over time. They consider resilience costs through measurement
of recovery effort over time. Figure 6 graphically shows their interpretation of system





[TSP (t)− SP (t)]dt, (7)
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Figure 6: (a) System performance and (b) recovery effort as a function of time [112].
where TSP is the targeted system performance, SP is the system performance, t0 is
the time of the disruption event, and tf is the time when system recovery is complete.





where RE is the recovery effort. The authors propose two additional metrics that
focus on a weighted sum of the systemic impact and total recovery effort.
Their framework identify three qualitative system capacities that determine sys-
tem resilience: absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and restorative capacity. These
capacities account for the dynamic nature of resilience and the role recovery speed
plays in system resilience. The absorptive capacity “is the degree to which a system
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can automatically absorb the impacts of system perturbations and minimize conse-
quences with little effort.” This capacity is endogenous to the system. System re-
dundancy is described as a method of improving a system’s absorptive capacity. The
adaptive capacity “is the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization
for recovery of system performance levels.” This capacity is an endogenous, dynamic
capability of a system. System replacement is described as a method of improving
a system’s adaptive capacity. The restorative capacity “is the ability of a system
to be repaired easily.” System repairs are typically performed by an external entity,
therefore making this capacity exogenous to a system. System health monitoring is
described as a method of improving a system’s restorative capacity.
The authors apply their framework to assess the resilience of critical infrastructure
systems to an earthquake. However, they only show qualitative results describing the
ability of emergency and postal/shipping services to handle an earthquake disruption.
Limitations of the System Resilience Framework
This framework addresses many of the desired aspects of resilience. However, the
framework is limited in its ability to quantitatively compare the resilience of multi-
ple system designs. Integrating system performance and cost with respect to time
provides quantitative values for comparison, but makes it difficult to differentiate be-
tween systems that may have similar integrated values yet vastly different dynamic
behaviors. For example, consider two systems designs, one that shows high initial
performance degradation but quickly recovers nearly all of that performance over
time, and another that shows no initial performance degradation but slowly loses
performance over time (see fig. 7). Integration may assign similar values of resilience
to these two systems, despite differences in their response to a disruption.
The concept of resilience capacities begins to address this issue, but defined in
a qualitative way. Turnquist and Vugrin extend this framework with a stochastic
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Figure 7: Notional comparison of system performance, y(t), for two systems with
different responses to a disruption. The recovering system (solid line) shows a large
initial degradation in performance following the disruption, but is able to quickly re-
cover most of the lost performance. The degrading system (dashed line) shows a slow,
gradual decline in performance following the disruption, but is not able to recover any
lost performance over time. These performance data show different responses to a
disruption but have notionally similar integration values.
optimization model (applied to infrastructure distribution networks), but only con-
sider three methods of improving resilience: increasing distribution center capacities
(improving system capabilities), providing backup distribution centers (redundancy),
and investing in faster recovery (improving system recovery capabilities) [108]. These
methods focus on overdesigning systems and providing redundancy, ignoring potential
adaptation methods.
TIRESIAS
TIRESIAS is a resilience framework proposed by Balchanos in his dissertation inves-
tigating complex dynamic system resilience [20]. The core of the framework is a set
of capability-based metrics proposed for quantified resilience comparisons between
potential system designs [20, 18, 19]. These metrics are used to provide a detailed
characterization of the dynamic aspects of system performance following a disruption
event. This characterization relies on measurements of system performance over time
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Figure 8: Notional diagram of system performance over time used for quantitative
resilience metrics [19].
potential designs. Using fig. 8 as a reference, the ability of a system to absorb a dis-
turbance is captured by the average degradation rate, ADR, and the time-averaged











where MC0 is the original desired mission capability or performance level, MCmin is
the minimum mission performance level, tmin is the time at which MCmin is reached,
and t0 is the time at which the disturbance occurs.
The ability of a system to restore capabilities lost due to a disturbance is captured











[MCSS −MC(t)] dt. (12)
where t1 is the start time of the system recovery.
Limitations of TIRESIAS
Balchanos et al. demonstrate the use of this framework on a chilled water network
[18] and a networked unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) surveillance simulation [19].
However, both of these demonstrations focus on assessing system resilience, rather
designing resilient SoS networks. As such, they provide limited guidance as to how SoS
networks should be structurally defined, and how adaptation should be incorporated
to achieve resilience.
ResiliNets
Sterbenz et al. propose the ResiliNets framework for assessing and designing resilient
networks [104]. Their framework is based on a set of qualitative axioms (e.g. faults
are inevitable) and a two-phase strategy for resilience called D2R2 + DR. This strat-
egy proposes that a resilient network be designed with the ability to defend itself
(passively and actively), detect disruptions, perform remediation actions, and recover
its lost capabilities. This phase defines the D2R2 part of the strategy. The system
would then diagnose what went wrong and refine itself to evolve and enhance re-
silience, defining the DR part of the strategy. The authors define a set of qualitative
enablers and desired behaviors for resilience. Resilience enablers include connectivity,
redundancy, and diversity. Resilience behaviors include self-organization, adaptabil-
ity, and evolvability. A resilience state space is proposed for the analysis of system
resilience, tracking the operational state of a system and its ability to provide desired
service parameters (see fig. 9).
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Figure 9: Resilience state space for the analysis of a system’s resilience following a
disruption event [104].
Sterbenz et al. apply the ResiliNets framework to study the resilience of var-
ious Internet topologies to node failures in [103]. They show results using network
structural properties (i.e., largest component size and clustering coefficient) as service
parameters and link failure probability as the operational state for several Internet
service provider topologies. They also show results using simulated packet delivery
ratio (service parameter) as a function of node and link failures (operational state).
Nodes and links are removed from networks in a malicious or non-malicious man-
ner. Malicious disruptions remove nodes or links based on degree and betweenness.
Non-malicious disruptions remove nodes or links uniformly at random. Area-based
disruptions are also modeled, where failures occur in a geographic region surrounding
an initial point. Results show that targeted attacks are more disruptive to service
parameters than random failures, and it is important to consider physical and logical
networks when evaluating Internet resilience.
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Limitations of ResiliNets
The ResiliNets framework provides a method for comparing the resilience of poten-
tial network designs. This framework can be quantitative and capability-based, as
demonstrated by use of simulated packet delivery ratio for measuring provided net-
work service. However, ResiliNets is mostly limited to being an assessment framework,
with conceptual suggestions for methods to improve network resilience. Additionally,
the work by Sterbenz et al. in [103] focuses on assessing the resilience of static network
topologies without considering how a network might adapt to improve its resilience.
System resilience factor
Francis and Bekera expand on other resilience metrics by incorporating a recovery
time factor to capture temporal aspects of resilience [48]. They define a system
resilience factor, ρi, as follows






where Sp is a recovery time factor, Fr is the recovered system performance level, Fd
is the degraded system performance level, and F0 is the original performance level.
They also account for uncertainty in event occurrences through consideration of event
probabilities. Hence, their method can be seen as a resilience-based risk assessment.
Limitations of the system resilience factor
The system resilience factor enables design comparisons and aids decision-making
processes by providing a single value for system resilience. However, their resilience
metric does not consider the intermediate variation of system performance during
recovery or the ability to adapt to multiple disruptions over time. There is also limited
guidance on how to determine recovered performance levels and recovery time in the
presence of volatile data.
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2.3 Complex Network Resilience
Given the importance of networks to SoS, network methods for resilience are also
reviewed. This review focuses on work from the field of complex networks. These
studies are motivated by the observation that many complex, natural networks display
a surprising amount of resilience to node failures. These failures, often random in
occurrence, rarely destabilize networks to the point of total failure. Researchers aim
to understand this inherent resilience of complex networks and identify conditions
that leave networks vulnerable to failures.
This section begins with definitions of basic network terminology, followed by an
introduction to the field of complex networks. The section concludes with a review
of complex network methods for resilience that are relevant to this thesis.
2.3.1 Network Terminology
A network is a set of connected items. These items are known as nodes or vertices,
and the connections between them as links or edges. The terms network and graph are
often used interchangeably, with networks typically being defined by nodes and links,
and graphs being defined by vertices and edges. Networks are typically associated
with real systems while graphs are simply mathematical representations composed of
vertices and edges [14]. Basic network terms are defined to clarify concepts commonly
used in network research. A more detailed discussion of basic graph theory concepts
is given by Barabási in his introductory book to Network Science [21].
The total number of nodes in a network is denoted by N . The set of all nodes in a
network is denoted by N = {n1, n2, . . . , nN}, where ni is the ith node in the network.
The total number of links in a network is denoted by L. The density, D, of a network





N (N − 1)
. (14)
Links in a network can be undirected or directed. An undirected link represents a
two-way connection (i.e. the connection runs in both directions), while a directed link
represents a one-way connection. An arrow pointing in the direction of the connection
typically designates the direction of a directed link. A research collaboration network
is an example of an undirected network, since research collaborations are typically bi-
lateral partnerships. The WWW is an example of a directed network, since hyperlinks
uni-directionally take a user from one web page to another. Two nodes i and j are
neighbors if they are connected by a link lij. For a directed network, the link lij refers
to a link from node i to node j.
The degree, k, of a node is the number of links connected to, or incident on, that
node. For directed networks, the in-degree of a node (number of incoming links) is
distinguished from its out-degree (number of outgoing links). The degree of a node
(researcher) in a research collaboration network is the number of direct collaborators
that node has. The out-degree of a node (webpage) in the WWW is the number of
webpages that node directly links to. The degree of node i in an undirected network
is denoted by ki. For a directed network, the in-degree of node i is denoted by k
in
i







The average degree of a network is the average of node degrees over the entire
























The average degree of a network is useful for providing a general description
of the network. However, average degree is insufficient when considering networks
with skewed proportions of high or low node degrees. The degree distribution, pk,
of a network is a more descriptive property for many real networks. The degree
distribution describes the probability that a randomly chosen node in a network has
a degree of k. Equivalently, pk is the fraction of nodes in the network with a degree





where Nk is the number of nodes with degree k. Since pk is a probability, the degree
distribution sums to one (i.e.
∑∞
k=1 pk = 1).
Networks are often represented by adjacency matrices. The adjacency matrix, A,
of a network of size N is an N ×N matrix whose elements are
Aij =

1 if there is a link from node i to node j
0 if there is not a link from node i to node j.
The adjacency matrix of an undirected network is symmetric (i.e., Aij = Aji).
Links in a network can be unweighted or weighted. A weighted link has a weight, wij,
associated with itself. Weighted networks are used to represent networks where links
have varied weights or strengths, such as a communication network where each link
has some data transmission or bandwidth capability. The elements of an adjacency
matrix for a weighted network are the weights of that link (i.e., Aij = wij).
Path lengths within a network are often used to describe the structure and assumed
capabilities of a network. A path in a network is a route used to get from one node to
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another, traveling along links in the network. The geodesic distance between nodes i
and j, dij, is the shortest path between those nodes (i.e. the path that uses the least
number of links). The geodesic distance between two unconnected nodes (i.e. two
nodes that have no path between them) is infinite. Breadth first search (BFS) is a
commonly used algorithm to determine the geodesic distance between two nodes [21].
BFS calculates the distance between two nodes by identifying the direct neighbors
of a starting node, then the neighbors of those neighbors, and continuing until the
target node is reached.
The diameter, dmax, of a network is the largest geodesic distance between any two




The average path length of a network, 〈d〉, is the average geodesic distance between all
possible node pairs in a network. Average path length is also known as characteristic
path length. Average path length can be used as a measure of network efficiency.






Since average path length diverges for networks with unconnected nodes, the in-
verse average path length is also used to represent network efficiency. Inverse average











The centrality of a node is useful for identifying how important it is to the con-









where σjk is the number of shortest paths between nodes j and k and σjk(i) is the
number of shortest paths between j and k that passes through i. A similar calculation
for edge betweenness centrality, be, can be defined using the number of paths that
includes an edge e.
A network is connected if a path exists between every pair of nodes in the network.
A connected component of a network is a subset of nodes in the network that is itself
connected, but would no longer be so if any other node was added to the subset. A
network composed of two components could become connected by the addition of a
properly placed link. A giant component is a component that contains a large fraction
of the nodes in a network [i.e., a component whose size is O(N)]. The connectance
of a network is the ratio of links in the network to the possible number of links in
the network (i.e., L
N
). Connectance is commonly used in ecological network studies
[40, 41].
A regular network is a network where every node has the same degree. A complete
network is a network where every node is connected to each other, such that









2.3.2 Background on Complex Networks
Many of the recent advances in network research, including those related to network
resilience, focus on real world networks. These studies often take a statistical approach
to modeling the evolution of real network topologies and understanding dynamic
processes occurring on those networks. This research is commonly referred to as
complex networks research, or network science. A 2005 NRC report on networks
and the Army defined network science as, “the study of network representations
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of physical, biological, and social phenomena leading to predictive models of these
phenomena” [79]. The growing presence of networks across multiple research domains
has led this field to be highly interdisciplinary, applying methods and data from
various research areas. Several review papers summarize influential work in complex
networks research [85, 8, 24].
There is no clear definition of what a complex network is. Alderson loosely defines
a complex network as a “network system with (1) a large number of components
(complexity of size), (2) intricate relationships among components (complexity of
interconnection), or (3) many degrees of freedom in the possible actions of components
(complexity of interaction)” [14]. Complex networks can also be defined as networks
with properties found in real world networks [67], such as the “small-world” property
[113] and a power-law degree distribution [22]. These properties result in non-trivial
network topologies not found in simple networks such as regular, latticed, and random
networks. Boccaletti et al. add the consideration of network evolution, defining
complex networks as “networks whose structure is irregular, complex and dynamically
evolving in time” [24]. For this work, a complex network is defined as a network
displaying properties and processes seen in real world networks, with a structure that
evolves over time.
There are many examples of complex networks. Four categories of commonly
studied complex networks are: social, information, technological, and biological net-
works [85]. Examples of complex networks (see fig. 10) include networks of terrorist
interactions [21], research collaborations [83, 82, 84, 86], relationships between finan-
cial institutions [99], the World Wide Web (WWW) [9], airline networks [17], the
Internet [45], and metabolic networks [63].
Complex networks research differs from traditional network research in three pri-
mary ways: (1) it focuses on real world networks rather than simple networks with
trivial topologies; (2) it considers the evolution of a network’s structure over time; and
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(a) (b)
Figure 10: Network representations of (a) an international financial network [99] and
(b) the Internet (links connect IP addresses) [4].
(3) it looks beyond the structural topology of a network to consider coevolutionary
network dynamics [89].
The increasing availability of data characterizing real networks has enabled re-
searchers to move beyond studies of simple, abstract networks to studies of complex,
naturally occurring networks. However, visualizing these large networks (which can
have up to millions of nodes), and attempting to derive meaningful insights from their
corresponding data is a difficult process, requiring new methods and techniques for
network analysis. A statistical approach enables researchers to study the structure
of a large network without needing to clearly visualize it. A traditional approach
might ask, “What does the network look like?” A statistical approach may alter the
question to be, “What are the statistical properties of the network, and how can they
be used to characterize the structure of the network?” Many network scientists use
a network’s degree distribution [22], diameter [10], and average path length [110] to
characterize its structure.
Complex networks research also aims to understand how networks evolve over
time. Previous research often viewed network topologies as static, limiting insights
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to be focused on the current state of a network. Focusing on the evolution of a
network provides an understanding of the processes driving the formation the network,
enabling new insights into the behaviors and dynamics of complex systems.
A growing area of research in complex networks considers coevolutionary behaviors
of networks [52]. Dynamic processes occurring on a network often affect the evolution
of a network’s structure (e.g., bottlenecks preventing information information flow in a
network may result in topological changes to alleviate those bottlenecks) . In turn, the
evolution of a network’s structure often affects process occurring on the network (e.g.,
topological changes to alleviate bottlenecks may have unintended consequences on
connectivity in a different part of the network). The study of coevolutionary networks
jointly considers the dynamics on a network (processes occurring on the network) and
the dynamics of a network (evolution of the network’s structure). Network resilience
can be considered a coevolutionary network dynamic, since it considers changes to a
network’s structure following node failures or attacks, how those changes affect the
ability of a network to provide desired capabilities, and how a network adapts its
structure to recover lost capabilities.
Complex Network Topologies
Many real, complex networks have been found to display a scale-free structure, or
topology [22, 45, 63, 8, 85]. Finding structural similarities between these networks
is particularly interesting, since they represent many different types of systems (e.g.
biological, information, and social systems) that would seem to be controlled by
different formation processes and dynamics. Engineered systems and SoS, such as
C2 networks, have also been found to have scale-free topologies [61, 51, 106]. Due to
their prevalence in real world networks, many studies of complex network resilience
focus on scale-free networks.
Scale-free networks have a degree distribution that follows a power law, such that
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the probability, pk, that a node has a degree of k, scales as
pk ∼ k−γ, (24)
where the degree exponent, γ, typically falls in the range of 2 < γ < 3. This class of
networks is heterogeneous with respect to node degree, as they contain many nodes
with a degree lower than the average and several nodes with a degree much higher
than the average. These highly connected nodes act as network hubs, efficiently
providing connectivity within the network. For this reason, scale-free networks can
also be described as hub and spoke networks. The term scale-free refers to the lack
of an intrinsic scale regarding the expected degree of a randomly chosen node in the
network, resulting from the large range in node degrees seen in scale-free networks
[21].
A commonly used model for generating scale-free networks is the Barabási-Albert
(BA) preferential attachment model [22]. The model begins with a small network
of size m0, with links arbitrarily assigned such that each node has at least one link
(this thesis assumes the m0 nodes are fully connected). A new node is then added
to the network at each time step. Each new node links with m existing nodes in the
network, where the probability,
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where N(t) is the size of the network at the current time step t and ki is the degree
of node i. This model includes two important network mechanisms, growth and
preferential attachment, hypothesized by Barabási and Albert to be driving forces
in the formation of scale-free networks. Network growth is captured by growing the
network from size m0 to N , one node at a time. Preferential attachment is captured by
the “preference” a new node gives to existing highly connected nodes when selecting
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who to link with.
In contrast, a random network is one where each node pair is independently linked
with the same probability p, creating a topological structure that appears to be truly
random. Random networks are also referred to as Erdős-Rényi (ER) networks, due
to the influential work of Erdős and Rényi establishing a branch of mathematics
focused on these networks [21]. Random networks have a degree distribution that











where λ = 〈k〉 in the limit of large N . The degree distribution of a random network
peaks at 〈k〉. This class of networks is homogeneous with respect to node degree, as
most nodes have a degree near the average. This homogeneity results in few, if any,
network hubs.
A model for generating random networks is the G(N,L) model, referred to as the
ER model (for its creators Erdős and Rényi) within this thesis [43]. The ER model
randomly links L node pairs in a network of size N . This model does not include
network growth or preferential attachment mechanisms, since the network begins with
all N nodes and randomly adds L links to the network. Figure 11 shows a notional
comparison of scale-free and random networks.
2.3.3 Complex Network Methods for Resilience
Many studies of complex network resilience expand on the work of Albert, Jeong,
and Barabási characterizing the effects of targeted and random node removal on
scale-free and random networks [10] (note the correction submission for their original
paper [11]). The authors consider a random network, created using the ER model
[43], and scale-free networks, created using the BA preferential attachment model [22]
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Figure 11: Comparison of theoretical degree distributions for scale-free (power law)
and random networks (Poisson) with 〈k〉 = 10, shown with (a) linear and (b) log-log
scales. Comparison of (c) random and (d) scale-free network topologies with 〈k〉 = 3
[21].
and data of the Internet and WWW. Targeted attacks are simulated by removing the
highest degree nodes from a network. Node degrees are recalculated following each
node removal. These attacks represent a malicious adversary seeking to damage a
network by targeting specific nodes. Random failures in a network are simulated by
removing nodes uniformly at random. Network resilience is quantified by tracking the
changes network structural properties as a function of the fraction of nodes removed,
f .
Results show that the average path length (referred to by the authors as the
network diameter) for random and scale-free networks stays fairly constant with f
for random node removals. However, average path length is slightly higher for random
networks than scale-free. The increased resilience of scale-free networks to random
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Figure 12: The effect of attack (targeted) and failure (random) on average path
length, d, as a function of the fraction of nodes removed, f , for (a) random (E) and
scale-free (SF) networks [10].
node removals is due to the heterogeneity of scale-free networks; since most nodes have
a relatively low degree, randomly removing a node has little probability of greatly
affecting the connectivity of the network. Since most nodes in random networks
have similar degrees, randomly removing a node in these networks has more impact
on network connectivity than with scale-free networks. Figure 12 shows results for
scale-free and random network resilience, measured by average path length.
Switching from random to targeted node removals shows no substantial change
in network resilience for random networks. These networks are insensitive to node
removal type because of their node homogeneity. In comparison, the average path
length of scale-free networks drastically increases with f for targeted node removals.
Scale-free networks are not resilient to targeted attacks because they contain highly
connected network “hubs,” which have a significant impact on overall network con-
nectivity when removed.
The authors also consider the effect of node removals on the size of the largest
component and the average size of isolated components. Isolated components are
all components other than the largest one. These results explain the fragmentation
process of networks as f is increased. The primary conclusion of the study is the
observation that scale-free networks are more tolerant to random failures than random
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networks, but more susceptible to targeted attacks.
Broder et al. perform a similar study in which they evaluate the size of the
largest component of the WWW network following removal of high degree nodes [27].
In contrast to Albert et al., they conclude that scale-free networks are resilient to
targeted attacks, since significant damage to the giant component does not occur until
all nodes with in-degree of five or higher are removed. Newman explains that there
is no conflict between these results because of the highly skewed degree distribution
for the WWW data used by Broder et al. [85]. This distribution results in the
fraction of nodes with in-degree higher than five being a small portion of the overall
network, meaning that only a small fraction of nodes had to be attacked before the
giant component collapsed.
Several other studies investigate the resilience and robustness of real and modeled
complex networks. Jeong et al. examine protein networks, correlating the degree of
a node to the phenotypic effect of removing that node [62]. Dunne et al. examine
the resilience of food web networks (i.e., species predator-prey networks), and show
that networks with higher connectance are more robust to highest degree and random
node removal [41]. Newman et al. study the prevention of a virus outbreak on email
networks, and show that selectively protecting about 10% of the nodes in an email
network can provide near immunity to a global virus outbreak [87]. Dodds et al.
focus on information exchange in an organizational network subject to information
overload (congestion) and node removal [38].
Holme et al. investigate the vulnerability of two real networks and several mod-
eled networks to node and edge removal [59]. Nodes are removed based on their
initial degree (ID), recalculated degree (RD), initial betweenness (IB), and recalcu-
lated betweenness (RB). Recalculation is done following every node removal step.
Similar targeting strategies are used to remove edges from a network. The degree
of an edge ke connecting nodes i and j is defined by the product of the degrees of
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Figure 13: Comparison of targeting strategies applied to the Watts-Strogatz small-
world network model. Edges are removed from the network following the images
moving down each column, beginning with the top left image for each targeting
strategy [58].
the connected nodes (i.e., ke = kikj). The four edge targeting strategies are shown
in fig. 13. Their support previous claims that random networks are more robust to
targeted node removal than scale-free networks.
Limitations of Complex Network Methods for Resilience
These studies of network resilience provide significant insights into the ability of
complex networks to maintain desired structural properties following node or edge
removal. However, several assumptions made in these studies limit their use towards
the design and understanding of resilient SoS networks.
One limitation is the use of network structural properties to assess resilience. The
performance of complex networks is intuitively related to their structure or topology.
However, focusing on structural properties does not fully capture the concept of re-
silience, as defined for this work (see section 1.5). Resilience focuses on the ability of
a system to maintain desired capabilities following disruptions. While network struc-
ture and connectivity likely contribute to these capabilities, there are many other
factors that may determine the provided capabilities of an SoS network. Ignoring
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these possible factors and assuming that connectivity directly translates to capability
can be misleading when designing SoS networks.
Focusing on structural properties also assumes a static view of resilience. The
resilience of a system is not only determined by the capabilities maintained in the
presence of a threat, but also the capabilities recovered following the threat dis-
turbance, with consideration of the time elapsed during this entire process. Using
network structural properties to evaluate resilience does not fully consider this aspect
of resilience, since there is no time consideration when determining the effect of a
removed node on network structure.
These studies also do not consider network adaptation and reconfiguration. The
ability of a resilient system to adapt to potential threats is a defining characteris-
tic that distinguishes it from a robust system. These studies are more accurately
described as studies of network robustness.
Percolation Theory Approaches to Resilience
Complex network researchers have also applied concepts from percolation theory to
study network resilience. This approach focuses on identifying the phase transition
of a network from a non-percolating to percolating state, in the limit of infinite
network size. A network is said to be percolating if a randomly selected node has
high probability of being in a giant or infinitely sized component. Percolation models
are based on bond or site percolation. Site percolation randomly designates nodes
as “occupied” (functional) or “unoccupied” (failed). A resilient network maintains a
giant component of occupied nodes for a high fraction of unoccupied nodes [85].
Cohen et al. use percolation theory to derive analytic expressions for the perco-
lation critical threshold, qc, of the Internet and similarly structured networks. They
assume that the phase transition of a network occurs when, on average, a node i
connected to a node j that is in the largest component, is also connected to at least
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one other node. The authors then consider the uniformly random breakdown of a
fraction q of nodes in a network (i.e., the probability that a node becomes unoc-
cupied is q). Using derived expressions for the phase transition as a function of q,
they identify that networks with a power law degree distribution and degree exponent
γ ≤ 3 (where pk ∼ k−γ) have a phase transition that occurs at q ≤ 0. This result
suggests that networks with the described power law degree distribution always have
a giant component. Since real world scale-free networks have been shown to have a
power law degree distribution with degree exponent γ ≤ 3, this result agrees with
other work showing scale-free networks to be robust to random node failures.
Callaway et al. [28] extend the work of Cohen et al. [30] by no longer restricting
breakdown probabilities to being uniformly random, instead allowing them to be a
function of node degree. This extension allows the consideration of targeted node
attacks. Their method uses generating functions to derive expressions for the phase
transition (see Newman et al. [88] for a description of this approach). Their results
show that networks with power law degree distributions are highly susceptible to tar-
geted node removal, as was shown by Albert et al. and others. Cohen et al. similarly
expand their previous work to include targeted attacks and reach the same conclusion
[31]. Figure 14 shows the critical threshold of power law networks as a function of
power law degree exponent. Schwartz et al. later consider the percolation of directed
networks [98] and Serrano and Boguna the percolation of clustered networks [100].
Limitations of Percolation Theory Approaches to Resilience
These studies are significant because they arrive at similar conclusions to those made
by Albert et al. [10], Broder et al. [27], and others regarding the resilience of complex
networks. However, these studies maintain many of the same issues limiting the use
of other network resilience studies for designing resilient networked SoS. These studies
focus on network structural properties, take a static view of resilience, and do not
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Figure 14: Critical threshold, pc, as a function of degree exponent (shown here as α),
for power law networks subjected to targeted node removal [31].
consider network adaptation.
Random Rewiring Approaches to Resilience
Schneider et al. [97] and Herrmann et al. [55] address some limitations of previous
work on network resilience by applying random link rewiring to improve network







where s(Q) is the fraction of nodes in the largest component after removing Q = qN
nodes. The fraction of removed nodes, q, consists of the most connected nodes in
the network, representing targeted attacks. This approach to measuring network
robustness is more descriptive than percolation theory methods since it considers the
partial breakdown of the giant component.
Schneider et al. use this robustness measure to propose a random rewiring algo-
rithm for mitigating the effects of targeted attacks [97]. The algorithm consists of
randomly selecting two links in a network, eij and ekl, and swapping those connec-
tions to result in links eik and ejl. The swap is only performed if network robustness,
calculated using eq. (27), is improved. The process is repeated with other randomly
50
Figure 15: EU power grid (structure shown in A) and point of presence Internet
networks (structure shown in B) are shown to have improved robustness following
link swaps. (C) shows improvements to the EU grid, (D) shows improvements to the
Internet networks [97].
selected pairs of links until no significant improvement is achieved within a series
of subsequent links swaps. This method considers connection costs by maintaining
the initial number of network links. The authors apply this method to a European
power supply network and service provider representation of the Internet (see fig. 15).
They also consider the case of designing a new network using their link swap algo-
rithm, while maintaining a given degree distribution. Their results show a unique
“onion-like” structure to their designed robust networks. Herrmann et al. provide an
expanded discussion of this novel onion-like network structure in [55]. Louzada et al.
apply a similar link swap algorithm to improve the robustness of air transportation
networks [71].
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Ventresca et al. focus on the resilience of a network against multi-strategy sequen-
tial attacks. Their approach allows an attacker to alter its targeting strategy during
successive attacks, choosing between six possible centrality measures (betweenness
centrality, closeness centrality, degree centrality, PageRank, Kleinberg’s Authority
scores, and leverage centrality). Attackers either randomly choose their targeting
strategy at each iteration or use a greedy approach based on ranked effects for each
strategy. Graph degree distribution entropy, largest component size, efficiency (simi-
lar to average path length), and pairwise connectivity are used as measures of network
resilience. They allow networks to adapt through random rewiring, in an effort to
mitigate the effects of node removals. Their rewiring strategy allows the random re-
addition of k−1 links following the removal of a node with k links. Results show that
maintaining a betweenness targeting strategy is generally more effective at damaging
a network than the other strategies considered, including the greedy multiple strategy
case. Random rewiring-based adaptation slows down network destruction for all cases
considered.
Limitations of Random Rewiring Approaches to Resilience
These studies add random link rewiring to previously discussed work on complex
network resilience, partially accounting for the adaptive aspect of resilience. However,
the link swap algorithm proposed by Schneider et al. [97] does not fully capture the
concept of resilience through adaptation, since they propose link swaps as a method
of preemptively improving a network’s structure. This approach is more focused on
robustness, since the network is still unable to adapt itself once an attack occurs. In
fact, the authors define their metric to determine accepted link swaps as a robustness
measure. Their robustness measure also does not consider the time aspect of resilience
(i.e., how quickly a system loses capabilities and how long it takes to recover following
an attack).
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Ventresca et al. [111] propose a more dynamic defense against attacks by allowing
networks to add links following each attack. Their method more closely considers
resilience by incorporating adaptation. However, their analysis of how well adaptive
networks perform still focuses on the structure of the network following each attack.
A Method for Organizational Network Resilience
Dodds et al. explore information exchange in an organizational network subjected to
information overload (congestion) and node removal [38]. They develop a model to
create organizational networks based on a backbone hierarchical network. Informa-
tion exchange in the network is modeled by specifying a message initiation rate, µ,
and target locality, ζ. The authors define an ultrarobust network to be one that is
robust to network congestion and node removal. Network congestion is varied by in-
creasing the message initiation rate and distance messages must be passed across the
network (i.e., decreasing target locality). Nodes are removed based on rank, neighbors
cascading outwards from a random star point, connectivity, and uniformly random
selection. Congestion robustness is measured by the maximum congestion centrality,
where congestion centrality is the probability that any message will be processed by a
node. Network robustness to node removals is measured by the fractional size of the
largest component in the network. Results show that a class of network topologies,
called multiscale networks, is the only network class studied to show the property of
ultrarobustness.
Limitations of A Method for Organizational Network Resilience
This study provides insights into the robustness of organizational networks, but as
with previous complex network studies, does not fully consider resilience. The net-
works studied are static and unable to adapt to attacks. Additionally, network con-
nectivity is used to evaluate the robustness of a network to node removal. This
approach does not account for the actual system capabilities. Congestion robustness
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is a capability-based measure, but this measure is only used to study network con-
gestion as the operational environment is changed (i.e., robustness to variations in
operating conditions).
2.4 Gaps in the Reslience Literature
A review of the literature reveals certain gaps and limitations regarding our un-
derstanding of resilient SoS networks, and the availability of methods for designing
them. Most of the work from the SoS community focuses on robustness, rather than
resilience, or provides limited guidance as to how resilient SoS networks should be
designed and assessed. The resilience engineering community has proposed many
frameworks for assessing resilience. However, these frameworks are often qualitative,
or limited in their application to real data. These framework also focus on resilience
assessments, rather than identifying novel ways to improve resilience.
Most work in the complex networks community also focus on network structural
properties. While network path lengths and connectivity can typically be assumed to
play a large role in how well an SoS network performs, there are other factors that
can affect SoS capabilities. Assuming that an SoS network is resilient because it is
connected can lead to poorly informed design choices. Complex networks research
is also limited in its application of network adaptation for resilience. Instead, many
studies focus on robustness to node removals.
The identified gaps in the literature result in the following observation:
Observation: Methods developed by the SoS, resilience engineering,
and complex networks communities are insufficient for meeting the re-
search objectives established for this thesis, due to incomplete quantita-
tive capability-based assessments of resilience and limited consideration
of network adaptation for resilience.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology developed to satisfy the research objectives for
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this thesis and address the issues raised by this observation.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW AND REPRESENTATIVE
TEST PROBLEM
A methodology for designing resilient SoS networks (ReSSNET) is developed to
answer the primary research question of how to mitigate network threats (RQ 1)
and test the hypothesis that designing for resilience rather than robustness is better
for SoS networks (HYP 2). This methodology satisfies the first research objective
for this thesis, by providing quantitative, capability-based assessments of resilience,
accounting for the networked nature of SoS, and considering network adaptation as a
response to potential threats.
This chapter describes a framework for developing the ReSSNET methodology,
high-level research questions related to methodology steps, and a representative SoS
network test problem used throughout this thesis.
3.1 ReSSNET Methodology Overview
A framework for developing the methodology is the Top-Down Design Decision Sup-
port Process in the Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) method-
ology [75]. The Decision Support Process is a general design method applicable to
many types of problems, regardless of their domain. This process is summarized on
the left side of fig. 16.
The first two steps of the process are outside the scope of this thesis, as this
work assumes that the need and problem have already been established with proper
requirements analysis and definition of desired system functions. The final step of
the process, make a decision, is also outside the scope of this thesis, since it is an
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Figure 16: Overview of the ReSSNET methodology for designing resilient SoS net-
works.
exhaustive step that is very specific to the application problem being considered. This
thesis focuses on steps 3-5: establishing metrics to assess performance, generating
alternatives, and evaluating those alternatives.
Figure 16 shows how the Decision Support Process is adapted to the problem of de-
signing resilient SoS networks. Since the objective is to design for resilience, a method
for assessing SoS resilience is defined. SoS design alternatives are then generated and
evaluated using the defined resilience assessment method. If the generated alterna-
tives are found to be insufficient for the problem of interest, new alternatives should
be generated based on lessons learned from the previous iteration of the methodology.
The loop between steps two and three of the methodology represents the possibility
of such an iteration.
3.2 High-level Research Questions
Several high-level research questions must be answered to develop the desired method-
ology. The first question focuses on identifying a method for assessing SoS resilience.
To enable SoS design comparisons and trade-off studies, the method should provide
a single metric, or set of metrics, for quantitatively assessing resilience. For example,
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these metrics would provide a method for quantifying the ability of an IE network
to maintain a high message passing rate in the presence of node failures. This need
results in the following research question:
Research Question 3: What metric, or set of metrics, should be used
to quantitatively assess SoS resilience?
Once a method for assessing resilience is identified, SoS design alternatives need
to be generated. To fully explore the problem of SoS network resilience, we need to
identify methods for defining initial network topologies and adaptation methods, as
well as potential threats. For example, these methods would provide a set of potential
IE network designs and threats to consider. This need results in the following research
question:
Research Question 4: How should we define potential SoS network
topologies, threats, and adaptation methods?
The final step in the methodology is to evaluate SoS design alternatives. This
step focuses on identifying trade-offs between alternatives and understanding what
types of scenarios those alternatives are best suited for. For example, this step would
identify what types of IE networks should be used in certain situations. The following
research question addresses this step in the methodology:
Research Question 5: What methods should be used to compare SoS
design alternatives and understand their advantages and disadvantages?
58
CHAPTER IV
A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING SOS RESILIENCE
The first step in the ReSSNET methodology requires a method for quantitatively
assessing SoS resilience. The selected method should provide a metric, or set of met-
rics, for assessing resilience to enable design trade-off studies. This need is reflected
in research question three (repeated here for convenience):
Research Question 3: What metric, or set of metrics, should be used
to quantitatively assess SoS resilience?
This chapter describes a capability-based framework that provides a set of metrics
for quantifying resilience and an experiment performed to test the metrics proposed
by the framework.
Method Requirements and Alternatives
To answer research question three, we must establish what it means to be resilient and
specify criteria for achieving resilience. Section 1.5 describes several defining char-
acteristics of resilience and resilient systems. These characteristics apply to systems
and SoS, and are summarized in the following observations:
 Resilience is capability-based, since resilient systems are able to maintain or
recover desired capabilities.
 Resilience is dynamic, since resilient systems are able to absorb, recover from,
and adapt to threats.
 Resilient systems provide graceful, or smooth, transitions from degraded to re-
covered states.
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 Resilience is time-dependent, since recovery time is typically important for mis-
sion success.
 Resilience is disruption-dependent, since the resilience of a system depends on
the disruption it faces.
In addition to these observations, we also note the importance of providing quanti-
tative assessments of resilience to enable design trade-off studies. These observations
are used to derive a set of requirements for selecting the method to assess SoS re-
silience. The selected method must be:
 Quantitative
 Capability-based
 Dynamic (account for the ability to smoothly and quickly absorb, recover from,
and adapt to threats)
 Disruption-based
A review of the literature shows many methods and frameworks for assessing sys-
tem resilience (see chapter 2). For this thesis, the most relevant of these methods are
the system resilience framework [112], TIRESIAS [20], ResiliNets [104], and complex
network structural properties [10, 59].
The system resilience framework [112] provides a partially quantitative method for
evaluating resilience. This method directly accounts for system capabilities through
calculations of systemic impact, but does not provide detailed quantitative calcula-
tions to differentiate between how a system absorbs, recovers from, and adapts to a
threat. Instead, the characterization of these resilience capacities is limited to qual-
itative comparisons. The use of performance and cost measurements over time does
account for dynamic system behavior. However, smooth capability transitions are
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not accounted for, since integration removes some of the dynamics of capability data.
The generalized nature of the framework allows any type and number of threats to
be considered.
TIRESIAS is a quantitative framework for assessing system resilience [20]. This
framework extends the system resilience framework by adding quantitative metrics to
characterize how well a system absorbs and recovers from a disruption. These metrics
allow a more refined comparison between potential systems that also considers the
dynamic behavior of a system following a disruption. However, these metrics are
limited in their ability to characterize the smoothness of capability transitions and
adaptation to repeated threats.
The ResiliNets framework proposes a resilience state space to evaluate the re-
silience of a potential system facing a given threat. Desired capabilities are used as
the service parameter in the state space. The state space provides a dynamic con-
sideration of system performance by tracking how the system behaves throughout an
engagement. However, there is no suggested quantification of the various capacities of
resilience or ability to provide smooth transitions from degraded to recovered states.
The system resilience factor extends other resilience metrics by explicitly con-
sidering recovery time, in addition to recovered and degraded performance levels.
However, there is limited guidance for how to calculate recovery time and recovered
performance levels for systems facing multiple threats with volatile performance data.
Assessing resilience with network structural properties is quantitative, but does
not directly account for system capabilities. While good network connectivity often
indicates good network performance, a more thorough approach would focus on ac-
tual system capabilities, whether through real data or simulated performance. This
approach also does not fully consider the dynamic behavior of a system following a
threat or disturbance, since network structures only change immediately before and
after threat events.
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Quantitative Partially Yes Partially Yes Yes
Capability-based Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Dynamic Partially Partially Partially Partially No
Disruption-based Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 3 compares potential resilience assessment methods with respect to the
defined requirements for use in this methodology. Since none of the methods meets
the established requirements, a gap in the literature is identified as follows:
Observation: There is a gap in the resilience engineering literature for a
capability-based resilience assessment framework that satisfies the estab-
lished requirements for assessing SoS resilience.
4.1 A Capability-based Resilience Assessment Framework
This thesis develops a new method for assessing system, or SoS, resilience. The
method is presented as a framework to provide a structured process for assessing
resilience, and fills the identified gap in the resilience engineering literature. This
framework enables quantitative comparisons of potential system designs, with respect
to their resilience to a set of identified disruptions. For example, the framework could
be used for the conceptual design of a resilient communications network, where mul-
tiple recovery actions (e.g., network adaptation) are being considered. Assessing the
resilience of these potential network designs enables decision makers to quantitatively
compare the benefits and expected performance of each design.
The framework is composed of five steps, shown in fig. 17. This section provides
a description of each step in the framework. Particular attention is given to the final
step of the framework, which develops of a set of resilience factors, a system resilience
metric R, and a system total resilience metric Rtotal. These metrics are the primary
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Figure 17: Overview of the capability-based resilience assessment framework.
contribution of the framework and are therefore given their own section, section 4.2.
These metrics directly answer research question three. The framework is applicable to
systems and SoS (it does not differentiate between the two), and is therefore described
with respect to systems for convenience.
System Description
The framework begins with a definition of the systems being considered and their
desired capabilities or performance levels. These systems may be currently existing
ones with suspected vulnerabilities, future systems being considered in a design study,
or any other systems requiring a resilience assessment. The primary limitation on the
type of system that may be considered is the ability to attain measurements of system
performance over time for the scenarios of interest. System capability is defined as a
time invariant property of a system (assuming no changes to the system itself) that
represents its ability to provide some desired functionality. System performance is
defined as a time varying measure of a system’s ability to provide its desired capability.
For the IE network model used in this thesis, systems are defined as IE networks,
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with network capability defined as the ability to receive messages. IE network per-
formance is therefore the number of received messages at a given time.
Potential Disruptions Analysis
When assessing the resilience of a system, an analyst must consider what the system
is resilient to, since “the resilience of a system can be measured only in terms of
the specific threat (input)... different attacks would generate different consequence
(output) trajectories for the same resilient system” [53]. Therefore, the framework
requires identification of potential threats, or disruptions, to be considered.
For example, consider a structure designed for use in areas known for strong
tornado activity. Since this structure is designed in anticipation of destructive wind
speeds, it will likely be resilient to scenarios with low to moderate wind speeds.
However, this same structure may not be as resilient to flooding, since it was not
designed with such disruptions in mind. Stating that a system is simply resilient does
not provide enough information regarding the expected performance of the system.
A more complete statement would include what the system is resilient to; high wind
speeds in this example.
Potential threats for the IE network model are node failures or attacks on nodes
and links.
Recovery Action Analysis
Since resilience focuses on the ability to adapt and respond to threats, a definition
of potential recovery actions is also required. These recovery actions enable a system
to respond to threats and recover lost capabilities. Some recovery actions may even
improve system capabilities relative to normal operating conditions, providing a level
of anti-fragility to the system [105].
Potential recovery actions for the IE network model include network adaptation
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and link redundancy. Network adaptation would allow a network to regain connec-
tivity following node or link attacks and maintain the ability to share information
throughout the network.
System Performance Measurements
This framework uses measurements of system performance over time to calculate
resilience, since temporal aspects of a system’s response to disruptions play a large
role in resilience [53]. These measurements are required to be equally spaced in time,
such that they can be represented as time series data. This requirement enables
the use of digital signal processing and time series methods for analyzing system
performance data and calculating resilience.
Two approaches to attaining system performance data are using recorded data
from actual system operations and modeling and simulation. If possible, real system
data should be used, provided that the data is complete and has been accumulated
over periods of time in which the system faced disruptions of interest. However,
such data is often highly corrupted or simply not available, particularly for large,
complex systems and SoS. Additionally, resilience assessments may be needed for
system design trade-off studies. The systems of interest in such studies typically do
not exist. This thesis uses modeling and simulation to produce system performance
data, in the absence of actual system data. This approach enables consideration of
multiple system designs, disruption types, and recovery actions. Simulation studies
can also capture stochasticity in system operations, for example through the use of
simulation replications or Monte Carlo simulation. Many complex systems and SoS
have randomness in certain aspects of their operation, which can strongly affect the
impact of potential disruptions on a system and ability of the system to respond. The
stochastic nature of system operations can therefore affect the resilience of a system,
and should be considered in any resilience assessment.
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Figure 18: Notional plot of system performance data. The inset figure shows a
notional example of volatile (solid line) and smoothed (dashed line) performance
data.
Figure 18 shows an example of notional system performance data, where y(t)
represents the performance of a system at time t. Important times and performance
values in this notional example are:
 t0 = start time of the period of interest
 tD = time of the disruption event
 tR = time when the recovery action is implemented
 tSS = time when performance recovery has reached steady-state
 tfinal = end time of the period of interest
 yD = desired performance level
 yR = recovered performance level
 ymin = minimum performance level
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The notional data in fig. 18 shows clear trends and smooth transitions in system
performance. However, actual measured or simulated data is often volatile or noisy,
due to the stochastic nature of many real or simulated processes (see the inset of
fig. 18). To simplify the analysis and focus on general trends in noisy performance
data, a data smoothing method is desired for the calculation of resilience metrics.
The following research question addresses this need:
Research Question 3.1: What method should be used to smooth system
performance data?
The primary requirement for a smoothing method for resilience assessments is the
ability to remove unnecessary noise in the data while still capturing general trends,
particularly large peaks due to sudden increases or decreases in the data. The method
should also be computationally inexpensive to aid in automation of resilience calcu-
lations for large simulation-based design studies. Since the framework requires per-
formance data that is equally spaced in time, digital signal processing methods are
considered.
A simple method of digital filtering replaces each data value with a linear combi-
nation of nearby values [93]. Assume data is provided as a series of N equally spaced
values where fi is the value associated with the ith data point, i = 1 . . . N . For
performance data, fi would represent the system performance at the ith time step.






where M is the moving window or interval half-width and cj are weighting coefficients.
The number of data points included in the moving window is defined by 2M + 1.
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A moving average filter replaces fi with the average of the values in the moving
window, such that the weighting coefficients in eq. (28) are defined as




The only tuning parameter for this type of filter is the window half-width M . This
filter introduces no bias into the data if the underlying functional shape of the data
is constant or linear. However, if the functional shape is non-linear, as is likely with
performance data for SoS scenarios, this filter will introduce undesirable bias into the
data. Additionally, though moving average filters are able to capture general trends
in the data, such as the area and location of peaks, they often smooth peaks too much
when the width of the peak is on the order of the window size [64].
An alternative data filter is the Savitzkey-Golay (S-G) filter [95, 93, 96]. S-G
filters use least-squares polynomial fitting to smooth data. For each data point i with





k = a0 + a1t+ a2t
2 + · · ·+ antn, (30)
to all 2M + 1 data points in the moving window surrounding the ith data point.
The data value fi is then replaced by pi(t = i), the value of the pi polynomial at
position t = i. A new polynomial, pi+1(t), is used to replace the next data value fi+1.
Linear matrix inversion is used to determine a set of filter coefficients cj that enables
the use of eq. (28) with least-squares polynomial smoothing, avoiding the process of
calculating a new polynomial for each data point. The only tuning parameters for
S-G filters are the polynomial order n and window half-width M .
S-G filters improve the ability of simple moving average filters to maintain the
shape of narrow peaks in the data, at the expense of removing less noise [64, 91].
Figure 19 shows a comparison of moving average and S-G filters. The moving average
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Figure 19: Comparison of (top) raw synthetic data with additive Gaussian white
noise, (middle) moving average smoothed data, and (bottom) S-G filter smoothed
data [93]. Data is smoothed with a window size of 33 for both filters (i.e., M = 16),
and a polynomial order of four for the S-G filter (i.e., n = 4)
location of peaks. However, the S-G filter captures peak heights better than the
moving average filter, especially for narrow width peaks. Since system degradation
and recovery may produce large, narrow peaks in performance data, S-G filters are
preferred for smoothing performance data. S-G filters are therefore selected for use in
the resilience assessment framework, summarized in the following response to research
question 3.1:
Response to RQ 3.1: Savitzky-Golay filters are used to smooth per-
formance data, due to their ability to capture desired trends in noisy and
peaked data, while still removing undesired noise.
For the remaining discussion of the assessment framework, yraw(t) represents raw
performance data and y(t) represents the raw data smoothed using an S-G filter.
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Smoothed data is used for all resilience metric calculations. Raw data is only used for
calculation of the volatility factor. This thesis uses n = 3 and m = 5 for all resilience
calculations, based on experimentation with performance data from the IE network
model.
System Resilience Calculation
The final step in the framework is to calculate system resilience, using performance
data. A resilience metric, R, is defined to quantify a system’s resilience to a single
disruption event. Providing a single metric for resilience enables quantitative com-
parisons and trade-offs studies between potential system designs. However, systems
may also face multiple disruption events within a time period of interest. To account
for such scenarios, a total resilience metric, Rtotal, is also defined. Section 4.2 defines
these metrics and describes steps used to calculate them.
4.2 Resilience Metric Definitions
The resilience metric R is developed from the requirements set for a method to assess
SoS resilience and established characteristics of resilience. This metric is based on
the integration metric proposed by Vugrin et al. [112] and the resilience factor pro-
posed by Francis and Bekera [48] (see section 2.2). The integration metric provides
a quantitative method of capturing the total performance maintained by a system
throughout a scenario. The metric proposed by Francis and Bekera additionally con-
siders recovery time, as well degraded and recovered system capabilities. Therefore,
combining these metrics accounts for the overall performance of a system, how quickly
it recovers lost capabilities, the absorptive capacity of a system, and the restorative
capacity.
However, these metrics do not consider the ability of a system to smoothly provide
desired capabilities (i.e., penalize volatile systems). Additionally, Francis and Bekera
provide limited guidance for how to determine certain values within their recovery
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time calculation. The proposed metric R addresses these limitations by incorporating
a volatility factor and providing a traceable method for calculating a recovery time
factor. The proposed metric explicitly accounts for desired characteristics of a resilient




σρ[δ + ζ + 1− τ (ρ−δ)] if ρ− δ ≥ 0
σρ (δ + ζ) otherwise,
(31)
where 0 ≤ R ≤ ∞, and R has a reference value of two for a normal operating scenario.
A normal operating scenario is defined as one in which the system shows no loss of
desired performance over time [i.e., y(t) is some constant C for all t].
This metric is based on the integration of performance data, defined as the total
performance factor, σ, similar to other resilience metrics in the literature [92, 94,
112]. Integration-based resilience is then modified by incorporating a set of resilience
factors to explicitly account for various aspects of resilience not considered by simple
integration. The recovery factor, ρ, accounts for the end state of the system (i.e.,
its recovered capability or performance level). The absorption factor, δ, accounts for
the ability of the system to absorb the effects of a disruption. A volatility factor,
ζ, accounts for the volatility of performance data, representing the ability of the
system to smoothly transition from one state to another. A normalized recovery time
factor, τ , accounts for temporal aspects of the system response through calculation
of the time required to reach steady-state following a disruption. The influence of τ
decreases as the recovered performance level (i.e., ρ − δ) decreases. The conditional
statement in eq. (31) ensures that systems are only rewarded for quickly reaching
steady-state (i.e., having low values of τ) if their recovered performance level is better
than their minimum performance. The following sections describe the calculation
of each resilience factor (refer to fig. 18 for descriptions of variables used in the
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calculations that are obtained from performance data).
Total Performance Factor
The total performance factor, σ, accounts for the total performance maintained by a













for continuous time data, where 0 ≤ σ ≤ ∞, and σ has a value of one in a normal
operating scenario. This metric rewards systems able to provide high performance
levels at any point of time during a scenario. However, it does not account for when
that performance is provided (see section 2.2).
Absorption, Recovery, and Recovery Time Factors
The ability of a system to absorb the impacts of a disruption and recover lost capa-
bilities in a timely manner is critical to its resilience [112, 48]. The absorption factor,
δ, captures how well a system is able to absorb a disruption and reduce its impact on





where 0 ≤ δ ≤ ∞, and δ has a value of one in a normal operating scenario. The
minimum of the performance data is used for ymin.
The recovery factor, ρ, captures how well a system is able to recover lost capabil-












Figure 20: Example showing raw performance data, yraw(t), smoothed with an S-G
filter (n = 3,M = 5) to give y(t). The smoothing reduces much of the noise in the raw
data; however, a method for calculating the recovery time and recovered capability





where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ∞, and ρ has a value of one in a normal operating scenario. Determin-
ing the recovered performance, yR, is a simple task when analyzing a small number
of scenarios with clearly defined recovery values, such as that seen in fig. 18. One can
perform a visual inspection of the data, or if automated calculation is desired, select
the final performance as the recovered value. However, for automated analysis of data
sets where the system does not recover to a clearly defined value (e.g., those from
stochastic simulation studies), determining yR is a non-trivial task. This difficulty
can exist even when using data smoothed with an S-G filter (see fig. 20).
To account for these situations, yR is defined to be the steady-state performance
(i.e., recovered capability) of the system following a disruption event and possible
implementation of a recovery action. Using the steady-state performance provides
a more accurate representation of what level the system has recovered to than, for
instance, using the final observed system performance. The use of steady-state per-
formance creates the following research question:
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Research Question 3.2: What method should be used to estimate the
steady-state time and value of system performance data?
The following are requirements for selecting a steady-state estimation method to
be used in the resilience assessment framework:
 Accuracy - The method should accurately estimate steady-state time and value.
 Robustness - The method should work well with a variety of system types.
 Easy automation - The method should be easily automated (requiring little user
input) and computationally inexpensive for use with large simulation design
studies.
The problem of finding the steady-state recovered performance level is similar to
that of the initial transient for steady-state estimation in stochastic simulation output
analysis [69]. Consider a discrete-time, stochastic process Y1, Y2, . . . from the output
of a single run of a non-terminating simulation. Each random variable Yi represents
the output of the simulation at time step i; for performance data, Yi represents the
performance of the system at the ith time step. Let Fi (y | I) = P (Yi ≤ y | I), where
y is a real number in the set of possible values for Yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , and I represents the
initial conditions of the simulation. Then F (y) is the steady-state distribution of the
stochastic process Y1, Y2, . . . if Fi (y | I)→ F (y) as i→∞. The steady-state random
variable Y is the random variable with distribution F (y). Steady-state estimation for
simulation output analysis attempts to estimate the time index k at which Fk (y | I)
is approximately the same as Fk+1 (y | I) , Fk+2 (y | I) , . . . , or equivalently Yk has
approximately the same distribution as Yk+1, Yk+2, . . . . This estimation does not
mean that the observed output values yk, yk+1, . . . from a given simulation run are
equal; it instead means that the distributions of those corresponding random variables
are approximately equal.
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Assuming a steady-state random variable Y of a stochastic process, the steady-
state mean ν = E(Y ). Since most simulations have initial conditions different from
those at steady-state, the sample mean, Ȳ (N), calculated from a sample size N of
observed output values, is a biased estimater of ν (i.e., the mean of observed output
values from a simulation run of length N is a biased estimator of the true steady-state






where Yi is the ith observed value and N is the sample size, or number of observations.
The difficulty of estimating ν given a sample of simulation output data is often referred
as the problem of the initial transient or initialization bias.
The most common method for dealing with the problem of the initial transient
is determining a simulation warm-up period, deleting the data determined to be
within that warm-up period, and using the remaining data to estimate ν [69]. Using
the warm-up period deletion method, the simulation steady-state mean ν can be
estimated as the truncated mean, Ȳ (N, d), calculated as





where the steady-state time index d determines the end of the warm-up period and
d + 1 determines the beginning of the truncated data. The truncated data includes
all Yi where i > d.
The length of the warm-up period, d, can be used to estimate the time when
steady-state is reached for system performance data. The truncated steady-state
mean, Ȳ (N, d), can then be used as the recovered system performance level, yR.
Simulation warm-up period estimation methods are therefore reviewed for use in the
resilience assessment framework.
Hoad, Robinson, and Davies [56] provide a comparison of methods for estimating
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the length of the warm-up period for simulation output data. They review 44 meth-
ods from the literature, which are categorized as being graphical methods, heuristic
methods, statistical methods, initialization bias tests, and hybrid methods. Their
criteria for evaluating the methods are accuracy and robustness of the method, ease
of automation, generality, and computer time. Since these criteria match the require-
ments set for a steady-state estimation method for this framework, and their study
provides a thorough comparison of methods, their results are used to answer research
question 3.2.
The results from Hoad, et al. identify the MSER-5 method as the method that best
satisfies their criteria for a warm-up estimation method. The authors find MSER-5 to
be a general method (i.e., not model or data type specific) that is easily automated,
as it does not require many input parameters or user actions. They find the method
to be robust and effective for the considered cases. Similar conclusions are drawn by
White and Spratt in a previous comparison of warm-up estimation methods [116].
The Marginal Standard Error Rules (MSER) method is a heuristic method for
estimating the length of the warm-up period in simulation data [114, 115, 69]. This
method estimates the length of the simulation warm-up period, d∗, using the MSER
statistic, as








(Yi − Ȳ (N, d))2. (39)
For system performance data, N is the number of observed performance values and
Yi is the ith performance value. White and Robinson [115] provide a description of
the intuition behind this method.
MSER-m modifies MSER by applying eq. (39) to batch means data, rather than
raw simulation output data [115]. This modification groups the data into batches
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of m observations each, and calculates steady-state from the mean value of each
batch. A batch size of m = 5 has shown improved performance for some cases
compared to MSER and other methods [116, 56]. However, using batched instead
of raw data reduces the resolution with which steady-state can be identified. Since
the assessment framework does not specify a required length of simulation data, using
batched data may not provide the desired level of resolution for steady-state estimates.
Additionally, the benefits of MSER-5 over MSER are not clearly established for a wide
variety of cases. Therefore, MSER is selected for calculating steady-state time.
One issue with using the MSER method with performance data is that typical
applications of the method assume steady-state is reached within the first half of
the data (i.e., d∗ ≤ N/2). A reason for this assumption is that the MSER statistic
naturally drops to very low values for the last few observations in a data set, since very
few data points are used to calculate the mean-squared error for those observations
(see fig. 21). This drop in MSER causes the algorithm to inaccurately estimate steady-
state within the final few observations. Since systems are not guaranteed to reach
steady-state in the first half of a data set, the last 10 percent of performance data
points are defined as a buffer region for steady-state calculations. These observations
are not considered as possible values for d∗, preventing the algorithm from incorrectly
estimating steady-state at the end of the data set.
A second issue with the MSER method is that it does not determine if steady-state
has actually been reached within a data set. A required MSER statistic threshold,
MSERrequired, is defined to account for this. If MSER(N, d) > MSERrequired for all
d = 0, 1, . . . N outside of the buffer region, then the framework assumes steady-state
is not reached. If steady-state is not reached, yR is defined as the mean performance
of the buffer region. This thesis uses MSERrequired = 0.1 for all resilience calculations
with the IE network model, based on experimentation with performance data from
the model.
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Figure 21: Example use of MSER to determine the steady-state time, tSS, for notional
system performance data with additive Gaussian white noise. The solid gray line
shows the noisy performance data, with the dashed black line showing the true signal
for the performance data (data with no additive white noise). The dashed red line
shows the MSER value at each possible truncation time t. The dashed vertical line
shows the selected steady-state time. The shaded area shows the buffer region not
considered by the algorithm.
A third modification to the MSER method is the use of another MSER threshold,
MSERthreshold, which defines the minimum MSER required to assume steady-state has
been reached (i.e., steady-state is reached once MSER(N, d) ≤ MSERthreshold). This
threshold is implemented to account for cases where performance values decrease so
slowly over time that the algorithm estimates steady-state at the end of the data
set even though very little change is seen in performance values past the first obser-
vation where the threshold is reached. This thesis uses MSERthreshold = 0.0001 for
all resilience calculations with the IE network model, based on experimentation with
performance data from the model.
Figure 21 shows an example use of the MSER method for estimating steady-state
time in notional performance data. The estimated steady-state time is tSS = 77. The
true steady-state time (determined using the true signal with no additive noise) is
80, demonstrating the accuracy of this method for this example case. The following
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answer is given to research question 3.2:
Response to RQ 3.2: The MSER method is used to estimate steady-
state time and value of system performance data, due to its accuracy,
robustness, and ability to be automated for large-scale simulation studies.
Using the MSER method, the steady-state recovery time of a system, tss, is defined
as the time associated with the d∗+ 1 observation in performance data. For example,
for performance data beginning at time t = 1 and incremented in one second time
steps (i.e., t = 1, 2, . . . ), if d∗ = 10 then tss = 11. The steady-state performance of







Steady-state recovery time is used to define the recovery time factor, τ , which cap-
tures the speed with which a system recovers to steady-state. This factor accounts
for the ability of a system to not only respond to a disruption and recover lost capa-
bilities, but to also do so in a timely manner. The recovery time factor is calculated






where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, and τ has a value of zero in a normal operating scenario.
Volatility Factor
The ability of a system to provide smooth transitions from degraded to recovered
states is accounted for with the volatility factor, ζ. A system with highly volatile
performance data, such as that in fig. 21, sees large and sudden drops in performance
over time. This type of system is defined to be less resilient than a system that
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produces similar, but smoother performance data. Signal-to-noise ratio (SNRdB) is
used to quantify volatility in performance data, calculated as












where Ps is the signal power, Pn is the noise power, S(t) is the true signal, and N(t)
is signal noise. The true signal is approximated with smoothed performance data,
such that S(t) = y(t). Signal noise is approximated as the difference between the raw
data, yraw(t), and the smoothed data, using
N(t) = yraw(t)− y(t) (45)
Figure 22 shows approximated performance noise for the raw and smoothed perfor-
mance data from fig. 20.




1 + exp [−0.25 (SNRdB − 15)]
, (46)
where 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1, and ζ has a value of one in a normal operating scenario. The function
steepness (set to -0.25) and offset (set to 15) are set to ensure that performance data
with no volatility provides a volatility factor of one, with a gradual decline in ζ as
volatility is increased.

















Figure 22: Example plot of (top) raw and smoothed performance data, with (bottom)
corresponding approximations for performance noise. The raw data is smoothed using
an S-G filter (n = 3 and m = 5).
similar performance measurement noise. For example, noise due to sensor measure-
ments needs to be comparable between systems, to prevent penalizing one system
more than another due to measurement noise, rather than response volatility.
Total Resilience Metric
Scenarios with multiple disruptions over time (see fig. 23) are also considered. Since
the resilience metric, R, is defined for a scenario with a single disruption, multiple
disruption scenarios are split into Nepochs epochs, where each epoch is defined to con-
tain a single disruption event and the subsequent recovery action. System resilience
for the ith epoch, Ri, is calculated using eq. (31). System total resilience, Rtotal, is
then calculated for the entire scenario using an exponentially weighted mean of Ri






Figure 23: Notional example of performance data for a system subjected to multiple
disruptions, with a recovery action implemented after each disruption. This scenario
is split in three epochs for calculation of R1, R2, R3, andRtotal.
where 0 ≤ Rtotal ≤ ∞. The weights, wi, are defined as normalized coefficients of an








with smoothing factor α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Higher values of α increase the weight
given to later values of Ri (i.e., Ri values associated with epochs that occur towards
the end of the scenario are more heavily weighted than those occurring earlier in the
scenario). A weighted mean is used to give preference to systems that improve their
resilience over time, representing the ability of a system to adapt to disruptions. This
weighting incorporates the adaptive capacity of resilience into the framework. All
calculations in this thesis use α = 0.06, a value commonly used in the analysis of
time series data.
4.3 EXP 1: Resilience Metric Comparison
Purpose of the experiment: Test hypothesis 3 that the developed resilience metric cap-
tures the desired aspects of resilience better than an integration-based metric commonly
used in the literature.
Having developed a resilience metric, R, and total resilience metric, Rtotal, the
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following hypothesis (HYP 3) is formed in response to research question three:
Hypothesis 3: The resilience metric R provides a quantitative metric
for assessing SoS resilience that captures the desired aspects of resilience
better than an integration-based metric commonly used in the literature.
This hypothesis focuses on R, rather Rtotal, because R is used to calculate Rtotal.
Additionally, most resilience metrics from the literature focus on a single threat event,
providing no comparison metrics for Rtotal.
Experimental Setup
Experiment one (EXP 1) is performed to test this hypothesis. This experiment com-
pares R and a resilience metric based on performance integration. Integration is
used for comparison because it is often used in the literature for quantifying system
resilience [92, 94, 112], and like R, provides a single value for resilience. These com-
parisons focus on the ability of both metrics to capture expected trends and desired
aspects of resilience for notional data, based on the definition of resilience accepted





A logistic function is used to create notional performance data for comparing
R and I. The “S”-curve shape of this function notionally captures the shape of
performance data for systems undergoing degradation and recovery processes. This
data would represent the number of received messages in the IE network example
problem. Data representative of a system facing a single disruption with no recovery
action is generated with
y(t) = A1 +
K1 − A1










































Figure 24: Notional performance data created using eq. (50), with the inflection
steepness, B1, varied (A1 = 20, K1 = 50, x1 = 25, σ = 0). The inset figure shows how
white noise (σ1 = 3) is used to model performance volatility, where the dashed line
shows the corresponding data with no volatility (i.e., σ1 = 0).
where A1 determines the minimum performance level (i.e., the lower asymptotic
limit), K1 determines the initial performance level (i.e., the upper asymptotic limit of
the function), B1 determines the inflection steepness, and x1 determines the location
of the inflection point on the x-axis. Volatility is modeled as Gaussian white noise,
added to the data by drawing from a normal distribution with mean of zero and
standard deviation σ. Figure 24 shows the function shape with B1 varied.
A recovery action is added to notional performance data using
y(t) = A2 +
K2 − A2
1 + exp [B2 (t− x2)]
+N(0, σ) (51)
for the recovery portion of the data, where a negative value is used for B2 to create
an increasing function. Equation (50) is still used for the degradation portion of
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Figure 25: Capability data with a recovery action, where the recovery steepness, B2,
is varied (K1 = 50, B1 = 0.5, x1 = 25, A2 = 20, K2 = 40, x2 = 70, σ = 0). Data for
0 ≤ t ≤ 50 is created using eq. (50), while data for 50 < t ≤ 100 is created using
eq. (51).
the data, with A1 adjusted to ensure a smooth transition between the recovery and
degradation portions of the data. Figure 25 shows an example of data with a recovery
action added and B2 varied.
Equations (50) and (51) are used to generate notional performance data for com-
parisons between R and the integration metric, I. Logistic function parameters are
parametrically varied to compare the behavior of these two metrics as the shape of
the data changes. These comparisons provide an understanding of how well each met-
ric is able to capture desired resilience trends for potential performance data shapes.
Results focus on scenarios with a recovery action (e.g., fig. 25), since the ability to
recover is an important characteristic of a resilient system. Table 4 shows logistic
function parameters varied for this experiment. Similar results are seen for cases
without a recovery action (e.g., fig. 24), when corresponding parameters of the degra-
dation function are varied. Resilience calculations for R use data smoothed by an
S-G filter (n = 3 and m = 5). Resilience calculations for I use raw performance data.
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Table 4: Logistic function parameters settings for EXP 1
Parameter Range Description
K2 [20, 50] Determines recovered performance level
x2 [70, 90] Determines location of inflection point
B2 [−0.5,−0.05] Determines inflection steepness
σ2 [0, 3] Determines performance volatility
Experiment Results
Figure 26 shows a comparison of R and I for scenarios where the recovered perfor-
mance level, K2, and the location of the recovery inflection point, x2, are varied.
Both metrics capture expected resilience trends, since R and I increase as K2 is in-
creased and x2 decreased. Increasing K2 should improve resilience because systems
that recover to a higher performance level are more resilient, assuming that all other
factors are held constant. Decreasing x2 should improve resilience because systems
that recover faster are more resilient.
Figure 27 shows that R and I have different trends when the recovery steepness,
B2, and volatility, σ2 are varied. Considering scenarios with no volatility added (i.e.,
σ2 = 0), resilience measured by R increases as B2 decreases. However, the opposite
trend is seen when resilience is measured with I. This difference in trends is primarily
due to the recovery factor, σ, used in the calculation ofR. This recovery factor rewards
systems that are able to recover to a higher performance level, such as those with low
B2 values in these scenarios. The recovery time factor, τ , also rewards scenarios with
low B2 values because of their fast recovery times. In comparison, the integration
calculation of I only considers the total performance maintained throughout the entire
scenario. Therefore, I rewards scenarios with higher B2 values due to their ability
to provide performance in the middle of the time period considered, despite lower
recovered performance levels. Given these differences, R better captures resilience as
defined for this work, since it focuses on the ability to recover lost capabilities.
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This preference of R over I depends on the definition of resilience used. For
example, there may be situations where the ability to absorb a disruption is more
important than the ability to recover from it. Should an analyst wish to focus on
particular aspects of resilience (e.g., absorption or recovery), weights can be added to
the resilience factors to adjust R for specific needs.
R and I also show different trends when the volatility in performance data is varied
using σ2. Increasing σ2 decreases resilience measured by R, due to the inclusion of the
volatility factor, ζ, in the calculation of R. This volatility factor penalizes systems
with highly volatile performance data, such as those represented by scenarios with
high values of σ2. In comparison, resilience measured by I is minimally affected by
changes to σ2. These results demonstrate the ability of R to account for performance





















































































Figure 26: Resilience results for (a) R and (b) I for scenarios with K2 and x2 varied.
These results are calculated using performance data shown in (c-d), where (c) K2 is

















































































Figure 27: Resilience results for (a) R and (b) I for scenarios with B2 and σ2 varied.
These results are calculated using performance data shown in (c-d), where (c) B2 is
varied and (d) σ2 is varied (K1 = 50, x1 = 25, B1 = 0.5, A2 = 20).
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Discussion of Results
The resilience metric R developed for the assessment framework is shown to better
quantify resilience (as defined for this work) than the integration metric I. While
other resilience metrics exist in the literature, some form of integration is found to be
commonly used by the resilience engineering community. The following summarizes
the outcome of experiment one, with respect to the hypothesis it aims to test:
Outcome of EXP 1: Hypothesis 3 is confirmed since the resilience
metric R better captures desired aspects of resilience than the integration
metric I.
Since the resilience metric R captures the desired aspects of resilience, the devel-
oped assessment framework is used to assess SoS resilience. The following response
is given to research question three:
Response to RQ 3: The capability-based resilience assessment frame-
work provides a set of metrics, R and Rtotal, that should be used to quan-
titatively assess SoS resilience.
4.4 Summary of Method for Resilience Assessment and
Results
The capability-based resilience assessment framework provides a method for perform-
ing the first step of the ReSSNET methodology (see fig. 28). The following summa-
rizes research questions, responses, and experiments from this chapter:
 RQ 3: What metric, or set of metrics, should be used to quantitatively assess
SoS resilience?
 Response to RQ 3: The capability-based resilience assessment framework pro-
vides a set of metrics, R and Rtotal, that should be used to quantitatively assess
SoS resilience.
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Figure 28: Updated overview of the ReSSNET methodology with the selected re-
silience assessment method.
 RQ 3.1: What method should be used to smooth system performance data?
 Response to RQ 3.1: Savitzky-Golay filters are used to smooth performance
data, due to their ability to capture desired trends in noisy and peaked data,
while still removing undesired noise.
 Research Question 3.2: What method should be used to estimate the steady-
state time and value of system performance data?
 Response to RQ 3.2: The MSER method is used to estimate steady-state time
and value of system performance data, due to its accuracy, robustness, and
ability to be automated for large-scale simulation studies.
 HYP 3: The resilience metric R provides a quantitative metric for assessing
SoS resilience that captures the desired aspects of resilience better than an
integration-based metric commonly used in the literature.
 Outcome of EXP 1: Hypothesis 3 is confirmed since the resilience metric R
better captures desired aspects of resilience than the integration metric I.
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CHAPTER V
A COMPLEX NETWORKS APPROACH TO DEFINING
SOS ALTERNATIVES
The second step in the ReSSNET methodology requires a method for generating SoS
design alternatives. An SoS design (e.g., an IE network) is defined by it’s initial
network topology and adaptation method, due to the networked nature of SoS and a
focus on resilience achieved through adaptation for this thesis. Therefore, methods for
defining potential network topologies and adaptation methods are needed to generate
design alternatives. Since resilience depends on the specific threat faced, a method
for defining potential network threats is also required. These needs are reflected in
research question four (repeated here for convenience):
Research Question 4: How should we define potential SoS network
topologies, threats, and adaptation methods?
The initial network topology, adaptation method, and threat type are referred to
as network design variables, forming a 3-dimensional network design space (notionally
shown in fig. 29). Threat type is included in the design space despite being out of
the control of SoS designers because the performance of SoS networks likely depends
on the threat faced. The axes of this design space can be categorical or continuous,
depending on the topologies, threats, and adaptation methods considered.
A complex networks approach is used to generate SoS design alternatives, due to
the coevolutionary nature of network resilience (see section 2.3.2). Additionally, the
focus on real world networks within the complex networks domain likely results in
methods that are more applicable to real SoS problems than many graph-theoretic
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Figure 29: Notional network design space.
methods, which often focus on abstract graphs. Many complex networks also rep-
resent systems that have naturally evolved into their current state, with no clear
central control figure and little external guidance. And yet despite the lack of a cen-
tral designer, these systems often display a surprising level of efficiency and inherent
robustness. Examples of such systems include the US economy, communication net-
works, transportation networks, societies, market systems, organisms, ant colonies,
and ecosystems [76]. This observation further motivates a complex networks approach
to generating SoS designs, and is summarized by the following quote:
...can something be learned from [complex systems and networks] that
would help us build not only better airplanes and computers, but also
smarter robots, safer buildings, more effective disaster response systems,
and better planetary probes? - Minai et al. [76]
This chapter describes complex network methods selected to define potential net-
work topologies, threats, and adaptation methods, as well as an experiment performed
to validate the IE network model for the selected network designs.
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5.1 Defining Network Topologies
Scale-free and random networks are used to represent two potential classes of network
topologies for this thesis (see section 2.3.2 for a discussion of scale-free and random
networks). Scale-free networks represent the class of networks with a heterogeneous,
hub and spoke-like structure. These network hubs often improve the efficiency of
networks (e.g., enabling fast message delivery in an IE network). Random networks
represent the class of networks with a homogeneous, random structure. Scale-free
networks are generated with the BA model. These networks are relevant to SoS de-
signs because of their common occurrence in many naturally occurring and engineered
networks. Random networks are generated with the ER model. Comparing scale-free
networks to random networks provides an understanding of the importance of defining
features in scale-free networks, since many of those features are not present in random
networks (e.g., network hubs). Scale-free and random networks also show different
behaviors when subjected to random and targeted node removals (see section 2.3.3),
further supporting their use for comparisons of potential SoS network designs.
5.2 Defining Network Threats
The typical method for modeling complex network threats is targeted and random
node removal. Targeted removals represent attacks where an adversary has knowl-
edge of the network topology and uses that knowledge to intentionally damage a
network. Varying the targeting strategy enables representation of a variety of threats
or uncertainty in potential threats. Potential targeting strategies include targeting by
node degree [10, 59], various centrality measures [111], geographic location [103], and
cascading neighbors of a randomly selected node [38]. Random removals represent
random failures of network nodes or unintentional network damage.
Targeted and random node removal is used to define potential SoS threats for
this thesis because of the networked nature of SoS. Targeting is done by recalculated
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Figure 30: Notional example of performance data for an SoS network subjected to
repeated, targeted node removals (Sthreat = 1, Nthreats = 3). The highlighted node
and its incident links are removed at each attack, using the RD removal strategy.
Node sizes are scaled by recalculated node degree, showing that the most connected
node (largest in size) is removed at each attack.
node degree (RD), where the most connected node is removed at each attack, with
node degrees being recalculated, or updated, following any change to the network
topology. If there are multiple nodes with the maximum degree in the network, one
of those nodes is randomly removed. RD targeting is used because it focuses on node
connectivity, which is expected to be critical to the performance of SoS networks.
Random removals (R) remove nodes uniformly at random. Random removals are used
because they represents the opposite case of RD targeting, providing an understanding
of the range of impacts threat types can have on SoS network resilience.
Removing a node models an attack on or failure of a system in an SoS. Once
a node is removed from the network, all incident links are also removed (i.e., all
links connected to that node are removed). A limitation of this method is that
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removals only allow modeling of threats that completely disable nodes. However, this
approach can be extended to include partial node failures by having threats alter
node properties, rather than removing nodes from a network.
Threat size, Sthreat, is defined to specify the number of nodes removed in a single
removal event (i.e., within a single time step). RD threats with Sthreat > 1 remove
nodes according to their degree at the beginning of a removal event, such that node
degrees are only recalculated after all Sthreat nodes are removed.
Repeated node removals are also considered, to represent scenarios in which an
SoS is subjected to multiple network attacks over time. For threats with Nthreats > 1
repeated removals, the same targeting strategy is used for each removal. Removal
events are defined to occur at equal intervals in time within a given scenario, such
that tD,1 − t0 = tD,2 − tD1 = tD,3 − tD2 = . . . = tfinal − tD,Nthreats . Figure 30 shows a
notional example of a repeated threat scenario.
5.3 Defining Network Adaptation Methods
Network adaptation to node removals is modeled by allowing neighbors of removed
nodes to rewire lost links following threat, or node removal, events. More precisely,
if node i is removed from a network, all neighbors of node i rewire their previous link
with node i to another node in the network that they are not currently linked with
(according to the network topology at the beginning of an adaptation event). Since
nodes choose new neighbors based on the topology at the beginning of an adaptation
event, there is a possibility for two rewiring nodes to choose to rewire links to each
other, in which case one of those links does not get rewired and is lost. However,
in the absence of such duplicate rewirings, L (tD,i) = L (tA,i), where L (tD,i) is the
number of links in the network before the ith removal event, L (tA,i) is the number
of links in the network after the corresponding adaptation event, and tD,i < tA,i. If a
rewiring node is already linked with all remaining nodes in the network, no rewiring
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Figure 31: Notional example of performance data for an SoS network that adapts to
a targeted node removal through random rewiring. The red highlighted node and its
incident links are removed at time tD. The network is then allowed to rewire lost
links (highlighted in green) at time tA. Node sizes are scaled by recalculated node
degree.
action is taken by that node.
A delay time, tadapt, is incorporated into the adaptation model, such that tA,i =
tD,i + tadapt, where tA,i is the adaptation time and tD,i is the threat event time. This
time delay represents the time required for network nodes to rewire links following a
threat event. Figure 31 shows a notional example of network adaptation following a
threat event.
Recalculated node degree, preferential attachment, and random rewiring are used
to define how nodes choose to rewire links for potential adaptation methods. Similar
to the use of scale-free and random networks as potential topologies, using these adap-
tation methods provide an understanding of the range of effects adaptation methods
can have on SoS network resilience.
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Recalculated degree adaptation (RDA) is based on recalculated degree-based threats
(RD threats). This adaptation method requires rewiring nodes to choose the most
connected nodes in the network as new neighbors. Therefore, a node rewiring nrewires
links in an adaptation event (i.e., within a given time step) will rewire to the nrewires
most connected nodes it is not already linked with. Node degrees are recalculated
at the start of every adaptation event. This adaptation method should create net-
work hubs over time, since rewiring nodes always link with the most highly connected
nodes. For the IE network model, these hubs should improve the ability of a network
to quickly share information and make the network more resilient to future random
removals. However, these hubs may also make a network more susceptible to targeted
attacks [10].
Preferential adaptation (PA) is based on the BA preferential attachment model
and defines the probability,
∏
(ki), that a rewiring node chooses to rewire a link to






j=1 kj if ni ∈ V
0 otherwise,
(52)
where ki is the degree of node i and V is the set of all nodes the rewiring node is not
currently linked with. This adaptation should also create network hubs over time,
though the connectivity of those hubs should be less than with RDA because there is
a non-zero probability of choosing nodes with low connectivity.
Random rewiring is modeled by allowing rewiring nodes to choose new neighbors
uniformly at random from the set of possible neighbors, V . This method defines the
probability,
∏








Random rewiring is considered because similar random adaptation methods have been
shown to improve network robustness [97, 71, 111]. However, this implementation of
random adaptation differs from previous ones in the literature by focusing on rewiring
existing links, rather than link re-addition or link swaps (see section 2.3.3 for further
discussion of previous work in the literature). This adaptation method should limit
the presence of network hubs since node degrees are not considered when nodes choose
new neighbors. A lack of network hubs should provide less network efficiency than
RDA and PA, but more resilience to targeted attacks.
These methods range from being deterministically defined by node degree (RDA),
to being probabilistically defined by node degree (PA), to having no consideration of
node degree (random rewiring). Progressing from RDA to PA to random rewiring
can also be viewed as increasing the randomness allowed in network adaptation.
The selected methods for defining potential network topologies, threats, and adap-
tation methods are summarized in the following answer to research question four:
Response to RQ 4: A complex networks approach is taken towards
generating SoS design alternatives, because it provides methods that con-
sider the coevolutionary nature of resilience, as well as real world network
topologies and evolutionary processes. The methods used to define net-
work initial topologies, threats, and adaptation methods are shown in
table 5.
5.4 EXP 2: IE Network Model Validation
Purpose of the experiment: Validate that the IE network model matches results from
the complex networks literature for scenarios using generated SoS design alternatives.
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Table 5: Selected methods for generating SoS design alternatives
Network design variable Selected methods for defining the variable
Initial topology Scale-free networks (BA model)
Random networks (ER model)
Threat Targeted node removals (recalculated node degree)
Random node removals




Having selected network topologies and threats to focus on for this thesis, experiment
two (EXP 2) is performed to validate the IE network model for relevant scenarios. The
model is considered validated if it matches results from the literature for changes to
the largest connected component (LCC) and inverse average path length of scale-free
and random networks, following RD and random node removals. This validation does
not use the capability defined for IE networks (i.e., the ability to receive messages)
because there are no such results in the literature to validate against. Instead, the
size of the LCC and inverse average path length are used because they are commonly
used in the literature to measure network resilience. Additionally, these properties are
expected to be critical to the ability of an IE network to provide its desired capability.
These validation results also do not consider network adaptation; however, the
omission of network adaptation is accepted because the algorithms used to model
adaptation are similar to those used to generate network topologies and model node
removal threats. Additionally, no results exist in the literature with network adapta-
tion implemented in a manner similar to this thesis.
Validation results shown are averages from 100 simulation replications of each
scenario, where a scenario is defined by the network topology and threat. Since
the BA and ER models used to generate network topologies are stochastic, each
replication for a given scenario is not guaranteed (or even likely) to begin with the
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same network topology. However, each replication for a given scenario begins with a
topology generated by the same algorithm, and uses the same algorithm to perform
node removals. Random threats are also stochastic, further introducing variability
into results.
Experiment Results
Albert et al. show that scale-free and random networks have similar robustness to
random node removals, based on changes to the size of the LCC; however, scale-
free networks are more susceptible to RD node removals than random networks [10,
11]. Figure 32 shows results from the IE model for scale-free and random networks
subjected to RD and random node removals. The size, S, of the LCC is normalized by
the initial network size N , and plotted against the fraction, f , of nodes removed from
the network. The simulated scenarios use the same topologies and threats as those
from [10, 11], except that the IE model uses networks of size N = 100, while Albert
et al. use networks of size N = 10, 000 (all networks have L = 2N links). However,
Albert et al. note that their results are independent of network size, enabling the use
of smaller networks for the IE model to reduce computation time.
IE model results show that S linearly decreases at similar rates for scale-free and
random networks facing random threats. However, both networks show a critical
point at which the LCC size non-linearly drops to near-zero values for RD targeted
threats. This critical failure point occurs sooner for scale-free networks than it does
for random networks. These results match those from [10, 11].
Holme et al. show results for inverse average path length in addition to S/N , in
their study of complex network robustness [59]. Figure 33 shows results from the
IE model for scale-free and random networks subjected to initial degree (D) and RD
node removals. Initial degree threats are considered to further validate the model for
other potential threats. Results for network robustness measured by 〈d〉′ are similar
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Figure 32: Comparison of the robustness of scale-free (SF) and random (ER) net-
works, subjected to random (R) and recalculated degree (RD) threats. Scale-free
networks are generated using the BA model with m0 = 5 and m = 2. Random
networks are generated with the ER model with L = 200. Networks have N = 100
nodes. Threats remove two nodes at each removal event, such that Nthreat = 2.
to those measured by S/N . Initial degree threats are less damaging than recalculated
degree threats. These results match those from [59].
Outcome of EXP 2: The IE network model is considered validated for
this thesis, because it matches trends from the literature for the robustness
of scale-free and random networks to RD and random node removals,
measured by changes to the size of the LCC and inverse average path
length.
5.5 Summary of Methods for Generating SoS Alternatives
and Validation Results
Complex network methods are used to perform the second step of the ReSSNET
methodology (see fig. 34). The IE network model is then validated for relevant sce-
narios, based on methods selected to generate SoS network designs. The following
summarizes research questions, answers, and experiments from this chapter:
 RQ 4: How should we define potential SoS network topologies, threats, and
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Figure 33: Comparison of the robustness of scale-free (SF) and random (ER) net-
works, subjected to initial degree (D) and recalculated degree (RD) threats. Scale-free
networks are generated using the BA model with m0 = 5 and m = 3. Random net-
works are generated with the ER model with L = 4500. Networks have N = 1500
nodes. Threats remove one nodes at each removal event, such that Nthreat = 1.
adaptation methods?
 Response to RQ 4: A complex networks approach is taken towards generat-
ing SoS design alternatives, because it provides methods that consider the co-
evolutionary nature of resilience, as well as real world network topologies and
evolutionary processes. The methods used to define network initial topologies,
threats, and adaptation methods are shown in table 5.
 Outcome of EXP 2: The IE network model is considered validated for this thesis,
because it matches trends from the literature for the robustness of scale-free and
random networks to RD and random node removals, measured by changes to
the size of the LCC and inverse average path length.
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Figure 34: Updated overview of the ReSSNET methodology with the selected method
for generating SoS design alternatives.
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CHAPTER VI
EVALUATING SOS ALTERNATIVES WITH RSM
The third step in the ReSSNET methodology requires methods for evaluating the SoS
design alternatives generated in step two. This evaluation should provide an under-
standing of the advantages and disadvantages of considered alternatives, such that an
analyst can make informed decisions in the design of current or future SoS networks.
This need is reflected in research question five (repeated here for convenience):
Research Question 5: What methods should be used to compare SoS
design alternatives and understand their advantages and disadvantages?
The process of evaluating SoS network designs is separated into two phases: (1)
an exploration study of the resilience of generated network designs within the network
design space and (2) an optimization study of the most resilient network designs as
the network threat is varied. The purpose of the exploration study is to develop
a general understanding of how SoS resilience changes as network design variables
(initial topology, adaptation method, and threat) are changed. This phase compares
the resilience of potential network designs to potential threats, as specified by table 5.
The design space considered in this exploration study is a categorical design space
(as opposed to a continuous space), since only two or three settings are considered
for each of the design variables, with each setting being defined by a different model.
These models, as currently defined, do not enable a continuous representation of
the design space. This exploration study directly compares designs of interest, but
provides limited insights into the behaviors of potential designs existing in the space
between the specified variable settings.
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Figure 35: Notional view of the network design space, where categorical network
designs from table 5 are displayed as circles. Red arrows and the shaded region
represent the consideration of the continuous space between categorically defined
network designs. The threat variable is not shown in this 2-dimensional view.
The purpose of the optimization study is to expand on the exploration study and
identify how the optimal network design (with respect to resilience) changes as the
threat variable changes. This study uses a continuous representation of the design
space specified by table 5, to allow the optimizer to consider network designs with
topologies between scale-free and random, and adaptation methods between RDA,
PA, and random (see fig. 35). A continuous representation of potential threats enables
the threat to be transitioned from fully targeted to fully random. This study should
provide an understanding of how the optimal design transitions from one optimal to
another, as threat randomness is increased. For example, the optimal topology may
show a smooth transition, where the randomness in the optimal topology gradually
increases or decreases as the threat randomness increases. Alternatively, the optimal
topology may show a sharp transition, with a critical point at which the optimal
shifts from fully scale-free to fully random, or vice versa. Characterizing the behavior
of the optimal design throughout the range of potential threats improves the ability
of SoS network designers to design for resilience.
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Methods for evaluating design alternatives, specifically those from the field of
statistical experimental design, are reviewed for use in this step of the methodology.
Following this review, results are discussed from experiment three, which identifies
methods that can be used to generate a continuous network design space for the
optimization phase of the evaluation process.
6.1 Statistical Experimental Design for Resilient SoS
Method Requirements and Alternatives
The method used to evaluate SoS design alternatives should provide a thorough un-
derstanding of advantages and disadvantages of considered alternatives, such that a
designer can identify what types of network designs are best suited for certain sce-
narios. The method should also enable optimization of a continuous design space, to
provide an in-depth understanding of SoS network resilience. Given the large scale
and complexity of most SoS, the method should be computationally feasible for sim-
ulation studies of SoS. Based on these observations, a set of requirements are derived
for selecting a method to evaluate SoS alternatives. The selected method should:
 be rigorous, with quantified comparisons of design alternatives,
 enable optimization of a continuous design space,
 and be computationally feasible for SoS simulation studies.
One approach to evaluating SoS network designs is to perform a one-factor-at-a-
time (OFAT) study. OFAT studies measure the effects of system factors by performing
simulation experiments where one factor is varied and all other factors held constant.
This approach requires a large number of simulation runs to understand the effects
of all system factors. Additionally, an OFAT approach does not consider potential
interactions, since all other factor levels are held constant. Since network topologies,
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threats, and adaptation methods are expected to show strong interactions, OFAT is
not used for this thesis.
Another approach is to simulate and analyze every possible case of interest. Run-
ning every case of interest enables direct comparisons of generated design alternatives,
including the use of some statistical design methods to analyze simulated scenarios.
This approach can also be referred to as using a full-factorial experimental design,
since every combination of design settings is considered. However, for large, multi-
dimensional design spaces, as are common with SoS designs, this approach can require
significant computational time due to the large number of possible combinatorial de-
signs. Given the scale of many SoS networks, SoS simulations may be too complex
and have too large of a computational requirement to consider the full design space
within a reasonable period of time. Additionally, determining the optimal design from
a full-factorial design limits the resolution with which the optimal can be determined,
since a discrete number of design settings is used to define the design space. For ex-
ample, if five settings are considered for the initial network topology and adaptation
method, then the resolution of optimal variable settings is limited to those five levels.
A third approach is using statistical experiment design methods. The field of
statistical experimental design provides methods that can be used to analyze, design,
and optimize new systems or products. This approach attempts to more intelligently
explore a design space than through a simple full-factorial experiment, significantly
reducing computational expenses. Statistical experimental design also provides meth-
ods for modeling a design space with a continuous function, which can be used by
a continuous function optimizer to determine the best design alternatives. A review
is given of statistical experiment design methods, due to their potential to efficiently
analyze and optimize SoS design alternatives.
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Background on Statistical Experimental Design
Statistical experimental design, or Design of Experiments (DoE), uses statistical
methods to determine experimental settings, or levels, and interpret data collected
from those experiments. Sir Ronald Fisher, a pioneering researcher in the field of
experiment design, describes an example experiment in which the hypothesis that a
lady can determine whether milk or tea was first added to a cup of tea can be tested,
and acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis substantiated [47]. Motivation for much
of Fisher’s work came from the realization that “statistical analysis of data could be
informative only if the data themselves were informative, and that informative data
could best be assured by applying statistical ideas to the way in which the data were
collected in the first place” [102]. The methods developed by Fisher and others in the
field are used in many research domains, including biology, sociology, and engineering
design. Many books [26, 68, 78, 77] and review papers [118, 102] provide a thorough
discussion of this topic, including a discussion of experimental design specifically for
simulation studies [69].
Many experimental design studies begin with a screening experiment, which iden-
tifies factors that most strongly affect the response. 2-level factorial designs are often
used for screening experiments and the identification of main effects of factors and
interactions between factors. Following the identification of factor and interaction
effects, a response surface (also referred to as a metamodel or surrogate model) can
be created from current or additional experimental data to predict the outcome of
the response at different factor levels. Response surfaces can be used to efficiently
optimize a system design for simulation studies.
This section provides a brief overview of statistical experiment design from the
perspective of a simulation design study, focusing on aspects relevant to this thesis.
The overview begins with basic terminology, then describes 2-level factorial designs
and response surface methodology.
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Basic Terminology
Experimental design attempts to develop an understanding of the effects indepen-
dent and dependent variables have on a specified performance measure for a system
or process. The independent and dependent variables are referred to as factors. The
performance measure is referred to as a response. A design point is a specific combi-
nation of factor levels.
Factors can be qualitative (also referred to as categorical) or quantitative. Qual-
itative factors have distinctly defined levels that are typically not numerical. Quan-
titative factors can be represented numerically, often in a continuous manner. The
factors considered in this thesis are the network initial topology, threat, and adap-
tation method. These factors are qualitatively defined for the exploration phase of
evaluating SoS alternatives, with each level defined in table 5. These factors are
quantitatively defined for the optimization phase of evaluating SoS alternatives. The
response considered in this thesis is the resilience of an SoS network, measured by
Rtotal.
Factors can also be defined as controllable or uncontrollable. For a system de-
signer, a controllable factor is one that the designer can specify in the design process.
An uncontrollable factor is one that is not within the control of the designer, such as
noise factors or uncertainty regarding the environment within which the system op-
erates. Most simulation experiments focus on controllable factors, since those are the
ones that can be set in the design process. However, uncontrollable factors are often
included in a simulation experiment to provide information regarding the behavior of
a system as those factors are changed. For this thesis, the initial network topology
and adaptation method are controllable factors, while the threat is uncontrollable.
One of the key principles of experimental design is replication. Replication is
the process of making multiple runs at each design point within an experiment. For
example, if an experimental design for a simulation study has m replications, m
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simulation runs will be performed at each combination of factor levels, resulting in m
observations of the system response for each design point. The concept of a replication
is different from that of a repetition. Repetition is the process of making multiple
measurements from a single run of a design point. Consider a manufacturing study
that aims to improve the tolerance of a specified dimension in a component. An
experimental design with m repetitions would measure the dimension of the same
component m times. An experimental design with m replications would measure
the dimension of m different components once, where each component is produced
under the same conditions (i.e., factor levels). For simulation studies, replication is
used to account for randomness in stochastic simulations, since the response, yi, of a
stochastic simulation at design point i is a random variable.
For experiments with replications, the sample mean and variance of observed sys-
tem responses are often used to characterize system performance. Let yi1, yi2, . . . , yim
be observations for the response of a system at design point i, where m replications
are performed. The sample mean, ȳi, is used to estimate the population mean or true







Since these observations are independently and identically distributed (IID) random
variables, ȳi is an unbiased estimator of µi. The sample variance is similarly an






(yij − ȳi)2 . (55)
A confidence interval for µi can be used to measure the precision with which ȳi
estimates µi. A 100(1 − α) percent confidence interval (specifically a t confidence





where tm−1,1−α is the standard t-statistic from the t-distribution with m− 1 degrees
of freedom. This confidence interval should be interpreted as an interval that may
vary from sample to sample for a given population or experiment; the proportion of
times that independently calculated intervals contains µi is 1−α. This proportion is
called the coverage of the confidence interval, where a confidence interval is said to
cover µi if it contains µi. This representation of a confidence interval for µi assumes
that the yi random variables are normally distributed. Non-normal responses will
decrease the correctness of the confidence interval. Law provides a description of the
effect the distribution of yi has on the coverage of the t confidence interval [69].
2-Level Factorial Designs
2-level factorial designs, or 2k factorial designs, consider k factors with two levels
for each factor. Design points can be displayed as a design matrix, where levels are
represented by a “+” or “−” in a table. Table 6 shows an example design matrix for
a 23 factorial design. For experiments where m replications are performed at each
design point, the response, yi, for design point i is defined as the sample mean of
responses from all replications of that design point [calculated with eq. (54)]. 2-level
factorial designs are often used to determine factor main effects and interactions.
The main effect, e, of a factor is defined as the change in the response as that factor
is changed from its “−” level to its “+” level, averaged over all levels of other factors.
A positive main effect (i.e., e > 0) means that on average, changing a factor from its
“−” level to its “+” level will increase the response. A negative main effect means
that on average, changing a factor from its “−” level to its “+” level will decrease
the response. The magnitude of e determines how much of an effect, on average, a
change in the factor level has on the response value. However, if interactions exist
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Table 6: Example design matrix for a 23 factorial design
Design point Factor A Factor B Factor C Response
1 − − − y1
2 + − − y2
3 − + − y3
4 + + − y4
5 − − + y5
6 + − + y6
7 − + + y7
8 + + + y8
between factors, interpretations of main effects must consider other factor levels.
Interaction effects account for the presence of interactions between two factors,
where the effect of one factor may depend on the level of another factor. The inter-
action effect, eAB, between two factors A and B, is defined as the difference between
the average effect of factor A with factor B at its “+” level, and the average effect
of factor A with factor B at its “−” level. By convention, the interaction effect is
calculated as half of this difference. The interaction, eABC , between factors A, B, and
C is half the difference between the average AB interaction with factor C at its “+”
level, and the average AB interaction with factor C at its “−” level. See appendix A
for calculations of main effects and interactions.
For experiments using stochastic simulations, it may be necessary to determine if
the observed effects are statistically significant, rather than effects due to random-
ness in the sampled data. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) can be used to determine
statistical significant of effects [78]. ANOVA calculates a sum of squares for each
effect, a total sum of squares, and an error sum of squares. These sum of squares are
used to calculate mean squares and corresponding F -test statistics, which are then
compared to the F -distribution to determine p-values. A p-value is the probability
that a value drawn from the F -distribution is greater than or equal to the F -test
statistic. If the p-value for an effect is less than or equal to a specified significance
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level α (e.g., p ≤ 0.05 for a 5 % significance level), the null hypothesis that the effect
is not significant is rejected.
Response Surface Methodology
Response surface methodology (RSM) provides techniques for constructing a model
of the response of a system based on observed data. A response surface, or regression
model, attempts to explain the relationship between the response of a system, y, and
a vector of explanatory input variables (or factors), x, such that
y = f (x) + ε, (57)
where ε is an error term that represents variability not described by f . Multiple linear
regression represents the response as a polynomial model in the following form,
y = β0 +
k∑
i=1
βixi + ε = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + . . .+ βkxk + ε, (58)
where x1, x2, . . . , xk are regressor variables and β0, β1, . . . , βk are regression coeffi-
cients. Equation (58) is a first-order model. Interaction and higher order terms can
be added to the model to handle more complex systems that are not well-represented
by a first-order model. For example, a second-order model with interaction terms and
two input variables, x1 and x2, could take the following form,




2 + β12x1x2 + ε. (59)
The method of least squares is usually used to estimate regression coefficients,
based on a set of data containing n > k observations of the response at n design
points or combinations of input variables [78]. The data used to fit the model is
referred to as fit or training data. Validation data refers to data used to validate the
model, or check its adequacy. Validation data can be separate from or part of the
fit data. Once regression coefficients are estimated, a regression model is obtained,
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which can be used to predict a response given a set of input variable settings or values.
Since this regression model is a simple polynomial model of the data, potential system
designs can be quickly evaluated within an optimization process.
Model fit checks must be performed to determine if a regression model is accurate
enough for use in a simulation study. Hypothesis testing with ANOVA can be used
to test for the significance of the regression, with regards to explaining the variability
in the observed data [78]. The hypotheses used in this test are
H0 : β1 = β2 = · · · = βk = 0 (60)
H1 : βj 6= 0 for at least one j. (61)
If the p-value calculated from ANOVA is less than the specified significance level
(i.e., p < α), then we can reject the null hypothesis that none of the regressor vari-
ables contributes significantly to the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis provides
statistical support for using the regression model.
The coefficient of multiple determination, R2, provides another goodness of fit
measure for the model. R2 measures how much of the variability in the data is
explained by the model, as opposed to being explained by residuals. Low R2 values
indicate a poor model fit, where 0 ≤ R ≤ 1. One issue with using R2 to check model
adequacy is that R2 always increases as the number of regressors increases, regardless
of whether or not additional regressors are statistically significant. The adjusted R2
statistic, R2adj, can be used to account for the inclusion of unnecessary regressors,
since R2adj will not always increase as regressors are added; R
2
adj can actually decrease
as unnecessary regressors are added.
A plot of predicted versus actual responses provides a visual test for model ade-
quacy. A good model fit should show minimal separation between plotted data points
and a 1:1 reference line representing a perfect fit to the training data.
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Residual analysis can also be used for goodness of fit checks. A residual, ei, for
the ith observation is calculated as
ei = yi − ŷi, (62)
where yi is the observed response for the ith observation and ŷi is the predicted
response for that observation. A residual versus predicted plot shows the magnitude
of residuals from the model. A random scattering of points in this plot is desired,
since that suggests normality in the residuals. An underlying assumption in linear
regression is that model errors, or residuals, are normally distributed. Patterns in the
residual plot often suggest the need for a transformation in the fitted data. A normal
probability plot of the residuals provides another visual representation of how close
residuals are to being normally distributed. Histogram plots of model percent error
from fit data (model fit error) and validation data (model representation error) give
further insight into the normality and magnitude of residuals. Model percent error





A lack of fit test can be used for regression models fit to experimental designs with
replications [78]. This test determines if there is strong evidence that the underlying
function, f , for the data is in fact linear, using a hypothesis test with the F -test
statistic. If there is no statistical evidence that underlying function is linear, a linear
regression model is deemed unfit for the data.
RSM for Designing Resilient SoS Networks
Statistical experimental design, in particular RSM, provides methods for comparing
SoS design alternatives, identifying factor main effects and interactions, and optimiz-
ing network design settings with linear regression models. A disadvantage of using
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linear regression is that there is some level of error in the model. However, the effi-
cient use of computational time offered by RSM experimental designs outweighs the
potential for model inaccuracies expected from using linear regression. Therefore,
an RSM approach is used to evaluate SoS design alternatives, answering research
question five as follows:
Response to RQ 5: An RSM approach with multiple linear regression
is used to explore and optimize SoS design alternatives, providing insight
into the advantages and disadvantages of potential SoS networks.
6.2 EXP 3: Interpolating the Network Design Space
Purpose of the experiment: Answer research question 5.1 by defining models that can
be used to interpolate between scale-free and random network topologies, as well as
RD and random network threats.
The optimization phase of evaluating network designs represents the network de-
sign space as a continuous design space. In comparison, the design space generated
in chapter 5 (which is used for the exploration phase) only considers categorically
defined network designs. A categorical design space limits the ability to gain insights
into the performance of intermediately defined networks. A continuous representation
of the network design space enables a more thorough investigation of how network
adaptation can be used to provide resilience to network threats. From an optimization
perspective, a continuous design space provides an optimizer with an exhaustive set
of potential designs to consider, giving a designer confidence that they are sufficiently
exploring the best set of potential alternatives.
An approach to generating a continuous network design space is to define a model
for each design variable that can be used to interpolate from one setting of the vari-
able to another. If this model is parameterized by a single model parameter, then
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design variable settings can be continuously changed by altering the value of that pa-
rameter. An example of this approach is the small-world network model from Watts
and Strogatz [113]. Their simple model interpolates between regular and random
networks by varying a single model parameter, p. Their model begin with a regular
network, defined as a ring lattice with N nodes, each with a degree of k. Each link
is then randomly rewired with probability p. Therefore, if p = 0, a regular network
is generated. If p = 1, a random network is generated. Values of 0 < p < 1 generate
intermediate network topologies in the space between regular and random.
Defining a model similar to the small-world network model for the network topolo-
gies, adaptation methods, and threats defined in chapter 5 would enable an explo-
ration of a continuous network design space. Based on generated network designs,
the network topology interpolation model should be able to continuously transition
from scale-free to random networks, and the network threat model from RD to ran-
dom node removals. Since the adaptation methods defined for this thesis are either
degree-based or random, the model used to interpolate between RD and random
threats can also be used for interpolating between adaptation methods. The need
for topology and threat interpolation models is reflected in the following research
question:
Research Question 5.1: What models should be used to interpolate
between scale-free and random networks, and RD and random threats?
This research question is defined as a sub-question of research question five because it
further answers the question of what methods should be used to compare and evaluate
SoS design alternatives.
Model Requirements and Alternatives
The interpolation models selected should be able to generate topologies that struc-
turally match scale-free and random networks, and generate threats able to replicate
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the effects of RD and random threats on the structure of scale-free and random net-
works. This analysis focuses on structural network properties because at their most
fundamental level, networks are defined by their structure. The importance of net-
work structural properties is reflected in their widespread use in the complex networks
literature.
Complex network topologies are often represented by their degree distribution,
because these distributions provide a quantitative way to capture and visualize the
overall connectivity of network nodes. Considering the topologies used in this thesis,
scale-free and random networks have significantly different degree distributions (see
section 2.3.2). Therefore, one requirement for a topology interpolation model is the
ability to generate networks with degree distributions matching those of scale-free
and random networks. The second requirement is the ability to generate interme-
diate network topologies that smoothly transition from scale-free to random, again
measured by changes to network degree distributions.
The effect of RD and random threats on scale-free and random networks is often
characterized by changes to the size of the LCC and inverse average path length
[10, 59]. Therefore, the primary requirement for the threat interpolation model is
the ability to generate threats that replicate the structural effects of RD and random
threats on scale-free and random networks. Structural effects are measured by changes
to the LCC and inverse average path length. A second requirement is the ability to
generate intermediate threats that smoothly transition between RD and random. The
following requirements are set for selecting network topology and threat interpolation
models:
 The topology model should be able to generate networks with degree distribu-
tions matching scale-free and random networks.
 The threat model should be able to generate threats that affect the structure
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(measured by size of the LCC and inverse average path length) of scale-free and
random networks similar to the way RD and random threats affect the structure
of those networks.
 The topology and threat models should be able to generate intermediate topolo-
gies that smoothly transition between scale-free and random topologies, and in-
termediate threats that smoothly transition between RD and random threats.
A potential model for interpolating between scale-free and random networks is the
Degree and Locality-based Attachment (DLA) model [119]. The DLA model extends
the BA model for scale-free networks by incorporating a degree preference parameter,
u, and considering node distances, in addition to node degrees, when forming new
links. The model begins with a small number of unlinked nodes, N0, and grows the
network by adding a new node to the network at each time step. Each new node is
added with m links. Two attachment rules are used for determining which existing
nodes are connected to by those m links.









where u is the degree preference parameter and N is the current size of the network.
The degree preference parameter determines how much preference to give to highly
connected nodes, with 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. A preference of u = 0 does not consider the
degree of a node when choosing neighbors, resulting in links being randomly connected
among existing nodes. A preference of u = 1 is equivalent to preferential attachment
used in the BA model, and therefore results in scale-free networks. For m > 1, the
remaining link(s) are added such that the probability an existing node j with geodesic









where γ is the locality preference parameter, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. High values of γ give
preference to nodes in the neighborhood of the newly selected neighbor.
The DLA model can be adapted to interpolate between scale-free and random
topologies by using eq. (64) to define preferential attachment for all links. Therefore,
by changing the degree preference parameter from zero to one, network topologies
ranging from random (u = 0) to scale-free (u = 1) can be generated.
Another potential model for interpolating between scale-free and random networks
is a model proposed by Gómez-Gardeñes and Moreno [49] (referred to as the GM
model within this thesis). The GM model is defined by a single parameter, α, which
determines the node heterogeneity of generated networks, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The
model begins with a fully connected network of m0 nodes, similar to the BA model.
However, unlike the BA model, the network also begins with a set U of unconnected
nodes, where |U| = N −m0 and N is the total network size. The model then steps
through N −m0 steps, where the ith step adds m links for the ith node in the set U
of initially unconnected nodes. Each of the m links added at a time step are added
using one of two attachment models. With probability α, a node links to any other
node in the total set of N nodes with uniform probability, such that the probability






With probability 1−α, a node links to another node using some form of preferential
attachment based on node degrees. The authors define two potential functions to use
for modeling preferential attachment. However, since this thesis seeks a model that
can replicate scale-free networks created by the BA model, preferential attachment
is defined using the BA model. Therefore, the probability,
∏
(kj), that an existing
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Using the GM model, scale-free networks can be generated with α = 0 and random
networks with α = 1.
The DLA and GM models are defined as models for interpolating between scale-
free and random network topologies. These models perform this interpolation by
adjusting the level of randomness allowed in the model, relative to degree-based pref-
erential attachment. Since the network threats considered in this thesis also range
from being degree-based to random, these models can be modified to interpolate
between RD and random threats.
For the DLA model, eq. (64) is used to define the probability that a node is
removed, rather than defining how new nodes add links. Therefore, u = 1 defines
preferential targeted threats and u = 0 defines random threats. Similarly, the GM
model can be used to define a network threat by having each node removed randomly
using eq. (66) with probability α, or in a targeted manner with probability 1−α. Two
types of targeting can be used with the GM model: one that preferentially targets
by node degree using eq. (67) (referred to as GM1) and another that always uses
recalculated node degree as described in section 5.2 (referred to as GM2).
Experimental Setup
Experiment three is performed to compare the ability of the DLA model and GM
model to interpolate the network design space generated in chapter 5, with respect to
the defined requirements for interpolating the space. The models are first tested for
use in interpolating between scale-free and random network topologies by comparing
degree distributions generated by each model for scale-free and random networks, to
those generated by the BA model (for scale-free topologies) and the ER model (for
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Table 7: IE network model parameters used for EXP 3
Parameter Settings used Description
N 100 Initial network size
L 200 Initial number of links in a network
[t0 tfinal] N/A Simulated scenario time interval (in seconds)
Sthreat 2 Number of nodes removed per threat event
Nthreats 24 Number of threat events within a scenario
tadapt N/A Adaptation delay time following a threat event (in sec-
onds)
µ 0 Message generation rate
∆ N/A Time sensitivity
random topologies). The models are then tested for use in interpolating between RD
and random threats by simulating changes to the LCC and inverse average path of
scale-free and random networks subjected to targeted and random threats generated
by the DLA and GM model, and comparing those to trends from networks subjected
to RD and random threats as defined in chapter 5.
Since topology comparisons only consider network degree distributions, no simu-
lation is needed. Instead, scale-free networks are generated using the BA, DLA, and
GM models, and random networks generating using the ER, DLA, and GM models.
1000 network replications are generated using each model, since they are stochastic
models. Networks are generated with N = 1000 nodes and L = 2000 links. Larger
networks are used for this comparison than others in this thesis to more clearly show
trends with respect to degree distributions.
Network simulations are required for the comparison of threat interpolation mod-
els. The IE network model is used for these comparisons, with simulation parameters
shown in table 7. Simulations are run with no message generation, since this exper-
iment only considers changes to the structure of networks as threats remove nodes.
Since no resilience calculations are performed, the simulated time scenario is also not
applicable; instead, enough time steps are used to simulate every threat event desired.
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Table 8: Experimental design matrix used for EXP 3 (50 replications at each point)
Design point Topology Threat
1 Scale-free (interpolated) RD
2 Scale-free (interpolated) RD (DLA)
3 Scale-free (interpolated) RD (GM)
4 Random (interpolated) RD
5 Random (interpolated) RD (DLA)
6 Random (interpolated) RD (GM)
7 Scale-free (interpolated) Random
8 Scale-free (interpolated) Random (DLA)
9 Scale-free (interpolated) Random (GM)
10 Random (interpolated) Random
11 Random (interpolated) Random (DLA)
12 Random (interpolated) Random (GM)
Simulation design points for threat interpolation comparisons are shown in ta-
ble 8. Topologies for these simulations are defined using the model selected from
the topology interpolation comparison. 50 replications are run at each design point.
Threats without a specified model (i.e., those specified as “RD” or “Random”) are
modeled as described in chapter 5.
Experiment Results (Topology Interpolation)
Figure 36 shows that scale-free networks generated using the BA and DLA models
have similar degree distributions. This result is expected, since for u = 1, the only
difference between the DLA model and the BA model is that the DLA model begins
with m0 disconnected nodes, while the BA model begins with m0 fully connected
nodes. Since the initial m0 nodes are disconnected in the DLA model, this model also
shows a non-zero probability of nodes with k < 2 links. In comparison, the BA model
ensures that all nodes have k ≥ 2 links. Despite this difference, the overall structure
of these networks is similar. Therefore, scale-free networks generated by the DLA
model are determined to sufficiently match those generated by the BA model.





















Figure 36: Degree distributions (plotted with exponentially increasing degree bin
sizes) for scale-free networks generated using BA and DLA models with N = 1000
nodes, L = 2000 links, m0 = 5, m = 2. The DLA model uses u = 1. Degree
distributions from two network instances are plotted on a log-log scale in (a). Degree
distributions from all 1000 replications are shown as a histogram in (b). pk is the
fraction of nodes in a network with degree k [i.e., pk = Pr (K = k)]. The dashed line
in (a) shows a linear power law, calculated using eq. (24) with γ = 3.
do not have similar degree distributions. Random networks generated with the DLA
model show less of an exponentially decaying tail at the high end of their degree
distributions than those from the ER model. Additionally, there are more low degree
nodes (k < 4) for random networks from the DLA model than the ER model.
These differences are due to the inclusion of network growth in the DLA model,
which is not included in the ER model. Including network growth exposes early
network nodes (i.e., those added to the network early in the growth process) to more
linking opportunities with new nodes than late network nodes (i.e., those added to the
network late in the growth process). Therefore, despite links being randomly added,
early network nodes have a higher average node degree than late network nodes,
creating the presence of more high degree nodes in the DLA model. In comparison,
the ER model exposes all nodes to the same number of linking opportunities, limiting
the presence of high degree nodes. Network growth also creates fewer low degree
nodes, because every new node added to the network is added with m = 2 links.



















Figure 37: Degree distributions for random networks generated using ER and DLA
models with N = 1000 nodes and L = 2000 links. The DLA model uses m0 = 5,
m = 2, and u = 0. Degree distributions from two network instances are plotted on
a log-log scale in (a). Degree distributions from all 1000 replications are shown as a
histogram in (b). The dashed line in (a) shows the expected Poisson distribution of
ER random networks, calculated using eq. (26) with 〈k〉 = 4.
a shift in the distribution peak for random networks generated with the DLA model
(near k = 2) compared to those from the ER model (near k = 4). Random networks
from the DLA model are therefore pseudo-random, since they do not fully match ER
random networks.
Figure 38 shows that the DLA model smoothly interpolates between DLA scale-
free networks (u = 1) and DLA random networks (u = 0), since degree distributions
gradually change from being linear to showing the curvature of ER networks. How-
ever, since DLA random networks are pseudo-random, the DLA model does not meet
the requirements established for a topology interpolation model.
The BA model and GM model (with α = 0) are identical algorithms for creating
scale-free networks, since the GM model always uses preferential attachment to add
the m links of each new node when α = 0. Therefore, only random networks are tested
for the GM interpolation model. Figure 39 shows that random networks generated
by the ER and GM model have similar degree distributions. Unlike those from the

























Figure 38: Degree distributions for single instances of networks generated using the
DLA model as the interpolation parameter u is varied (N = 1000 nodes, L = 2000
links, m0 = 5, and m = 2). These plots show cumulative degree distributions, where
Pk = Pr (K ≥ k), to enable better comparisons between distributions.
distribution. This peak is also at a similar location to ER random networks. GM
random networks differ from DLA random networks because the GM model does not
include network growth. For the DLA model, all added nodes are required to connect
to the currently existing connected component (i.e., the ith new node can only link
with i − 1 nodes). For the GM model, nodes in the set U of initially unconnected
nodes can link with any other node in the network, whether they are in the current
connected component or not. The ability to link with any node better replicates the
randomness of ER networks.
One difference between GM random networks and ER networks is that all nodes
have k ≥ 2 links in the GM model, which slightly reduces the number of low degree




















Figure 39: Degree distributions for random networks generated using ER and GM
models with N = 1000 nodes, L = 2000 links. The GM model uses m0 = 5, m = 2,
and α = 1. Degree distributions from two network instances are plotted on a log-log
scale in (a). Degree distributions from all 1000 replications are shown as a histogram
in (b).
difference has a small effect on the general shape of GM random network degree
distributions. To further verify that this difference minimally affects the behavior of
random networks, changes to the LCC and inverse average path length are compared
for GM and ER random networks facing RD and random threats. Results for the GM
random networks should match those from experiment two, since experiment two used
ER networks and non-interpolated RD and random threats. Figure 40 shows that
changing from ER to GM random networks has little effect on the general robustness
of random networks to RD and random threats.
Figure 41 shows that the GM model smoothly interpolates between GM scale-free
networks (α = 0) and GM random networks (α = 1). Therefore, the GM model meets
established requirements for a network topology interpolation model and is selected



























Figure 40: Changes to the size of the LCC normalized by N (a) and inverse aver-
age path length (b) with a fraction f of removed nodes for random networks facing
targeted (RD) and random (R) node removals. Networks have N = 100 nodes and
L = 200 links and are generated using the ER model (unfilled black symbols) and
























Figure 41: Degree distributions for single instances of networks generated using the
GM model as the interpolation parameter α is varied (N = 100 nodes, L = 200
links, m0 = 5, and m = 2). These plots show cumulative degree distributions, where
Pk = Pr (K ≥ k).
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Experiment Results (Threat Interpolation)
Algorithmically, random threats defined using the DLA model (with u = 0) or the GM
model (with α = 1) are identical to those described in section 5.2. Therefore, either
the DLA model or GM model can be used to represent random threats. However,
targeted threats are defined differently between the DLA model (with u = 1) and the
GM model (with α = 0).
Figures 42 and 43 show the effects of DLA and GM defined targeted threats on
scale-free and random networks. Targeting by the DLA model and GM1 model show
reduced impacts on the normalized size of the LCC, S/N , and the inverse average path
length, 〈d〉′, compared to RD threats. For random networks, DLA and GM1 targeted
threats actually more closely match a random threat than RD threat. However,
GM2 targeting is able to match the effects of RD threats on scale-free and random
networks. DLA and GM1 differ from GM2 and RD threats because DLA and GM1
use preferential targeting, which defines a non-zero probability of nodes without the
highest degrees being removed. Allowing low degree nodes to be removed results in
more threat randomness than GM2 and RD threats.
Figures 44 and 45 shows that the GM2 model smoothly interpolates between RD
threats (α = 0) and random threats (α = 1). Therefore, the GM2 model meets
established requirements for a network threat interpolation model and is selected for





























Figure 42: Changes to the size of the LCC (a) and inverse average path length (b)
with a fraction f of removed nodes for scale-free networks facing targeted threats
generated using the DLA model and two GM model variants. Scale-free topologies
are generated using the GM model with N = 100 nodes, L = 200 links, m0 = 5,
m = 2, and α = 0. Solid lines show data using RD threats as defined in section 5.2.




























Figure 43: Changes to the size of the LCC (a) and inverse average path length (b) with
a fraction f of removed nodes for random networks facing targeted threats generated
using the DLA model and two GM model variants. Random topologies are generated
using the GM model with N = 100 nodes, L = 200 links, m0 = 5, m = 2, and α = 1.
Solid lines show data using RD threats as defined in section 5.2. Dashed lines show







































Figure 44: Changes to the size of the LCC (a) and inverse average path length (b)
for scale-free networks facing GM2 threats with α varied. Scale-free topologies are
generated using the GM model with N = 100 nodes, L = 200 links, m0 = 5, m = 2,






































Figure 45: Changes to the size of the LCC (a) and inverse average path length (b)
for random networks facing GM2 threats with α varied. Scale-free topologies are
generated using the GM model with N = 100 nodes, L = 200 links, m0 = 5, m = 2,
and α = 1.
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Discussion of Results
Scale-free networks generated by the DLA and GM models closely match degree dis-
tributions of those generated by the BA model commonly used in the literature.
However, only the GM model is able to sufficiently match degree distributions of
random networks generated by the ER model. The DLA model does not match ER
random networks well because it includes network growth, which indirectly includes
preferential attachment for early network nodes. Network growth in the DLA model
results in the creation of pseudo-random networks, which approach a scale-free topol-
ogy rather than purely random one. These results support the claim by Barabási and
Albert that network growth is an important mechanism in the formation of scale-free
networks [22]. The GM model is also shown to smoothly interpolate between scale-
free and random networks, and is therefore selected as the topology interpolation
model.
The GM model (specifically GM2) is used to interpolate between network threats,
because it better captures the effects of RD threats on network robustness than GM1
and DLA threats. These results show that threats defined by preferential node re-
moval include too much randomness to replicate the damage inflicted by RD threats
on scale-free and random networks, despite their preference for removing high degree
nodes. Therefore, preferential threats can be viewed as an intermediate threat be-
tween RD and random ones. GM2 threats are also shown to smoothly interpolate
between RD and random threats. These results substantiate the following response
to research question 5.1:
Response to RQ 5.1: The GM model is used to interpolate between
scale-free and random networks, as well as RD and random threats using
GM2 targeting.
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Figure 46: Updated overview of the ReSSNET methodology with the selected SoS
network evaluation methods.
6.3 Summary of Methods for Evaluating SoS Alternatives
and Results
RSM provides methods for performing the third step of the ReSSNET methodology
(see fig. 46). This evaluation step is split into two phases, an exploration phase
and an optimization phase. A continuous network design space for the optimization
phase of the study is defined using the GM model to interpolate between network
topologies, threats, and adaptation methods. The following summarizes research
questions, responses, and experiments from this chapter:
 RQ 5: What methods should be used to compare SoS design alternatives and
understand their advantages and disadvantages?
 Response to RQ 5: An RSM approach with multiple linear regression is used
to explore and optimize SoS design alternatives, providing insight into the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of potential SoS networks.
 RQ 5.1: What models should be used to interpolate between scale-free and
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random networks, and RD and random threats?
 Response to RQ 5.1: The GM model is used to interpolate between scale-free
and random networks, as well as RD and random threats using GM2 targeting.
6.4 Summary of the ReSSNET Methodology
Chapters 3 to 6 develop the ReSSNET methodology for designing resilient SoS net-
works, satisfying research objective one for this thesis. The methodology is composed
of three primary steps: quantifying resilience, generating an SoS network design space,
and evaluating those SoS network designs. Figure 47 summarizes the methods used
to perform each step.
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DESIGNING RESILIENT IE NETWORKS
The second research objective for this thesis is to use the developed methodology to
investigate the first overarching research question (RQ 1). This research question asks
what happens to an SoS network when nodes fail or are attacked, and seeks to identify
methods for mitigating the effects of potential node losses. The IE network model is
used as an application problem for the methodology. The capability-based resilience
assessment framework is used to quantify the ability of IE networks to maintain
and recover lost capabilities, where IE performance is defined from the number of
received messages. IE network alternatives are generated by specifying initial network
topologies, adaptation methods, and threats. Design alternatives are evaluated with
statistical experimental design methods. The evaluation step is split into two phases.
The first phase explores the resilience of generated categorical network designs and
is discussed in section 7.1. The second phase optimizes a continuous representation
of the network design space and is discussed in section 7.2.
This chapter describes experiments four and five, which explore and optimize the
IE network design space, satisfying the second research objective for this thesis.
7.1 EXP 4: Exploring the IE Network Design Space
Experiment four (EXP 4) explores a categorical IE network design space generated
using methods from chapter 5. This experiment investigates two questions derived
from research question one; one focusing on the resilience of networks without adap-
tation to node losses, the other focusing on the resilience gained by incorporating
adaptation to SoS networks. These derived research questions are formalized as fol-
lows, with respect to resilience as measured by Rtotal:
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Research Question 1.1: How resilient are scale-free and random IE
networks to targeted attacks and random node failures, with no adaptation
considered and resilience measured by Rtotal?
Research Question 1.2: How is the resilience gained by adding network
adaptation to IE networks affected by threat type and initial network
topology?
This experiment is split into two sub-experiments, experiment 4.1 and 4.2. Exper-
iment 4.1 focuses on answering research question 1.1 by comparing network designs
without adaptation. Experiment 4.2 focuses on answering research question 1.2 by
adding adaptation to SoS networks.
Experimental Setup
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 use the IE network model as an application problem with
model input parameters defined by table 9. A maximum simulation time of 1000
seconds with nine threats per scenario results in threat events occurring every 200
seconds in a simulated scenario. For network designs with adaptation, adaptation
occurs 50 seconds after each threat event. A message generation probability, or rate,
of 0.25 means that the expected number of new messages generated by an entire
network per time step is 25.
The resilience assessment framework developed in chapter 4 is used to quantify
the resilience of design alternatives. Figure 48 shows how the assessment framework
is applied to these experiments. Performance data is smoothed using an S-G filter
(n = 3,m = 5). Two sets of performance data are used; one set with ∆ = 1, the other
set with ∆ = 0.8. Results using performance data with ∆ = 1 represent scenarios
where message time sensitivity is low. Results using performance data with ∆ = 0.8
represent scenarios where time sensitivity is high, such that a long message travel
time degrades the value of a message.
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Table 9: IE network model parameters used for EXP 4
Parameter Settings used Description
N 100 Initial network size
L 200 Initial number of links in a network
[t0 tfinal] [1 1000 s] Simulated scenario time interval (in seconds)
Sthreat 5 Number of nodes removed per threat event
Nthreats 9 Number of threat events within a scenario
tadapt 50 s Adaptation delay time following a threat event (in
seconds)
µ 0.25 Message generation rate
∆ 1 (EXP 4.1) Time sensitivity
0.8, 1 (EXP 4.2)
The desired performance level of a network, yD, used in resilience calculations [e.g.,
in eq. (32)] is defined as the steady-state mean network performance [where network
performance is calculated using eq. (6)] within the initial time period before the first
threat event (i.e., the steady-state mean network performance for the time period
specified by t ≤ 199). Thus, yD is calculated using eq. (40) with N = tfinal = 199.
The steady-state mean of the initial time period is used because it represents normal
network operating conditions. The first threat event is defined to provide enough
time for the system performance to reach steady-state.
This definition for yD results in resilience calculations relative to the initial perfor-
mance level of a network. Therefore, analysis with R and Rtotal is focused on network
resilience, rather than overall network performance. Conclusions drawn from this
analysis can be supplemented with performance-based analysis to provide a more
complete understanding of IE network performance.
Design alternatives considered in experiment four are shown in table 10. 100
replications are run for each design point. Experiment 4.1 analyzes the first four
design points, which can be represented as a 22 factorial design. These designs are
viewed as baseline designs, since they do not include adaptation. Experiment 4.2
focuses on the remaining design points, with comparisons to the baseline to determine
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Figure 48: Application of the capability-based resilience assessment framework to the
scenarios considered in EXP 4.
the benefits of adaptation.
7.1.1 EXP 4.1: IE Network Resilience without Adaptation
Purpose of the experiment: Answer research question 1.1 by exploring the resilience
of IE networks without adaptation.
Experiment 4.1 investigates research question 1.1 by comparing the resilience of
designs with scale-free and random topologies facing RD targeted and random threats.
All network performance levels for experiment 4.1 are calculated using eq. (6) with
∆ = 0.8 to represent networks exchanging time sensitive information.
Figure 49 shows results for the resilience of scale-free networks to RD and random
threats. Figure 49a shows performance data from two replications for these design
points, or scenarios (the first two replications are arbitrarily used). Figure 49b shows
mean performance data for these design points, where the mean is calculated from
all 100 replications of each design point, using eq. (54) for data at each time step t
with m = 100. Figure 49c shows mean R results calculated from performance data;
note that R is not calculated from the mean performance data. Instead, a set of
nine R values (one for each epoch) is calculated for each replicated simulation run.
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Table 10: Experimental design matrix used for EXP 4 (100 replications at each point)
Design point Topology Adaptation Threat
1 Scale-free None RD
2 Random None RD
3 Scale-free None Random
4 Random None Random
5 Scale-free RDA RD
6 Random RDA RD
7 Scale-free PA RD
8 Random PA RD
9 Scale-free Random rewiring RD
10 Random Random rewiring RD
11 Scale-free RDA Random
12 Random RDA Random
13 Scale-free PA Random
14 Random PA Random
15 Scale-free Random rewiring Random
16 Random Random rewiring Random
Since 100 replications are run for each design point, 100 sets of nine R values are
calculated for each scenario, where each set of R values is calculated from a single
replicated simulation run. These data sets of R are then averaged over all replications
using eq. (54) with m = 100 for each epoch, and plotted in fig. 49c. The R values
plotted at time t = 100 correspond to the resilience of these design points in the first
epoch, which spans the time interval 100 ≤ t ≤ 199. A similar process is used to
calculate Rtotal for each design point, where a single Rtotal value is calculated for each
replicated simulation run. These Rtotal values are then averaged over all replications
using eq. (54) with m = 100. Figure 49d shows the mean Rtotal for each design point,
with 90 percent confidence intervals calculated using eq. (56).
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Figure 49: Results from design points one and three, with scale-free topologies sub-
jected to RD threats (SF-RD) and random threats (SF-R). Capability data from
replications one (SF-RD-1, SF-R-1) and two (SF-RD-2, SF-R-2) are shown in (a).
Mean performance data is shown in (b). Mean R results are shown in (c). Mean
Rtotal results are shown in (d), with 90% confidence intervals for Rtotal marked by red
error bars. Vertical dashed lines show threat event times. Capability is calculated
with ∆ = 0.8.
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These results show that scale-free networks are more resilient to random threats
than RD targeted threats, as measured by Rtotal. The performance and epoch-based
resilience, R, of these networks significantly decreases after the first RD threat event,
at which point only five percent of the most connected network nodes have been re-
moved. This point at which a significant decrease in performance occurs can be viewed
as a critical point in the performance of the network. In comparison, performance
and R results show a linear decrease over time for random threats.
The small size of 90 percent confidence intervals on Rtotal suggests that the differ-
ences seen among the resilience of considered designs is due to changes in the designs
themselves, rather than randomness in the model.
Figure 50 shows a probabilistic visualization of the data, focusing on median
values, 25 and 75 percent quartiles, minimum and maximum ranges, and probability
density functions (PDFs) and cumulative density functions (CDFs). These results
show that more variability is seen in results with random threats, than those with
RD targeted threats. However, the range in Rtotal for scenarios with random threats is
always higher than the range for scenarios with RD threats. This result suggests that
a scale-free network facing an RD threat will nearly always have lower resilience than
one facing a random threat, even with variability due to randomness in the model.
Figures 51 and 52 show results for random networks subjected to RD and random
threats. Compared to scale-free networks, random networks show similar resilience
to random threats, but higher resilience to RD threats. This increased resilience is
seen in a delay in the critical point, or time at which the performance of the network
quickly degrades to low levels, compared to results for scale-free networks. The range
of Rtotal seen for scenarios facing random threats still shows no overlap with the range
of Rtotal for scenarios facing RD threats.
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Figure 50: Probabilistic results from design points one and three. Capability quantiles
are shown in (a), where solid lines show median data, dark shaded regions show 25
and 75% quartiles, and light shaded regions show the full range of data from all 100
replications. R quantiles are similarly shown in (b). PDFs for Rtotal are shown in (c),
with corresponding CDFs shown in the inset of (c).
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Figure 51: Results from design points two and four, with random topologies sub-
jected to RD threats (ER-RD) and random threats (ER-R). Capability data from
replications one (ER-RD-1, ER-R-1) and two (ER-RD-2, ER-R-2) are shown in (a).
Mean performance data is shown in (b). Mean R results are shown in (c). Mean
Rtotal results are shown in (d), with 90% confidence intervals for Rtotal marked by red
error bars.
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Figure 52: Probabilistic results from design points two and four. Capability quantiles
are shown in (a), where solid lines show median data, dark shaded regions show 25
and 75% quartiles, and light shaded regions show the full range of data from all 100
replications. R quantiles are similarly shown in (b). PDFs for Rtotal are shown in (c),


















Figure 53: Main effects of network topology and threat type on Rtotal.
Figure 53 shows main effects of the network topology and threat type on Rtotal.
Changing threat type has over eight times the effect on mean Rtotal as changing
network topology. This analysis also shows that resilience is highest, on average
and without consideration of interactions, for scenarios with random topologies and
random threats. However, the potential for an interaction between topology and
threat type limits conclusions that can be drawn from these main effects. ANOVA
shows that calculated main effects are statistically significant, where ptopology ≈ 0.0031
and pthreat ≈ 0.
Figure 54 show that an interaction exists between network topology and threat
type, with respect to effects on Rtotal. The effect of changing from a scale-free to
random network depends on the threat faced, where scale-free topologies are more
resilient than random topologies when facing random threats, but random topologies
are more resilient than scale-free topologies when facing RD threats. This result agrees
with those seen in figs. 49 and 51. Scenarios facing RD threats have lower resilience,
on average, than those facing random threats; however, the effect of changing from
an RD to random threat depends on the network topology. Changing threats has a
larger effect on Rtotal for designs with scale-free topologies than those with random






























Figure 54: Interactions effects of network topology and threat type on Rtotal.
in addition to main effects, since only analyzing main effects may have led to the
conclusion that random topologies are always preferred.
Discussion of Results
Experiment 4.1 shows that scale-free networks are more resilient to random node fail-
ures than random networks. This resilience is due to scale-free networks having many
nodes with low connectivity. Therefore, when nodes are randomly removed, the aver-
age connectivity of removed nodes is low. Scale-free networks also have network hubs,
which provide short path lengths between nodes. Since this experiment includes time
sensitivity in performance calculations (i.e., ∆ < 1), these short path lengths reduce
message travel times and increase network performance, relative to random networks
which generally have longer average path lengths. However, network hubs also make
scale-free networks less resilient to RD targeted attacks than random networks, since
removing the most connected nodes significantly decreases connectivity for scale-free
networks.
The observed resilience of scale-free networks to random threats, but susceptibility
to targeted threats, agrees with results from the complex networks literature, where
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resilience is measured by changes to network structural properties (see section 2.3.3).
This agreement suggests that network structural properties are critical to the ability
of IE networks to effectively distribute information, and have the potential to be used
as a surrogate for network performance or R for the model considered. The following
answer is provided to research question 1.1:
Response to RQ 1.1: Scale-free SoS networks are more resilient to ran-
dom failures than random SoS networks but less resilient to RD targeted
attacks, with no adaptation considered and resilience measured by Rtotal.
These results agree with those from the complex networks literature where
resilience is measured by network structural properties, suggesting the po-
tential to use those properties as surrogates for network performance or
R in the IE network model.
149
7.1.2 EXP 4.2: IE Network Resilience with Adaptation
Purpose of the experiment: Answer research question 1.2 by exploring the resilience
of IE networks with adaptation.
Experiment 4.2 investigates research question 1.2 by adding potential adapta-
tion methods to IE network designs. Network performance is calculated with ∆ =
0.8 and 1. Results for ∆ = 0.8 are discussed first.
Figure 55 shows that for scale-free topologies facing random threats, adding adap-
tation allows networks to recover lost capabilities and become more resilient to node
losses over time. All three adaptation methods show an increase in network perfor-
mance and resilience measured with R over time. These metrics increase because
as nodes are removed and links rewired, network density increases and network size
decreases. Since nodes are allowed to rewire any lost links, the overall number of links
in a network stays relatively constant over time. Therefore, as nodes are removed,
network density increases, which makes it easier for source nodes to find short paths
to target nodes. Smaller network sizes also decrease average distances between nodes.
Figure 56 shows how mean network density and inverse average path length increase
throughout simulated scenarios. Since ∆ = 0.8, this decrease in path lengths (and
therefore message travel times) improves network performance and R. Figure 56b
also shows that designs with RDA-based adaptation achieve higher inverse average
path length than those with PA or random rewiring. These shorter path lengths
translate to slightly higher network capabilities, R, and Rtotal values for designs with
RDA, and suggest a positive correlation between inverse average path length and R.
This correlation between inverse average path length, IE network performance,
and R supports the observation from experiment 4.1 that network structural proper-
ties have the potential to be used as a surrogate for network performance or R. How-
ever, similar correlations are not seen between the size of the LCC and IE network
performance or R. Figure 57 shows that changes to LCC size throughout simulated
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Figure 55: Probabilistic results for scale-free topologies (SF) subjected to random
threats (R) with no adaptation (SF-None-R), recalculated degree-based adaptation
(SF-RDA-R), and random rewiring (SF-Rand.-R). Capability quantiles are shown in
(a), R quantiles are shown in (b), and PDFs for Rtotal with corresponding CDFs are
shown in (c).
scenarios are nearly identical for all three adaptation methods, and relatively close in
value to networks without adaptation. Therefore, LCC size should not be used as a
surrogate for IE network performance or R.
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Figure 56: Mean (a) network density and (b) inverse average path length throughout
simulated scenarios, as nodes are removed and links rewired.












Figure 57: Mean size of the LCC (normalized by initial network size N) throughout
simulated scenarios, as nodes are removed and links rewired.
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Though all three adaptation methods improve the resilience of designs without
any adaptation, distributions on Rtotal show that given the stochastic nature of the
simulation, there is some overlap between the resilience of designs with and without
adaptation. This overlap suggests the possibility for a scale-free network without
adaptation to actually have higher resilience than one with adaptation, depending on
the actual nodes removed by random threats. Therefore, the cost of incorporating
adaptation should be considered when random threats are anticipated, due to the
potential for no benefits from adaptation depending on removed nodes.
Figure 58 shows that similar to scenarios with random threats, adding adaptation
to scale-free topologies facing RD targeted threats increases network performance
and R over time. However, RDA-based adaptation shows lower resilience than PA
and random rewiring-based adaptation for these scenarios. This decrease in resilience
is due to large drops in network performance following node removals, as shown by
fig. 58a. These large performance degradations occur because rewiring by recalcu-
lated node degree creates highly connected network hubs following adaptation events.
These hubs provide short path lengths throughout the network, which result in high
performance levels following adaptation. However, these hubs also make networks
vulnerable to RD node removals, which result in large drops in performance follow-
ing removals. For these scenarios, the benefits of node hubs are outweighed by the
vulnerabilities they create, which results in lower R and Rtotal values for designs with
RDA, compared to those with other adaptation methods.
Probabilistic results for random topologies show similar trends to those for scale-
free topologies, with slightly higher increases in resilience due to adaptation (not
shown here). Therefore, the remaining analysis focuses on mean Rtotal. Measuring
resilience with mean Rtotal provides a single resilience metric for simpler comparisons
between designs. Capability plots, R results, and distributions of Rtotal are only
discussed when they provide additional insights to analysis of mean Rtotal.
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Figure 58: Probabilistic results for scale-free topologies (SF) subjected to RD threats
(RD) with no adaptation (SF-None-RD), recalculated degree-based adaptation (SF-
RDA-RD), and random rewiring (SF-Rand.-RD). Capability quantiles are shown in
(a), R quantiles are shown in (b), and PDFs for Rtotal with corresponding CDFs are
shown in (c).
Figure 59 compares the mean total resilience of all 16 design points considered in
experiment four. As suggested by probabilistic results for scale-free network designs,
adding adaptation improves resilience, on average, for all topology and threat combi-
nations considered. Results also show that the resilience gained by PA and random
rewiring-based adaptation are very similar for considered combinations of topology
and threat type. However, the resilience gained by RDA-based adaptation differs
from that of PA and random rewiring. For RD threats, designs with PA or ran-
dom rewiring show nearly twice the resilience of those with RDA-based adaptation.
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Figure 59: Mean Rtotal for all designs considered in EXP 4, where designs with scale-
free topologies (SF) are shown in (a) and designs with random topologies (ER) in (b).
Adaptation methods are specified as none, recalculated degree adaptation (RDA),
preferential adaptation (PA), and random rewiring adaptation (Rand.). 90% confi-
dence intervals for mean Rtotal are shown by red intervals on each bar.
Yet for random threats, designs with RDA show higher resilience than those with
PA or random rewiring. Therefore, anticipated threat types should be considered
when deciding what type of adaptation to incorporate, in addition to whether or not
adaptation should be incorporated in the first place.
Main effects analysis in fig. 60 shows that threat type has the largest main effect
on Rtotal, where changing from RD to random threats increases the mean Rtotal by
nearly one. This analysis considers effects of network topology, adaptation method,
and threat type on Rtotal, excluding designs with no adaptation (i.e., not including
design points 1-4). Network topology and adaptation method show similar main
effects on Rtotal, when considering the effect of changing adaptation method from
RDA to random rewiring. The effect of changing adaptation method from PA to
random rewiring is smaller than all others. Only considering main effects suggests
that increasing randomness in topology, adaptation method, and threat generally
improves resilience, when averaged over all designs considered. However, inspection of




















Figure 60: Main effects of network topology, adaptation method, and threat type on
Rtotal.
effects are accepted to be statistically significant due to low p-values for those effects
from ANOVA (ptopology ≈ 7.6× 10−65, padaptation ≈ 3.2× 10−32, pthreat ≈ 2.3× 10−216).
Analysis of interaction effects (shown in fig. 61) shows that interactions between
network topology and adaptation method, as well as network topology and threat
type, are small, with respect to Rtotal. Low interactions are evidenced by nearly
parallel interaction effects among factors. These results suggest that as long as some
form of adaptation is included, random topologies show higher mean resilience than
scale-free topologies regardless of adaptation method and threat type.
However, there is a strong interaction between adaptation method and threat type.
For RD targeted threats, changing adaptation method from RDA to PA or random
rewiring has a large positive effect on resilience, increasing mean Rtotal by approxi-
mately one. However, for random threats, changing adaptation method from RDA to
PA or random rewiring has a large negative effect on resilience, decreasing mean Rtotal
by approximately 0.5. This interaction between adaptation method and threat type
agrees with results from bar charts in fig. 59 showing that benefits from adaptation
methods depend on threat type. This interaction is also seen when comparing the
effects of changing threat type, for different adaptation methods. Changing threat
type from RD to random has nearly twice the effect on mean Rtotal when RDA is












































Figure 61: Interaction effects of network topology, adaptation method, and threat
type on Rtotal.
rewiring are more robust to threat type than RDA.
Note that since yD is defined from the initial capability of a network, this anal-
ysis focuses on network resilience rather than network performance. To more ex-
plicitly consider network performance in resilience calculations, fig. 62 shows results
for performance adjusted Rtotal calculations, where the same yD is used as the de-
sired capability for all networks. The desired capability for this analysis is defined
as yD = µ × N × ∆d, where d = 2.6483. This calculation normalizes all network
performance data to the same initial network capability. d is defined as the mean
average path length of scale-free networks created for this experiment, because this
value represents the best travel times expected from considered networks.
Performance adjusted results show that when the same yD is used for all net-
works, adaptive scale-free networks are able to achieve nearly the same resilience as
random networks when facing targeted threats. Therefore, while random topologies
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Figure 62: Mean performance adjusted Rtotal for all designs considered in EXP 4,
where Rtotal is adjusted to more explicitly account for network performance by using
the same desired performance level, yD, for all networks (regardless of their initial
performance). 90% confidence intervals for mean Rtotal are shown by red intervals on
each bar.
provide more resilience than scale-free topologies, they do not always provide better
performance. However, since this thesis focuses on network resilience, remaining cal-
culations use the unadjusted Rtotal calculations, where yD is defined relative to the
initial capability of a network.
As seen in fig. 56a, adaptation methods implemented do not restrict network
density, allowing it to increase as nodes are removed and networks adapt through
link rewiring. Rather, the primary restrictions on adaptation are that only previously
existing links are rewired and no new links added. Network adaptation can be further
constrained to require that network density never increases relative to the initial
density at time t = 0. This type of constant density adaptation represents scenarios
in which the number of links a network can sustain is defined relative to its current
network size, rather than initial network size. An SoS network with this type of
constraint might be one where links are powered by nodes, therefore requiring that
the ratio of links to nodes stays relatively constant over time.
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Figure 63: Mean Rtotal for designs with scale-free topologies (SF) are shown in (a)
and designs with random topologies (ER) in (b). Adaptation methods are specified
as none, recalculated degree adaptation (RDA), preferential adaptation (PA), and
random rewiring adaptation (Rand.). Adaptation methods without a constant density
constraint are specified by bars without black borders. Adaptation methods with a
constant density constraint are specified by bars with black borders. 90% confidence
intervals for mean Rtotal are shown by red intervals on each bar.
Figure 63 shows that constraining network adaptation by initial network den-
sity collapses differences between considered adaptation methods, such that all three
methods show similar resilience to specified threats. Little variation is seen among
density constrained adaptation methods because few links are allowed to be rewired.
However, density constrained adaptation methods show the same trends compared
to each other as unconstrained methods do, i.e. RDA provides the most resilience to
random threats, while random rewiring provides the most resilience to RD threats.
Figure 64 shows the number of links rewired at each adaptation event for scenar-
ios with and without density constraints. Similar results are seen for scenarios with
random networks. Since little differences are seen between adaptation methods with
density constraints, these methods are not considered for the remainder of this thesis.
Only adaptation without density constraints are used.
All results shown have been processed with ∆ = 0.8, i.e. assuming time sen-








































Figure 64: Mean number of links rewired at each adaptation event for designs with
scale-free topologies facing (a) RD threats and (b) random threats. Adaptation meth-
ods are specified as recalculated degree adaptation (RDA), preferential adaptation
(PA), and random rewiring adaptation (Rand.). Adaptation methods without a con-
stant density constraint are specified by filled in symbols. Adaptation methods with
a constant density constraint are specified by unfilled symbols.
also considered. Figure 65 shows that similar trends are seen between scenarios with
∆ = 1 and ∆ = 0.8, when comparing the resilience of designs with RDA, PA and ran-
dom rewiring to RD threats (i.e., comparing fig. 65 to fig. 59). However, for random
threats, changing ∆ from 0.8 to 1 collapses differences in Rtotal between adaptation
methods. Analysis of interaction effects also shows that benefits of RDA relative to
PA and random rewiring are much smaller for scenarios with ∆ = 1 than ∆ = 0.8
(see fig. 66). For random threats, changing from RDA to PA or random rewiring no
longer shows a large gain in mean resilience. However, the susceptibility of designs
with RDA to targeted attacks still exists, since changing from PA to RDA shows a
large decrease in mean resilience for designs facing RD threats.
Discussion of Results
Experiment 4.2 explores the resilience gained by incorporating network adaptation
(through RDA, PA, or random rewiring) to SoS network designs. Results show that
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Figure 65: MeanRtotal for all designs considered in EXP 4 with ∆ = 1. 90% confidence
intervals for mean Rtotal are shown by red intervals on each bar.
on average, all three adaptation methods considered improve the resilience of network
designs without adaptation. However, probabilistic analysis shows that for networks
facing random threats, there is a potential for individual instances, or replications,
of networks without adaptation to actually show higher resilience than those with
adaptation. These results suggest that cost-benefit analysis for adding network adap-
tation is especially needed for networks facing random threats, particularly those
with very few anticipated threat events. Simply analyzing mean results, rather than
probabilistic results, may not have enabled this insight.
Analysis of main and interaction effects shows that threat type has the largest
effect on mean Rtotal, and strong interactions exist between adaptation method and
threat type. These effects further demonstrate the need to consider threat type when
designing for resilience, as the best adaptation method for a network design strongly
depends on the anticipated threat. For the considered network designs, adaptation
using RDA provides the most resilience to random threats, while adaptation using
random rewiring provides the most resilience to RD threats. RDA performs well
against random threats because network hubs formed by this adaptation method

























































Figure 66: Interaction effects of network topology, adaptation method, and threat
type on Rtotal for scenarios with ∆ = 1.
information. Random rewiring performs well against RD threats because it prevents
the formation of network hubs, limiting the availability of highly connected nodes
for targeted attacks to remove. Adaptation using PA shows similar resilience to
adaptation using random rewiring, because node-degree preferences implemented in
the PA model are not strong enough to provide significant structural differences to
networks randomly rewiring links.
In comparison to the large effects and interactions seen between threat type and
adaptation method, network topology shows a small main effect on Rtotal and small
interactions with adaptation method and threat. In fact, interaction effects sug-
gest that random topologies provide more resilience than scale-free topologies when
adaptation is included, regardless of threat type and adaptation method. This is an
unexpected result, since for designs without adaptation, scale-free topologies are more
resilient than random topologies to random threats (see section 7.1.1). One would
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expect scale-free topologies to provide the same benefits when adaptation is added,
and therefore expect network designs with scale-free topologies and RDA-based adap-
tation to be the most resilient to random threats. However, such designs are likely
generating hubs that are too highly connected, such that even though random threats
very rarely remove those hubs, when they do, the impact on network connectivity is
large enough to outweigh benefits of short path lengths. In comparison, adding RDA
to designs with random initial topologies provides a better balance between the gen-
eration of network hubs and the prevention of too much connectivity in those hubs.
Additionally, this analysis focuses on resilience relative to initial capabilities, thereby
limiting the benefits of scale-free initial topologies. While random topologies pro-
vide more resilience than scale-free topologies, they do not necessarily provide better
overall performance, as shown by performance adjusted Rtotal results.
Network adaptation methods with density constraints are also considered. Enforc-
ing density constraints on the number of links allowed to be rewired would provide
more cost-effective network designs, assuming that there are costs incurred by an SoS
network each time a link is rewired. However, results for these methods show small
benefits to resilience and very little differences between designs with RDA, PA, and
random rewiring. These small differences are due to the small number of links being
rewired at each adaptation event when density is constrained. Therefore, adaptation
without density constraints is used for the remainder of this thesis, to provide more
insights into the benefits of network adaptation.
Results from scenarios with ∆ = 1 show that removing time sensitivity reduces
benefits of RDA-based adaptation relative to PA and random rewiring. However,
the disadvantages of RDA facing RD threats still exist, therefore suggesting that
RDA-based adaptation should not be considered when no time sensitivity exists.
The following answer is given to research question 1.2, based on results from this
experiment:
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Response to RQ 1.2: The resilience gained by adding network adapta-
tion strongly depends on threat type, due to interactions between threat
type and adaptation method. For random threats, adaptation using RDA
provides more resilience than PA or random rewiring. For RD threats,
adaptation using random rewiring provides more resilience than RDA.
Random network topologies provide more resilience (but not necessarily
performance) than scale-free topologies for all scenarios considered, as
long as adaptation is incorporated.
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7.2 EXP 5: Optimizing the IE Network Design Space
Purpose of the experiment: Answer research question 1.3 by exploring the continuous
IE network design space and optimizing network designs as threat type is varied.
Experiment five (EXP 5) optimizes a continuous IE network design space gen-
erated using methods from section 6.2. This experiment further investigates the
overarching research question for this thesis (RQ 1), by extending the exploration
performed in experiment four and developing an understanding of how the optimal
network design changes as threat type changes. The primary research question for
this experiment is derived from research question one as follows:
Research Question 1.3: How does the optimally resilient IE network
design (i.e., combination of topology and adaptation method) change as
the threat type changes?
Experimental Setup
Experiment five uses the IE network model as an application problem with the
same model input parameters from experiment four (table 9), except with ∆ =
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1. This experiment varies ∆ to further investigate the relationship
between message time sensitivity and network resilience. The resilience assessment
framework is applied as described for experiment four, shown in fig. 48.
An RSM process is used to optimize network designs, as described in section 6.1.
This process consists of identifying experimental design points to simulate, fitting
a linear regression model to the simulated response data, and using that regression
model to optimize for Rtotal as the threat is varied. Results from linear regression-
based optimization are compared to full-factorial simulation data, to characterize the
effects of regression model error on observed trends.
The network design space is represented by three variables: the initial network















Figure 67: View of the continuous IE network design space, which includes all designs
in the interior of the space. This representation includes threat type in the design
space, with the understanding that threats are not typically within the control of the
designer.
parameter, corresponding to the α parameter used by the GM model to interpolate
between topologies, adaptation methods, and threats. Therefore, the design space
is defined by αtopology (defining the initial topology), αadapt (defining the adaptation
method), and αthreat (defining the threat). These variables are defined with limits of
0 ≤ αtopology ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αadapt ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ αthreat ≤ 1, as shown in fig. 67. Designs
at the corners of this space can be described by topologies, adaptation methods, and
threats from the categorical design space used in experiment four. Thus, a network
with αtopology = 0 has a scale-free topology, while one with αtopology = 1 has a random
topology. A network with αadapt = 0 uses RDA-based adaptation, while one with
αadapt = 1 uses random rewiring. A network with αthreat = 0 is subjected to RD
threats, while one with αthreat = 1 is subjected to random threats.
Experiment design methods are used to determine which design points to simulate
from the space shown in fig. 67. A hybrid combination of experimental designs is used
to fully capture the design space. A face-centered central composite design (CCD)
is used to account for potential nonlinearities in the data and curvature with respect

































Figure 68: Scatterplot matrix of the experimental design used for experiment five.
Fit points are used for the regression model. Random validation points are used for
model fit checks.
experimental designs that enable fits to second-order regression models. These designs
are often used for cuboidal design spaces where design points at the extremes of the
space are of interest, since they include corners of the design space. A Box-Behnken
design (BBD) is superimposed on top of a face-centered CCD to include sampling
along the edges of the design space, not included by CCDs. Space-filling designs
are often used for computer experiments because they nearly uniformly sample the
interior of the design space, which is useful when the general form of the regression
model is unknown. Since limited knowledge exists concerning the interior of the
defined network design space, a latin hypercube design is also used to sample the
interior of the space. A description of these experimental designs is given in [78].
Since this experiment contains three factors, or design variables, the CCD and
BBD each include 15 design points. 350 latin hypercube points are run, resulting in a
total of 380 experimental design points. An additional 76 random points in the space
are run for model validation data (20 percent of 380 fit points). The experimental
design is shown in fig. 68.
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# of replications





















Figure 69: Changes to the maximum (Max HL) and mean (Mean HL) 90% t con-
fidence interval half-lengths as the number of replications is varied for all designs
points from experiment four. Maximum half-lengths are calculated as the maximum
half-length of 90% confidence intervals among all designs points, where confidence
intervals are calculated for the mean Rtotal at each design point. Mean half-lengths
are similarly calculated as the mean half-length over all design points.
50 replications are run at each design point, based on analysis of 90 percent t
confidence intervals for mean Rtotal data from experiment four. Figure 69 shows that
the maximum 90 percent confidence interval half-length for mean Rtotal data from
experiment four minimally decreases once 50 replications is used. The maximum half-
length with 50 replication is 0.06 for that data. This half-length is 1.5 percent of the
maximum Rtotal seen in that data. Since the design space used for this experiment
is similar to the space from experiment four (just with the interior of the space
considered), 50 replications is determined to be sufficient for this experiment.
Stepwise linear regression is used to fit a surrogate model to the data from sim-
ulated experimental design points. Stepwise regression begins with a starting model
(e.g., a second-order model with all interaction terms) and adds or subtracts terms
one step at a time based on a defined criterion. MATLAB’s stepwiselm function is
used, with default model specifications (i.e., SSE criterion with a term enter threshold
of 0.05 and exit threshold of 0.1 for the p-value of the term F -statistic). Stepwise
regression is used to limit the inclusion of unnecessary model terms while allowing for
the inclusion of important terms that may not be intuitively known to the analyst.
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The factors for the regression model are αtopology, αadapt, and αthreat. Time sensi-
tivity, ∆, is also considered as a factor for initial model fits; however, due to the large
impact ∆ has on the response, final model fits are performed separately, one for each
∆ setting. The response for final regression models is the mean Rtotal at each design
point, averaged over all simulated replications.
MATLAB’s fmincon function is used to optimize regression models using the se-
quential quadratic programming (SQP) algorithm with default specifications. SQP
outperforms the default interior point method for most models used in this thesis.
Since regression models are polynomial functions, additional computational costs of
SQP relative to an interior point method are insignificant.
Experiment Results (Trends in the Data)
Figure 70 shows general trends in the data for Rtotal with respect to ∆ and αtopology.
This analysis is performed on all experimental data including replications. ∆ and
αtopology are viewed as scenario variables, since they define the scenario or task envi-
ronment of a network and are likely out of the control of a network designer. The
box plot shows that increasing ∆, or decreasing message time sensitivity, collapses
differences between designs with respect to Rtotal (i.e., decreases the total range and
range of the inner quartiles) and decreases median Rtotal. Increasing ∆ decreases
Rtotal ranges because when message time sensitivity is low, a network’s performance
does not depend on how long it takes messages to arrive at their target node. There-
fore, the benefits of networks that promote short path lengths are reduced and most
networks tend to show similar levels of resilience. Reducing the benefits of short path
length networks limits the ability of networks to achieve high resilience, which reduces
the median Rtotal. A similar result is seen in experiment four, where changing from
∆ = 0.8 to ∆ = 1 collapses differences between adaptation methods, particularly
reducing the benefits of RDA-based adaptation (see fig. 65).
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Figure 70: Box plot (a) and heat map (b) showing trends in the data as ∆ and
αtopology are varied. The box plot shows median (central red lines), 25% and 75%
quartiles (blue box edges), minimum and maximum data points without outliers
(black whiskers), and outliers (red symbols). The heat map shows the mean Rtotal
within each bin of ∆ and αtopology.
The heat map shows that mean resilience is highest for scenarios with low ∆ and
high αtopology. These scenarios have high time sensitivity and highly random threats.
Networks facing random threats show more resilience than those facing more targeted
threats because random threats are less likely to remove highly connected network
nodes. This result supports those from experiment four, which show that RD threats
are more damaging to network resilience than random threats, even with network
adaptation included.
Figure 71 shows a parallel plot of data from this experiment with respect to
network designs grouped by high, medium, and low resilience. Parallel plots are
useful for identifying general trends in multi-variate data, since they show average
variable settings for specified groups. These results show that designs with high
resilience typically have topologies closer to random than scale-free, face threats that
are more random than targeted, and use adaptation that is more degree-based than
random. Highly resilient designs also show small variance with respect to the type of






























Figure 71: Parallel plot showing normalized values for each design variable, when
grouped by high, medium, and low Rtotal. Solid lines show median normalized values
with shaded lines capturing 25% and 75% quartiles. Statistics are calculated from
all data used in this experiment, including replications. High resilience is defined as
Rtotal > 4, medium resilience as 2 < Rtotal ≤ 4, and low resilience as Rtotal ≤ 2.
Variables values are normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation.
with low resilience have variable settings closer to the middle of the design space (i.e.,
a normalized value ≈ 0 or α ≈ 0.5).
Since threat type is identified to be important for network resilience, fig. 72 shows
a scatterplot of mean Rtotal as threat type is varied, colored by initial topology.
For low values of ∆, or high time sensitivity scenarios, increasing αthreat generally
increases resilience. However, as ∆ is increased, differences between the resilience
of network designs collapses to the point where very few networks show resilience
above two. These plots also shows that for low values of ∆, increasing αtopology
increases resilience (seen by stacked color bands of data for ∆ = 0.6, 0.7). These
results confirm the general trend that randomness in network topology and threat type
increases resilience, while low time sensitivity collapses differences between network
alternatives.
Figure 73a focuses on data for ∆ = 0.6 and shows a scatterplot of mean Rtotal
as threat type is varied, this time colored by adaptation method. As shown by















































Figure 72: Scatterplots of mean Rtotal as threat type (αthreat) changes. Points are
colored by initial topology (αtopology). Each scatterplot shows results calculated for a
different time sensitivity (∆) and includes data from every replication.
method on Rtotal depends on the threat type. For low αthreat values, increasing αadapt
(i.e., increasing adaptation randomness) increases Rtotal. However, the opposite trend
is seen for high αthreat values, where decreasing αadapt increases Rtotal. These results
also show that networks with degree-based adaptation (i.e., low αadapt) show a wide
range in resilience as the threat is varied. In comparison, networks with highly random
adaptation (i.e., high αadapt) show less variation in resilience as the threat is varied,
suggesting that random adaptation is more robust to threat type than degree-based
adaptation.
Figure 73b shows that resilience trends with αadapt can be explained by trends with
total network inverse average path length. Total inverse average path length, 〈d〉′total,
differs from the typical calculated inverse average path length, 〈d〉′, in that the total












































Figure 73: Scatterplots of (a) mean Rtotal and (b) total inverse average path length
as threat type (αthreat) changes. Points are colored by adaptation method (αadapt).
Rtotal is calculated with ∆ = 0.6.
network structure over time for this data. In comparison, the typical inverse average
path length quantity is calculated for a single network structure. The total quantity
is used because each simulated scenario contains nine threat and nine adaptation
events, resulting in 19 values of 〈d〉′ (one for the initial topology, and one following
each threat or adaptation event). These 19 values are collapsed into a single value





where Nnetworks is the total number of network structures seen in the scenario, the
weights wi are calculated using eq. (48), and 〈d〉′i is the inverse average path length for
the ith network structure seen, calculated with eq. (21). This calculation is similar
to that of Rtotal from a set of R values (see section 4.2).
Trends for total inverse average path length suggest that for highly random threats,
networks with low αadapt have high resilience because they achieve high 〈d〉′total, re-
sulting in short message travel times. These networks have high 〈d〉′total because the
degree-based adaptation creates network hubs. However, when threats become more
targeted, these hubs make node removals more damaging to the network, resulting
173
in lower 〈d〉′total and longer message travel times. Networks with random adaptation
are more robust to threat type variations than those with degree-based adaptation
because their path lengths show less sensitivity to threat type. Though 〈d〉′total can
be used to explain trends with Rtotal, they are not directly correlated, since trends
with respect to threat type are less clear in Rtotal data than 〈d〉′total data.
Experiment Results (Regression Models)
Linear regression models are created from the experimental data to enable further
analysis and optimization of the network design space. Regression models are gener-
ated to predict the response, Rtotal, from the set of factors used to define a network
design and scenario (i.e., ∆, αtopology, αadapt, and αthreat), such that
y = f (∆, αtopology, αadapt, αthreat) + ε. (69)
A regression model is first fit to the entire set of experimental data, including
individual replications. However, the large variance seen in simulation replications
results in poor model fits using replicated data (artificial neural network fits are also
attempted, which do not improve model fits). An attempt is then made to fit a
regression model to mean data from the entire set of experimental data. Fitting to
mean data uses the mean Rtotal at each design point (averaged over all 50 replications),
and uses that data to fit a model to. Model fits are improved by fitting to mean data,
compared to replicated data. However, regression models still show large residuals
and model errors.
Since ∆ has a large impact on network resilience, separate model fits are performed
for each ∆ setting. This process splits the experimental data into five datasets, one
for each ∆ setting, and creates a separate regression model for each of those datasets.
Thus, five regression models are created where each model, fi, is fit to mean data for
a specific ∆ (e.g., f0.6 is the regression model for data with ∆ = 0.6) such that
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y = fi (αtopology, αadapt, αthreat) + ε. (70)
Figure 74 shows model fit checks for a regression model of the dataset with ∆ =
0.6, generated using stepwise regression with a full second-order initial model (i.e., a
second-order model with individual factors and all interactions). These model checks
show that the generated regression model does not accurately represent the data,
since actual by predicted results show large deviations from the 1:1 reference line,
residuals do not appear to be randomly scattered (showing slight curvature in the
positive range of residuals), and model errors are as large as 39.3%. Residuals are
nearly normally distributed, but do show more high valued residuals than expected
from normally distributed residuals. Similar fits are seen for second-order models of
other ∆ datasets.
Higher order terms are added to the initial regression model in an attempt create
less patterned residuals and decrease model errors. Fifth-order models are found to
provide the best model fits across all ∆ datasets. Figure 75 shows model fit results
for a fifth-order regression model with the ∆ = 0.6 dataset. This model shows an
improved fit over the second-order model. Actual by predicted data is tightly bound to
the 1:1 perfect fit line, indicating that the model accurately predicts fit and validation
data. Compared to residuals from the second-order model, residual magnitudes are
decreased, show a more random scattering, and are more normally distributed. Model
fit errors are also decreased, with a maximum error of 6.5%.
Fifth-order model fits for other ∆ datasets are similar to those for ∆ = 0.6 and
shown in appendix B. Model fit statistics for all fifth-order models are shown in
table 11, where fi specifies the model for ∆ = i. ANOVA statistics are shown for the
typical null hypothesis of a constant model form. High F -statistics, low p-values, and
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Figure 74: Model fit checks for a second-order regression model of data with ∆ = 0.6,
grouped by calculations using fit data (fit) and validation data (val.). Actual by
predicted responses are shown in (a), with the red dashed line showing a 1:1 perfect
fit reference line. Residuals are shown in (b), a normal probability plot for fit data
in (c), and model error distributions in (d). Normally distributed data should lie on
or near the red dashed reference line in the normal probability plot shown in (c).
Standard deviations for model error distributions in (d) are σfit = 7.3 and σval. = 6.7.
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Figure 75: Model fit checks for a fifth-order regression model of data with ∆ = 0.6.
Actual by predicted responses are shown in (a), residuals are shown in (b), a normal
probability plot for fit data in (c), and model error distributions in (d). Standard
deviations for model error distributions are σfit = 1.8 and σval. = 2.3. Maximum
model error is 6.5%.
Model fits are also attempted on natural log and exponential transformed re-
sponses to further reduce model errors. Models fit to transformed responses apply a
natural log or exponential transformation to the actual response data such that the
regression model is fit to ln(y) or exp(y), rather than the actual response y. The model
then outputs a prediction for the transformed response. No significant improvements
are seen to model fits with natural log or exponentially transformed responses. Some
model fit checks show worse performance with transformed response data. Therefore,
transformations are not included in generated regression models.
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Table 11: Linear regression model fit statistics
Regression model ANOVA F -statistic ANOVA p-value R2 R2adj
f0.6 2.25× 103 0 0.997 0.996
f0.7 2.64× 103 0 0.997 0.996
f0.8 2.56× 103 0 0.997 0.996
f0.9 2.84× 103 0 0.997 0.997
f1 1.95× 103 0 0.995 0.995
Fifth-order linear regression models with natural (i.e., untransformed) responses
and factors are selected to further analyze and optimize network designs. Model errors
are determined to be sufficiently low for this thesis, since this thesis focuses on the
conceptual design of SoS networks. This experiment also focuses on understanding
general trends for optimal network designs, with respect to abstracted, high-level
information exchange processes, further reducing the need for high fidelity models.
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Experiment Results (Optimal Network Designs)
The generated linear regression models are used to determine interaction effects
among initial network topology, adaptation method, and threat type. Figure 76 shows
the interaction between threat type and topology, and confirms previous findings that
on average, the most resilience initial topology is a random one (i.e., αtopology = 1), for
networks with some form of adaptation, regardless of threat type. Since intermediate
topologies are included in this analysis, results also show a smooth improvement in
resilience as topology randomness is increased. Decreasing time sensitivity (i.e., in-
creasing ∆) is shown to collapse differences between network designs, as seen in the
analysis of general trends in the data from this experiment.
Figure 77 shows a strong interaction between threat type and adaptation method,
as seen in analysis of the categorical design space in experiment four (see fig. 61).
However, regression models enable a more detailed inspection of this interaction by
providing data for intermediate networks in the design space. For example, experi-
ment four shows that random rewiring provides more resilience to RD threats than
RDA-based adaptation, while RDA provides more resilience to random threats. How-
ever, those results provide no insights into the possibility or location of a transition
point at which RDA becomes a better option than random rewiring, as threat type
is varied. Analysis of interactions using regression models suggests that such a tran-
sition point does exist, where the location of that point changes as time sensitivity
changes. Interactions also show that on average, intermediate adaptation methods












































































































Figure 76: Interaction effects between αthreat and αtopology. Interaction effects are
shown as the adjusted Rtotal for specific topology settings as threat type is varied,
averaged over all adaptation methods. Adjusted Rtotal is calculated as the sum of the






































































































Figure 77: Interaction effects between αthreat and αadapt. Interaction effects are shown
as the adjusted Rtotal for specific adaptation methods as threat type is varied, aver-
aged over all initial topologies. Results suggest a transition point at which highly
degree-based adaptation provides more resilience than highly random adaptation.
This transition point is identified by the αthreat value at which the αadapt = 0 and
αadapt = 1 lines intersect.
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Analysis of interaction effects provides an understanding of general trends through-
out the design space. However, conclusions drawn from this analysis are limited be-
cause interactions effects are averaged over all settings for the network variable not
included in a particular interaction. Regression models are optimized with respect
to resilience for various threat types to more deeply investigate network resilience,
especially regarding potential transition points for the optimal adaptation method.
Since threat type shows a strong impact on network resilience, optimal network
designs are determined with respect to Rtotal as threat type is changed. The optimizer
is allowed to change the network design, specified by the initial topology, αtopology,
and adaptation method, αadapt. Time sensitivity and threat type are assumed to be
outside the control of the designer, and are therefore not changed by the optimizer.






subject to 0 ≤ αtopology ≤ 1
0 ≤ αadapt ≤ 1,
(71)
where fi is the regression model for ∆ = i and α
j
threat is the jth threat setting the
optimal network design is being determined for.
Optimization results are shown in fig. 78. Focusing on the scenario with ∆ = 0.6
(i.e., high time sensitivity), the optimally resilient network topology is always fully
random. This result confirms observations from experiment four and general trends in
the data for this experiment that random topologies are more resilient than scale-free
when adaptation is included. However, the optimally resilient adaptation method
shows a sharp transition from being fully random to fully degree-based at αthreat =
0.72. Above this transition point (i.e., for αadapt > 0.72), networks are able to gain
resilience by switching from random rewiring to a degree-based adaptation method.
As discussed in experiment four, random rewiring is preferred for targeted threats
182
because of a lack of network hubs; degree-based adaptation is preferred for random
threats because of the low probability of highly connected hubs being removed.
A small dip in the optimal adaptation method is seen around αthreat = 0.28, where
α∗adapt = 0.97 instead of 1. This dip is likely due to small errors in the regression model,
amplified by small differences in Rtotal for networks in this part of the design space.
For example, Rtotal for the optimal network at αthreat = 0.28 (i.e., α
∗
topology = 1 and
α∗adapt = 0.97) is 3.50. If αadapt is changed to 1 instead of 0.97, Rtotal = 3.49, which
is a 0.3% change in Rtotal. Since this difference is so small, model errors that may be
causing this dip in the optimal adaptation method are assumed to be insignificant to
this analysis.
Increasing ∆ shifts the location of the optimal adaptation transition point, up
until ∆ = 0.9, at which point fully degree-based adaptation methods (i.e., αadapt = 0)
are only optimal for fully random threats. For ∆ = 1, the optimal adaptation method
never goes below 0.33. Therefore, as time sensitivity decreases, the benefits of degree-
based adaptation methods decrease, and increasing levels of randomness are preferred
for network resilience.
Optimal network designs for ∆ = 1 show more disjointed trends than those for
∆ < 1. As with the dip seen in results for ∆ = 0.6, these behaviors are caused by
small differences in the resilience of network designs. Since many networks are able
to provide nearly optimal resilience, transition points and optimal trends become













































































































































Figure 78: Optimally resilient network designs as threat type, αthreat, and time sen-
sitivity, ∆, are varied. Network designs are specified by their initial topology and
adaptation method. Optimal combinations of those variables are shown on the left
axis. Optimal topology settings, α∗topology, are shown by black circles. Optimal adap-
tation methods, α∗adapt, are shown by blue triangles. Resilience, Rtotal, of optimal































Figure 79: Scatterplot matrix of the full-factorial experimental design used to compare
to regression model optimization results.
A full-factorial experimental design is run to ensure that optimal network trends
determined from regression models are accurate. Figure 79 shows the full-factorial
design used, where α settings are defined to be 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1. This full-factorial
design contains 1331 design points, over three times as many points as used for
regression model fit data. 50 replications are run at each design point.
Optimally resilient network designs are determined from the full-factorial experi-
ment by selecting the design point that maximizes Rtotal at each level of αthreat. Op-
timal networks are therefore limited to those included in the full-factorial experiment
design, resulting in a low resolution determination of optimal networks. However,
these results can still be used to provide a general idea of optimization trends in the
network design space, without model errors incurred by using regression models.
Figure 80 shows that optimization trends from the full-factorial experiment are
similar to those from the regression models, where the optimal adaptation method
shows a sharp transition point whose location changes with ∆. These similarities
provide confidence that regression model errors do not influence observed optimization
trends. Differences are seen between full-factorial results and regression models with
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∆ = 1; however, these differences are again attributed to the fact that many network
designs show similar levels of resilience for ∆ = 1, and therefore determined to be









































































































































Figure 80: Optimally resilient network designs as threat type, αthreat, and time sen-
sitivity, ∆, are varied. Optimal combinations of initial topology (shown by black
circles) and adaptation method (shown by blue triangles) are shown on the left axis.




Analysis of the continuous IE network design space shows that for adaptive IE net-
works operating with high message time sensitivity, the optimally resilient initial
network topology is always random, regardless of threat type. Since random net-
works are characterized by node degree homogeneity, network designers aiming for
resilience should strive to limit network hubs in initial topologies, when adaptation is
included and multiple network threats are anticipated. Note that this analysis strictly
optimizes for resilience, relative to the initial capability of a network; therefore, while
random topologies provide optimal resilience, they do not necessarily provide optimal
performance.
Network optimization for resilience confirms general adaptation trends observed
from experiment four, where random rewiring gives more resilience against targeted
threats than degree-based adaptation, and degree-based adaptation gives more re-
silience against random threats than random rewiring. However, this experiment
extends those observations by showing that a sharp (rather than gradual, or smooth)
transition exists for the optimal adaptation method from random rewiring to degree-
based adaptation, as threat randomness is increased. This transition is also seen in
interaction analysis (see fig. 77), and suggests that when resilience is the primary
objective, network adaptation should be designed to be either fully random or fully
degree-based. Therefore, there is no need to consider intermediately defined network
adaptation methods when designing for resilience, regardless of the threat faced. Pre-
vious analysis of the discrete network design space may have lead one to consider
intermediately defined network designs for threats that are not fully random or fully
targeted.
The observed adaptation transition occurs at αthreat = 0.72 for networks with
high message time sensitivity. Therefore, in addition to showing a sharp transition,
the optimally resilient adaptation method is random rewiring for 72% of the threats
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considered. Analysis of the discrete design space does not provide such insights into
the relative percentage of threats considered for which each adaptation method is
preferred.
The optimal adaptation transition is most clearly seen for scenarios with high
time sensitivity. As message time sensitivity decreases, the sharpness of the tran-
sition decreases, since most network show similar levels of resilience. The impact
of changing network initial topologies is also decreased as time sensitivity decreases.
Therefore, investing resources to design optimally resilient networks is less important
for networks operating with low time sensitivity constraints.
The following answer is given to research question 1.3, based on results from this
experiment:
Response to RQ 1.3: The optimally resilient IE network design is one
with a random topology and random rewiring, for targeted threats. How-
ever, the optimally resilient design shows a sharp transition with respect
to adaptation method as threat randomness increases; for highly random
threats, the optimal design uses degree-based adaptation. Differences be-
tween optimal and sub-optimal designs are minimal for scenarios with low
message time sensitivity.
7.3 Summary of Results
This chapter uses the methodology developed by chapters 3 to 6 to design resilient
IE networks. A categorical network design space is explored, focusing on general
trends and factor interaction effects. A continuous design space is then modeled with
linear regression. Regression models are used to determine optimal network designs
as threat type changes. The following summarizes research questions, responses, and
experiments from this chapter:
 RQ 1.1: How resilient are scale-free and random SoS networks to targeted
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attacks and random node failures, with no adaptation considered and resilience
measured by Rtotal?
 Response to RQ 1.1 (EXP 4.1): Scale-free SoS networks are more resilient
to random failures than random SoS networks but less resilient to RD targeted
attacks, with no adaptation considered and resilience measured by Rtotal. These
results agree with those from the complex networks literature where resilience is
measured by network structural properties, suggesting the ability to use those
properties as surrogates for network performance in the IE network model.
 RQ 1.2: How is the resilience gained by adding network adaptation to SoS
networks affected by threat type and initial network topology?
 Response to RQ 1.2 (EXP 4.2): The resilience gained by adding network adap-
tation strongly depends on threat type, due to interactions between threat type
and adaptation method. For random threats, adaptation using RDA provides
more resilience than PA or random rewiring. For RD threats, adaptation using
random rewiring provides more resilience than RDA. Random network topolo-
gies provide more resilience (but not necessarily performance) than scale-free
topologies for all scenarios considered, as long as adaptation is incorporated.
 RQ 1.3: How does the optimally resilient IE network design (i.e., combination
of topology and adaptation method) change as the threat type changes?
 Response to RQ 1.3 (EXP 5) The optimally resilient IE network design is one
with a random topology and random rewiring, for targeted threats. However,
the optimally resilient design shows a sharp transition with respect to adap-
tation method as threat randomness increases; for highly random threats, the
optimal design uses degree-based adaptation. Differences between optimal and
sub-optimal designs are minimal for scenarios with low message time sensitivity.
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CHAPTER VIII
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF RESILIENT AND
ROBUST C2 NETWORKS
The third research objective for this thesis is to perform cost-benefit analysis on
resilient and robust SoS networks to test the hypothesis that a resilience-based ap-
proach is better than a robustness-based approach for designing SoS networks (HYP
2). This analysis addresses the second overarching research question for this thesis
(RQ 2), which asks what the most cost effective method to design SoS networks ca-
pable of mitigating network threats is. A military application problem is used for the
cost-benefit analysis.
This chapter describes an experiment performed to substantiate hypothesis two,
beginning with a description of the application problem, followed by results from the
cost-benefit analysis.
8.1 Application Problem: Military C2 Networks
A military command and control (C2) network application is used to test hypothe-
sis two because there is a need for C2 networks able to operate in highly contested
environments with uncertain and evolving threats [106]. C2 networks enable commu-
nications between military systems and are essential to the ability of military forces
to share information and develop awareness of the battlespace. Therefore, C2 net-
works need to be able to mitigate the effects of potential threats to nodes or links.
This need is commonly referred to as a need for C2 agility within the C2 commu-
nity, where agility can be defined as the “capability to successfully cope with changes
in circumstances,” and includes responsiveness, versatility, flexibility, resilience, and
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adaptability [12].
C2 networks define connections between military systems operating across poten-
tially large geographic spaces. Nodes represent individual systems (e.g., vehicles or
command centers) and links represent communication links between those systems
(e.g., secure data transfer links). A network approach to C2 aligns with recent mil-
itary efforts to transition from platform-centric to network-centric forces, driven by
the concepts of NCW and NEC (see section 1.1). C2 networks are representative of
SoS networks because they are composed of independent systems, networked together
to provide a greater capability than individually possible.
A military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) simulation is used to test the perfor-
mance of potential C2 network designs, where UAVs (blue team) are tasked with
maintaining surveillance over enemy and neutral agents in a defined battlefield. C2
networks define communication links between UAVs, enabling information sharing
throughout a mission. Enemy agents (red team) are also connected by their own C2
network, accounting for the fact that modern adversaries are often technologically ad-
vanced and well-connected. Neutral agents (white team) are not connected to anyone,
modeling the presence of people or systems not associated with the blue or red team.
This scenario could represent a military force trying to track the actions of terrorists
in a populated civilian area. The ability to share information is crucial to success in
such a mission, due to large geographic distances that may need to be covered and
the movements of people in the area.
The capability of a C2 network is defined as its ability to maintain surveillance of
the battlefield. C2 performance is then measured with an awareness metric, defined
to quantify the ability of blue agents to maintain awareness of other agent actions. C2
awareness, A, is calculated using Shannon’s information entropy such that 0 ≤ A ≤ 1.
An awareness of A = 0 represents a scenario where UAVs have complete uncertainty
regarding the locations of other agents. An awareness of A = 1 represents a scenario
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where UAVs have complete certainty regrading the locations of other agents. See
appendix C or [107] for more details regarding calculation of the awareness metric.
NetLogo is used to create an agent-based model (ABM) of the C2 application
problem. Agent-based modeling is often used to model complex systems composed
of many interacting parts, typically networked together in a manner that results in
emergent behaviors [25, 72]. NetLogo is a simulation environment commonly used to
teach and create ABMs [117].
Three types of agents are defined for the model: blue UAV agents, red enemy
agents, and white neutral agents. Agents are defined by a set of attributes and actions.
UAVs perform search patterns throughout a simulation, sensing other agents as they
enter their sensing radius. UAVs determine locations of other agents as they sense
them, which translates to awareness for the blue team. UAVs share the location of
other agents through their C2 network, making network connectivity important to
their ability to maintain awareness of the battlefield. Red agents attempt to evade
detection by moving away from UAVs that they are aware of.
Agents move throughout a square battlefield separated into 36 search grids, where
each grid is a square area of equal size. These grids are used to define blue agent
search areas and specify agent locations for awareness calculations. Figure 81 shows
a screenshot of the ABM. See [107] for more details regarding the simulation.
8.2 EXP 6: Cost-benefit Analysis for Resilient and Robust
C2 Networks
Purpose of the experiment: Answer research two and test hypothesis two by comparing
the ability of resilient and robust C2 networks to mitigate the effects of network threats
in a cost-effective manner.
Experiment six (EXP 6) performs a cost-benefit analysis of resilient and robust
C2 networks to test the hypothesis that designing SoS networks for resilience is better
than designing them for robustness. A resilient C2 network is defined as one with
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Figure 81: Screenshot of the NetLogo UAV model showing agents with their infor-
mation links and square search grids in the battlefield (defined by darker shaded
patches). Triangular agents are blue agents, “X”-shaped agents are red agents, and
circular agents are white agents.
network adaptation, implemented as described in section 5.3. A robust C2 network
is defined as one with a high number of initial links (i.e., high initial network den-
sity), but no adaptation. Highly dense networks are used to represent robust network
designs because increasing network density adds redundant paths or connections be-
tween nodes. As described in section 1.5, traditional approaches to robust design
include system or functional redundancies.
Experimental Setup
This experiment uses the UAV surveillance simulation with input parameters from
[107]. Since C2 networks focus on the ability to share awareness, which can be modeled
through message passing as done in the IE network model, results from experiments
four and five are used to define scenarios of interest for this experiment.
Experiments four and five show that random topologies provide the most resilience
for adaptive networks, regardless of threat type. However, adjusting resilience calcula-
tions to more explicitly consider network performance shows that scale-free topologies
are able to achieve performance adjusted resilience levels similar to random topologies
(when designed with an appropriate adaption method). Since network performance
is important to consider in cost-benefit analysis of resilient and robust networks, this
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experiment focuses on networks with scale-free topologies. Additionally, many real
military C2 networks already display scale-free features [61, 51], which may be hard
to change due to the complexity and cost of military systems. Therefore, C2 networks
are defined to have scale-free (SF) initial network topologies with N = 20 nodes (i.e.,
20 UAVs or 20 enemy agents). Experiments four and five show that targeted threats
are the most damaging to all networks (e.g., see fig. 61). Therefore, C2 threats are
defined to be RD targeted node removals to simulate a worst-case scenario.
Multiple robust networks are generated with increasing initial network densities
(ranging from 0.1 to 0.95) to account for the lack of adaptation. As a reminder, a
network with a density D = 1 is a complete network (i.e., all possible links exist). An
adjusted BA algorithm is used to generate initial network topologies because network
densities that can be generated using the BA model are limited, due to the inclusion
of network growth in the model. The number of links in a network from the BA
model is defined by the combination of m0 and m. Since m0 and m are restricted to
being integers, a limited set of network densities can be generated.
The adjusted BA model generates a starting scale-free topology using the BA
model. For example, if N = 20, m0 = 2, and m = 1, a scale-free network with
L = 19 links (or density D = 0.1) is created. Additional links are then randomly
added to the scale-free network to achieve the desired network density. Therefore, if
a network with L = 100 links (or D = 0.53) is desired rather than L = 19, 81 links
are randomly added to the BA scale-free network. This method provides a way to
increase the density of scale-free networks. However, these networks are no longer
purely scale-free since random link addition is used. Therefore, they are referred to
as pseudo-scale-free networks (pseudo-SF), since they transition from being scale-free
to complete as network density is increased to one.
Only one adaptive (i.e., resilient) C2 network design is considered. The BA model
(m0 = 2 and m = 1) is used to generate scale-free topologies for these networks
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Table 12: Experimental design matrix used for EXP 6 (50 replications at each point)
Design point Topology Initial L Initial D Adaptation Threat
1 Pseudo-SF 19 0.1 None RD
2 Pseudo-SF 40 0.21 None RD
3 Pseudo-SF 60 0.32 None RD
4 Pseudo-SF 80 0.42 None RD
5 Pseudo-SF 100 0.53 None RD
6 Pseudo-SF 120 0.63 None RD
7 Pseudo-SF 140 0.74 None RD
8 Pseudo-SF 160 0.84 None RD
9 Pseudo-SF 180 0.95 None RD
10 SF 19 0.1 Random rewiring RD
with 19 initial links for an initial network density of 0.1. Random rewiring is used
for adaptation, since experiments four and five identify that as the best adaptation
method for time sensitive networks facing targeted threats (C2 networks are time sen-
sitive, due to movements within the battlefield). Additionally, optimization results
from experiment five show that random rewiring provides the most resilience against
a wide range of threats (nearly 72% of the considered threats), ranging from fully
targeted to partially random (i.e., αthreat ≤ 0.72). Therefore, even if C2 threats are
not fully targeted (e.g., C2 networks facing an adversary with incomplete informa-
tion of the C2 network topology), the most resilient adaptation method is one that
is fully random rewiring-based (i.e., there is no need to consider intermediately de-
fined adaptation methods). Therefore, random rewiring is considered to be the most
appropriate adaptation method for C2 networks and is used for this experiment.
Simulated design points for this experiment are shown in table 12, based on se-
lected topologies, threats, and adaptation methods. Design points 1-9 are robust
designs; design point 10 is a resilient design. Since the simulation is stochastic, 50
replications are run at each design point.
The cost of a C2 network, C, is represented by the number of links initially created
or rewired throughout a simulated scenario, such that
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C = (L× Cinitial) + (Lrewired × Crewired) , (72)
where L is the number of initial links in the network, Cinitial is cost of creating an
initial link, Lrewired is the number of links rewired throughout a scenario, and Crewired
is the cost of rewiring a link.
Network links are used as a proxy for cost because there is a cost associated
with creating a new link or rewiring an existing one. For example, creating a link
between two UAVs may require fitting each UAV with new equipment to enable
the transmission, reception, and processing of information. Rewiring a link between
UAVs is less easily defined. Certain types of links may simply require a redirection of
an existing antenna to “rewire” a previous link to a new UAV. However, other links
may require alterations to a UAV to be rewired. Therefore, a range of rewiring costs
is considered. The cost of creating an initial link is arbitrarily set to one to simplify
analysis.
The total resilience metric, Rtotal, is used to assess the ability of C2 networks to
mitigate the effects of network threats. Though this metric is developed to assess
resilience, robust and resilient designs share a common goal of preventing the disrup-
tion of necessary capabilities and/or recovering any lost capabilities. Therefore, the
metric can be used to compare resilient and robust networks.
Network structural properties are also used to compare C2 networks. Total inverse
average path length captures the ability of a network to maintain short path lengths
throughout a scenario, and is calculated using eq. (68). Path lengths are important
for UAV awareness because they determine how quickly information is shared. Since
agents are constantly moving around the battlefield, receiving timely updates is im-
portant for developing awareness. Total LCC captures the ability of a network to





wi (S/N)i , (73)
where Nnetworks is the total number of network structures seen in the scenario, the
weights wi are calculated using eq. (48), and (S/N)i is the normalized size of the LCC
for the ith network structure seen. These structural properties are commonly used, in
some form or another, to assess network robustness and resilience (see section 2.3.3).
Therefore, these metrics are suitable for comparing resilient and robust networks.
Experiment Results
Figure 82a compares the resilience and cost of resilient and robust C2 networks. Since
only one resilient network is considered, a constant Rtotal line is shown for the resilient
network (design point 10). Increasing network density for the robust designs increases
Rtotal, though a threshold is seen at which point further increasing density provides
small gains in Rtotal. The resilient network is able to achieve an Rtotal near the
threshold of Rtotal ≈ 1.75. The robust design with D = 0.32 (design point three), also
achieves an Rtotal near the threshold value and therefore provides similar resilience to
the resilient design.
Figure 82b compares the cost of the resilient design to the cost of the robust
design specified by design point three, since these designs provide similar levels of
resilience. Since the robust design does not include adaptation, its cost is constant
and defined by the number of initial links, C = L = 60. The cost of the resilient
design is shown for various ratios of Cintial/Crewired. This plot shows that the cost of
rewiring a link must be over 1.5 times that of creating a new link to make the resilient
design less cost effective than the robust design (when comparing networks able to
achieve similar Rtotal values).
Figure 83 shows cost-benefit analysis for resilient and robust designs where net-
work performance is measured by structural properties, rather than Rtotal. These
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Figure 82: Rtotal for the resilient network design (design point 10, shown by the
dashed blue line) and robust network designs with varied levels of initial network
density (design points 1-9, shown by black circles) are shown in (a). Network cost,
C, is shown in (b) for the resilient network where the cost of the resilient design
is calculated for various link rewiring costs, Crewired. Network cost is also shown for
design point 3, the robust network showing the most comparable Rtotal to the resilient
network.
results show slightly different trends, depending on the structural property used. Ro-
bust networks are able to provide higher total inverse average path lengths than the
resilient network with no apparent threshold on their maximal value (within the sce-
narios considered). In comparison, a threshold is seen on the size of the total LCC ro-
bust networks can achieve. The resilient design is unable to match the performance of
highly dense robust networks, when measured by these structural properties, though
it is closer to matching maximum total LCC than maximum total inverse average
path length.
However, comparison of network costs for similarly performing networks shows
that depending on the cost of rewiring a link, a resilient design may still be more
cost effective than a robust one. Comparing design points two and ten, which show
similar total inverse average path lengths and LCCs, the resilient design is more cost
effective if the cost of rewiring a link is less than 0.75 times that of creating a new
link.
Since comparisons between resilient and robust designs using Rtotal and structural
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Figure 83: Total inverse average path lengths for the resilient network design (design
point 10, shown by the dashed blue line) and robust network designs with varied
levels of initial network density (design points 1-9, shown by black circles) are shown
in (a), with total size of the LCC shown in (b). Network cost, C, is shown in (c) for
the resilient network as a function of the ratio Cinitial/Crewired. Network cost is also
shown for design point 2, the robust network showing the most comparable structural
properties to the resilient network.
properties show different trends, the actual performance of these networks is also
analyzed. Analyzing the desired capability, awareness for this application, provides
a sense of how well Rtotal, 〈d〉′total, and (S/N)total are capturing differences between
network designs. Figure 84 show awareness quantiles for robust networks specified by
designs two and three, and the resilient network specified by design ten.
Recall that robust design three shows similar values for Rtotal to resilient design
ten (see fig. 82a). However, comparison of awareness results shows that design three
actually maintains higher awareness than design ten throughout the entire simulated
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Figure 84: Quantile awareness results for the robust and resilient network designs
showing similar performance when measured by Rtotal, 〈d〉′total, and (S/N)total. Solid
and dashed lines show median awareness, dark shaded regions show 25 and 75%
quartiles, and lightly shaded regions show minimum and maximum ranges. Dashed
vertical lines show node removal events, where one blue UAV agent is removed at
each event.
scenario, contradicting the Rtotal comparison. This contradiction is explained by the
lower initial awareness of the resilient network [i.e., A(t) for 0 ≤ t < 200]. Calcula-
tions of R (which are used for Rtotal) assume that the initial awareness is the desired
performance level, yD, resulting in Rtotal being resilience relative to the initial perfor-
mance of a system. Therefore, despite design ten having lower awareness throughout
the scenario, it shows similar levels of resilience to design three, because of its ability
to recover performance levels equal to or greater than its initial performance level or
capability. Resilience calculations can be adjusted to prevent this contradiction by
specifying the same desired capability, yD, for all designs being compared.
Recall that robust design two shows similar structural properties to resilient design
ten (see figs. 83a and 83b). These two designs also show comparable awareness trends
throughout the entire scenario, where the robust design is better able to absorb the
effects of threats early in the scenario, but the resilient design is better able to recover
from threats later in the scenario. Therefore, network structural properties may be
better metrics for comparing robust and resilient designs than Rtotal, due to their
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inclusion of the initial network performance in calculated properties.
Discussion of Results
Cost-benefit analysis of resilient and robust C2 networks focuses on the cost of
rewiring a link relative to creating a new one. When measuring the ability of a
network to mitigate threats with Rtotal, the ratio Cinitial/Crewired must be over 1.5 for
robust networks to be more cost effective. However, when measuring threat mitiga-
tion ability with structural network properties, the point at which robust networks
become more cost effective is lowered to Cinitial/Crewired ≈ 0.75. Therefore, as long
the cost of rewiring links is less than three-fourths the cost of creating a new link, a
resilient C2 network design is more cost effective than a robust design (based on the
provided definition of network cost). Note that this definition of network cost does
not explicitly consider the over-head cost that may be associated with enabling link
rewiring. However, this cost can be implicitly included in the cost of rewiring a link.
Current studies of network resilience are limited in their consideration of network
costs, specifically with regards to the cost of achieving resilience through link rewiring
rather than link redundancy. This analysis identifies a quantitative (though abstract)
threshold for when adaptive networks are a more cost-effective solution than robust
networks, and provides an analyst with a method for supporting one design approach
over another (given estimations of link creation and rewiring costs). Since there
are scenarios where robust networks are more cost effective than resilient networks,
hypothesis two cannot be fully verified. The following answer is given to research
question two, based on results from this experiment:
Response to RQ 2: Resilient C2 network designs are generally more cost
effective than robust designs, when the cost of rewiring a link is less than
three-fourths the cost of creating a new one. Otherwise, robust networks
may be more cost effective.
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8.3 Summary of Results
This chapter presents a cost-benefit analysis for resilient and robust C2 network
designs. A network UAV surveillance simulation is used to evaluate the performance
of C2 networks facing targeted node removals. Network cost is represented by new
and rewired link costs. A resilient C2 network is defined using random rewiring.
Robust C2 networks are defined by increasing initial network densities. The following
summarizes research questions, responses, and experiments from this chapter:
 RQ 2: What is the most cost effective method for designing SoS networks that
can mitigate the effects of potential network threats?
 Response to RQ 2 (EXP 6): Resilient C2 network designs are generally more
cost effective than robust designs, when the cost of rewiring a link is less than
three-fourths the cost of creating a new one. Otherwise, robust networks may




Increased connectivity among systems has created SoS dependent upon networks to
provide desired capabilities and functionality. This connectivity introduces vulnera-
bilities to SoS networks that must be considered for the analysis and design of SoS.
This thesis addresses two primary research questions related to this problem: (1)
what happens to SoS networks when nodes fail or are attacked, and how can we
mitigate the effects of those failures and (2) what is the most cost-effective method
for designing SoS networks able to provide that mitigation ability? A review of the
literature identifies designing for resilience as a promising approach to addressing SoS
network vulnerabilities. This thesis hypothesizes that a resilience-based approach is
more cost-effective than a robustness-based approach for designing SoS networks.
Three research objectives are identified for this thesis, in an effort to answer those
research questions and test the formulated hypothesis. The first is to develop a
resilience-based methodology for designing SoS networks able to mitigate potential
threats. The second is to then use the developed methodology to design resilient
SoS networks. The third objective is to perform a cost-benefit analysis of resilient
and robust SoS networks to identify whether designing for resilience or robustness is
better suited for SoS networks.
This chapter summarizes the developed ReSSNET methodology for designing re-
silient SoS networks, experimental results from applying the methodology to design
resilient IE networks, as well as results from the cost-benefit analysis of resilient and
robust C2 networks, main contributions from this thesis, and possible extensions for
this work.
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ReSSNET: A Methodology for Designing Resilient SoS Net-
works
Chapters 3 to 6 develop the ReSSNET methodology for designing resilient SoS net-
works, satisfying the first research objective for this thesis (summarized in fig. 47).
The methodology includes a capability-based resilience assessment framework, which
provides a set of quantitative metrics for assessing system, or SoS, resilience. The
total resilience metric Rtotal provides a single metric for the resilience of a system
facing multiple disruptions over time, enabling large simulation design studies, such
as that performed in this thesis. This assessment framework builds upon and expands
previously proposed frameworks in the resilience engineering community.
A complex networks approach is used to generate SoS design alternatives. This
approach provides methods for defining network topologies, threats, and adaptation
methods based on real world networks and processes occurring on those networks. The
focus on adaptive networks within this thesis extends previous work on the robustness
of statically defined complex networks.
Statistical experimental design methods, specifically RSM, are used to explore
and optimize SoS design alternatives. Main and interaction effects identify overall
trends in the data and provide a general idea of how particular factors affect net-
work resilience. Linear regression provides polynomial functions representative of
the continuous network design space, which are used to determine optimally resilient
SoS networks. A network interpolation model is identified and modified to enable a
continuous representation of the network design space, extending previous studies of
discretely defined networks.
Experimental Results
The developed methodology is applied to an IE network model. Results for IE net-
works without adaptation confirm those from the complex networks literature, that
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scale-free networks are robust to random failures but susceptible to targeted attacks.
Adding network adaptation to IE networks improves their resilience to all threat types
considered. The most resilient network topology for IE networks with adaptation is
found to random, rather than scale-free, regardless of threat type. The optimally
resilient network adaptation method shows a sharp transition from being fully ran-
dom to fully degree-based, as threat randomness increases. These results suggest that
adaptive IE networks should have a random initial topology, with a fully random or
fully degree-based adaptation method (depending on anticipated threat types) when
multiple threats are anticipated throughout the life-cycle of a network.
Cost-benefit analysis is performed to compare resilient and robust C2 network
designs. This analysis shows that when performance is measured by total resilience
Rtotal, resilient C2 networks are more cost-effective than robust ones as long as the
cost of rewiring a link is less than 1.5 times the cost of creating a new link. However,
when performance is measured by network structural properties, the cost of rewiring
a link must be less than 0.75 times the cost of a new link for resilient designs to be
more cost effective.
Main Contributions
There are three main contributions from this thesis: the ReSSNET methodology for
designing resilient SoS networks, the exploration and optimization of a continuous
IE network design space, and the cost-benefit analysis of resilient and robust C2
networks.
The ReSSNET methodology provides a thorough process for a designer or analyst
to generate potential network alternatives and quantitatively evaluate their resilience.
Current resilience assessment methods are limited in their ability to account for the
adaptive nature of desired resilient systems, as well as complexities related to actual
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data from SoS simulations. For example, many existing frameworks focus on no-
tional data representative of SoS performance, rather than actual data characterized
by performance volatility and noisy transitions from degraded to recovered states.
The proposed resilience assessment framework provides easily automated methods
for handling noisy data and quantifying resilience in a way that penalizes perfor-
mance volatility. The total resilience metric, Rtotal, also provides a single value for
the resilience of a system, or SoS, facing repeated threats. This metric enables large-
scale simulation design studies that consider the overall life cycle of an SoS, such
as the one performed in experiments four and five. Previous resilience metrics limit
analysis of SoS resilience to a single threat event, require user inputs, or focus on
qualitative comparisons of system performance. Experiment one also describes an an-
alytic function (based on the logistic function) that can be used to generate notional
system performance data for evaluating potential resilience metrics. This function
enables more thorough comparisons of resilience assessment methods than those cur-
rently performed in the literature. By focusing on resilience, this methodology can
be coupled with more traditional performance-based analysis to provide a complete
understanding of how to design SoS networks.
The methodology also provides guidance for how to generate and analyze a con-
tinuous network design space using response surface methodology. Much of the work
on complex network resilience focuses on discretely defined combinations of static
networks and threat types. This thesis contributes to this area by considering several
network adaptation methods as a response to node removals and exploring the full
space of IE network designs, including intermediately defined networks, with design
of experiments and linear regression models.
Exploration of a continuous network design space is important because network
topologies and adaptation methods do not have to be designed as fully degree-based
(e.g., scale-free topologies) or fully random, just as threats will not always be purely
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targeted or random. Therefore, network designers must understand the resilience of
intermediately defined networks, and consider threats spanning the space between
fully targeted and random. Without such analysis, one may assume that interme-
diately defined networks are best for intermediately defined threats (e.g., partially
random networks provide the most resilience against partially targeted threats). In
other words, one may assume that network resilience can be interpolated from analysis
of the discrete design space.
However, optimization of the continuous network design space shows a sharp adap-
tation transition for time sensitive IE networks, where the optimally resilient adap-
tation method changes from fully random to fully degree-based as threat randomness
increases. This transition does not occur until threats become highly random for
time sensitive networks (i.e., fully random adaptation provides the most resilience
against threats with up to 72% randomness). This result suggests that partially ran-
dom adaptation should not be used; instead, fully random adaptation should be used
unless threats are anticipated to be completely random, at which point fully degree-
based adaptation should be used. In comparison, fully random topologies are found to
provide the most resilience against all threat types considered. These results suggest
that network designers should not consider intermediate network designs, and demon-
strate that simply interpolating discrete network results may lead to poor network
resilience.
The suggestion of fully random adaptation for targeted and partially random
threats particularly impacts C2 network designers because C2 systems are often de-
signed around hubs that control the overall C2 network. The presence of hubs in
military networks is evidenced by the scale-free nature of many C2 networks. These
results suggest that adaptive C2 networks should instead focus on degree homogene-
ity to achieve resilience, even for threats that contain some combination of targeting
and randomness.
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This thesis also addresses the relationship between resilient and robust design
methods through cost-benefit analysis of adaptive and highly dense C2 networks.
For network costs focusing on link creation and rewiring, results show that resilient
C2 networks are more cost-effective than robust C2 networks as long as the cost of
rewiring a link is less than three-fourths the cost of creating a link. This analysis
provides quantitative support for choosing one design approach over another. For
C2 systems with low rewiring costs (e.g., airborne networks that may only require a
re-direction of existing antennae), this analysis suggests one should design adaptive,
rather than dense C2 networks. However, for C2 networks with high rewiring costs
(e.g., ground-based communications requiring landlines), this analysis suggests the
design of dense C2 networks.
Future Work
There are limitations to this work, as well as many potential extensions, that if
addressed can further develop our understanding of network resilience. One limitation
is that the networks used are defined to be homogeneous with respect to individual
node properties or capabilities. As discussed in section 1.2, many SoS are actually
composed of heterogeneous systems, with varying capabilities and properties. Much
of the work on complex network resilience also focuses on homogeneous networks.
The inclusion of node heterogeneity to this work would advance research on network
resilience and improve its applicability to the SoS design process.
The IE network model used also assumes that nodes have global knowledge of
the network, i.e. nodes know the complete topology of the network at any given
time. Due to the large scale and geographic dispersion of many SoS, this assumption
may not always be accurate. Accounting for information locality constraints would
extend this research and provide a more thorough consideration of adaptive network
resilience.
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Additionally, this thesis focuses on single-layered networks. Many network re-
searchers have identified that networks are often characterized by interdependencies
between network layers; i.e., networks are often multi-layered, such that failures in
one layer affect the behaviors and processes occurring in another layer. Consider-
ing multi-layered networks and the interdependencies within them would extend the
consideration of network resilience provided by this thesis.
This work can also be combined with big data analytics to provide real-time health
monitoring and control of adaptive SoS networks and similar complex systems. There
is a growing amount of data available that can be used to monitor and characterize
the performance of modern systems. Classification of trends in this data, or perhaps
more importantly anomalies in the data, can be combined with surrogate modeling-
enabled decision support tools to identify potential responses and adaptive measures
to use in response to future threats. This data can feed into network simulations and
models to more accurately represent desired systems. In return, these simulations
and models can predict system behaviors in potentially catastrophic conditions.
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APPENDIX A
MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS
Using the notation defined in table 6, the main effect of factor A, eA, is calculated as
eA = ȳA+ − ȳA− (74)
=
y2 + y4 + y6 + y8
4





[y2 + y4 + y6 + y8 − y1 − y3 − y5 − y7] ,
where ȳA+ is the mean response for all design points where factor A is set to its “+”
level. The main effects of factors B, eB, and C, eC , are similarly calculated as
eB = ȳB+ − ȳB− (75)
=
y3 + y4 + y7 + y8
4





[y3 + y4 + y7 + y8 − y1 − y2 − y5 − y6] ,
eC = ȳC+ − ȳC− (76)
=
y5 + y6 + y7 + y8
4





[y5 + y6 + y7 + y8 − y1 − y2 − y3 − y4] .









(y4 − y3) + (y8 − y7)
2






[(y4 − y3 + y8 − y7)− (y2 − y1 + y6 − y5)] ,
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where ēA,B+ is the average effect of factor A with factor B at its “+” level and ēA,B−
is the average effect of factor A with factor B at its “−” level. The interaction effects
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Figure 85: Model fit checks for a fifth-order regression model of data with ∆ = 0.7.
Actual by predicted responses are shown in (a), residuals are shown in (b), a normal
probability plot for fit data in (c), and model error distributions in (d). Standard
deviations for model error distributions are σfit = 1.6 and σval. = 2.1. Maximum
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Figure 86: Model fit checks for a fifth-order regression model of data with ∆ = 0.8.
Actual by predicted responses are shown in (a), residuals are shown in (b), a normal
probability plot for fit data in (c), and model error distributions in (d). Standard
deviations for model error distributions are σfit = 1.4 and σval. = 1.8. Maximum
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Figure 87: Model fit checks for a fifth-order regression model of data with ∆ = 0.9.
Actual by predicted responses are shown in (a), residuals are shown in (b), a normal
probability plot for fit data in (c), and model error distributions in (d). Standard
deviations for model error distributions are σfit = 1.2 and σval. = 1.6. Maximum
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Figure 88: Model fit checks for a fifth-order regression model of data with ∆ = 1.
Actual by predicted responses are shown in (a), residuals are shown in (b), a normal
probability plot for fit data in (c), and model error distributions in (d). Standard
deviations for model error distributions are σfit = 1.5 and σval. = 1.7. Maximum




Awareness is calculated using Shannon’s information entropy as follows [39, 106]:
1. Discretize the battlespace into relevant features such as the ID, location, and
team of friendly and enemy forces. These features are referred to as state prop-
erties of the battlespace, where each agent is defined by those state properties.
Each state property is defined by a set of possible conditions or values. For
example, the team state property consists of three possible conditions: blue,
red, or white.
2. Model each state property as a random variable, X, with a discrete probability
distribution. State probability distributions are derived from the performance of
system functions (e.g., sensing, classification) corresponding to related mission
tasks.
3. Use information entropy to determine the amount of maximum uncertainty, U ,
based on the maximum number of possible conditions or outcomes:
U = H(X)max = logb(n). (81)
4. Use information entropy to determine the amount of uncertainty, H(X), repre-






5. Transform H(X) into a measure of awareness, A, using
A(t) = 1− H(X)
U
. (83)
Complete awareness of the battlespace means having absolute certainty of the
condition of each state property or battlespace feature.
6. Calculate total awareness for a group of n agents (e.g., n blue team agents)
considering m state properties (e.g., agent ID, location, team) as the mean
awareness of all state properties over all active agents within that group (i.e.,









7. Incorporate the awareness calculations into a warfare simulation.
8. Analyze awareness versus time results to determine the effectiveness of various
C2 networks.
Table 13 shows example awareness calculations for the team state property of
an un-identified agent, with three cases shown. The first case represents maximum
uncertainty, as the unidentified agent is estimated to be a friendly agent (blue), en-
emy agent (red), or neutral agent (white) with equal probability. Case 3 represents
the opposite situation, where the agent’s team is identified with complete certainty,
leading to an awareness value of one. Case 2 represents an intermediate situation,
where the agent’s team is believed to be red, but with some uncertainty. This type
of probability distribution results in an intermediate value of awareness.
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Table 13: Example entropy calculations for quantifying awareness of an agent’s team
(using a log base of 2)
Team Probability Distribution Awareness Calculation
Blue team Red team White team U (bits) H(X) (bits) A(t)
Case 1 (maximum
uncertainty)
0.33 0.33 0.33 1.59 1.59 0
Case 2 (interme-
diate uncertainty)
0 0.75 0.25 1.59 0.81 0.49
Case 3 (no uncer-
tainty)
0 1 0 1.59 0 1
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[100] Serrano, M. A. and Boguñá, M., “Percolation and Epidemic Thresholds
in Clustered Networks,” Physical Review Letters, vol. 97, p. 088701, Aug. 2006.
[101] Shenhar, A., “A new systems engineering taxonomy,” in Proceedings of the
4th International Symposium of the National Council on System Engineering,
National Council on System Engineering, 1994.
[102] Steinberg, D. M. and Hunter, W. G., “Experimental Design: review and
comment,” Technometrics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 71–97, 1984.
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